From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: DRBG - guard uninstantion by lock
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 19:09:53 +0200
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+ZxumagMiZTFwzX2e_tdd4U862BzgzHVDsiOACbMXEh_A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <001a114467482dbc4b05692df8f9@google.com> <2704286.80iLvC0rRL@tauon.chronox.de>
 <CACT4Y+bRmYMt3WuVHE7e624KgRUTXQWa36wn-pr_gm2STq80bQ@mail.gmail.com> <2186798.qrgUIDAn9S@positron.chronox.de>
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Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
        syzbot <syzbot+75397ee3df5c70164154@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: =?UTF-8?Q?Stephan_M=C3=BCller?= <smueller@chronox.de>
Return-path: <linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org>
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List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org

On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 4:26 PM, Stephan M=C3=BCller <smueller@chronox.de> =
wrote:
> Hi Dimitry,
>
> This fix prevents the kernel from crashing when injecting the fault.

Good!

> Stack traces are yet shown but I guess that is expected every time
> a fault is injected.

Yes, nothing to fix here.

> As to why KASAN did not notice this one, I am not sure. Maybe it is
> because I use two buffer pointers to point to (almost) the same memory
> (one that is aligned and one pointing to the complete buffer)?

After looking at the fix, I figured out what happened with KASAN.
Filed https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D199359. In short,
tricky interplay between kzfree, ksize and double-free detection.
If KASAN worked as intended it would give a nice "double-free in this
stack for object allocated in this stack and previously freed in this
stack", which would probably make debugging much simpler.


> ---8<---
>
> During freeing of the internal buffers used by the DRBG, set the pointer
> to NULL. It is possible that the context with the freed buffers is
> reused. In case of an error during initialization where the pointers
> do not yet point to allocated memory, the NULL value prevents a double
> free.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> Reported-by: syzbot+75397ee3df5c70164154@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> ---
>  crypto/drbg.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
> index 4faa2781c964..466a112a4446 100644
> --- a/crypto/drbg.c
> +++ b/crypto/drbg.c
> @@ -1134,8 +1134,10 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_=
state *drbg)
>         if (!drbg)
>                 return;
>         kzfree(drbg->Vbuf);
> +       drbg->Vbuf =3D NULL;
>         drbg->V =3D NULL;
>         kzfree(drbg->Cbuf);
> +       drbg->Cbuf =3D NULL;
>         drbg->C =3D NULL;
>         kzfree(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
>         drbg->scratchpadbuf =3D NULL;
> --
> 2.14.3
>
>
>
>
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