From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751737AbaLCJEe (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Dec 2014 04:04:34 -0500 Received: from mail-la0-f47.google.com ([209.85.215.47]:48689 "EHLO mail-la0-f47.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751148AbaLCJEZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Dec 2014 04:04:25 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Dmitry Vyukov Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:04:03 +0400 Message-ID: Subject: Out-of-bounds access in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax To: Andrew Morton , Nadia.Derbey@bull.net, aquini@redhat.com, davidlohr@hp.com, Joe Perches , manfred@colorfullife.com, avagin@openvz.org, LKML , Kostya Serebryany , Dmitry Chernenkov , Andrey Konovalov , Andrey Ryabinin , Konstantin Khlebnikov , kasan-dev Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, I am working on AddressSanitizer, a fast memory error detector for kernel: https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel Here is a bug report that I've got while running trinity: ================================================================== BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x8a0/0x9a0 at addr ffffffff83980960 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c14/6919 Out-of-bounds access to the global variable 'zero' [ffffffff83980960-ffffffff83980964) defined at ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:158 CPU: 1 PID: 6919 Comm: trinity-c14 Not tainted 3.18.0-rc1+ #50 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff8800b68cf418 ffffffff82c2d3ae 0000000000000000 ffff8800b68cf4c0 ffff8800b68cf4a8 ffffffff813eaa81 ffffffff0000000c ffff88010b003600 ffff8800b68cf479 0000000000000296 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x51/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:248 [] __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x8a0/0x9a0 kernel/sysctl.c:2284 [< inlined >] proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x50/0x80 do_proc_doulongvec_minmax kernel/sysctl.c:2322 [] proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x50/0x80 kernel/sysctl.c:2345 [] hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0x12a/0x3c0 mm/hugetlb.c:2270 [] hugetlb_mempolicy_sysctl_handler+0x1c/0x20 mm/hugetlb.c:2293 [] proc_sys_call_handler+0x179/0x1f0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:506 [] proc_sys_write+0xf/0x20 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:524 [] __kernel_write+0x123/0x440 fs/read_write.c:502 [] write_pipe_buf+0x14a/0x1d0 fs/splice.c:1074 [< inlined >] __splice_from_pipe+0x22e/0x6f0 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:769 [] __splice_from_pipe+0x22e/0x6f0 fs/splice.c:886 [] splice_from_pipe+0xc1/0x110 fs/splice.c:921 [] default_file_splice_write+0x18/0x50 fs/splice.c:1086 [< inlined >] direct_splice_actor+0x104/0x1c0 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:1128 [] direct_splice_actor+0x104/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1284 [] splice_direct_to_actor+0x24a/0x6f0 fs/splice.c:1237 [] do_splice_direct+0x154/0x270 fs/splice.c:1327 [] do_sendfile+0x5fb/0x1260 fs/read_write.c:1266 [< inlined >] SyS_sendfile64+0xfa/0x100 SYSC_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1327 [] SyS_sendfile64+0xfa/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1313 [] ia32_do_call+0x13/0x13 arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S:444 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff83980680: 04 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 02 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ffffffff83980700: 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ffffffff83980780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 00 00 00 00 ffffffff83980800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 04 f8 f8 f8 ffffffff83980880: f8 f8 f8 f8 04 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 04 f8 f8 f8 >ffffffff83980900: f8 f8 f8 f8 04 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 04 f8 f8 f8 ^ ffffffff83980980: f8 f8 f8 f8 00 00 00 00 f8 f8 f8 f8 00 00 00 00 ffffffff83980a00: 02 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff83980a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff83980b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff83980b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== The core creates ctl_table as: static int zero; static int one = 1; static int int_max = INT_MAX; static struct ctl_table ipc_kern_table[] = { { ... { .procname = "shm_rmid_forced", .data = &init_ipc_ns.shm_rmid_forced, .maxlen = sizeof(init_ipc_ns.shm_rmid_forced), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_ipc_dointvec_minmax_orphans, .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &one, }, But later extra1/2 are casted to *unsigned long**: static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table, int write, ... { ... min = (unsigned long *) table->extra1; max = (unsigned long *) table->extra2; This leads to bogus bounds check for the sysctl value. The bug is added in commit: commit 9eefe520c814f6f62c5d36a2ddcd3fb99dfdb30e Author: Nadia Derbey Date: Fri Jul 25 01:48:08 2008 -0700 Later zero and one were used in a bunch of other ctl_table's.