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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	syzbot <syzbot+85da7ac734f7ba432ee4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: WARNING in ext4_invalidatepage
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 13:16:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+b3rujNu+kJFaEmZzwOWSHuFYpYVJ4q3vvY62FtQ8+7xA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181016155341.GF8983@thunk.org>

On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 5:53 PM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>> > The patch I referenced in my previous e-mail protects against
>> > additional scenarios where someone might be trying to punch a whole
>> > into a file that is being swapped into the bootloader ioctl.  This
>> > particular ioctl isn't yet being used by anyone, so it had some other
>> > issues as well, such as not interacting well with inline_data-enabled
>> > file systems --- not that any bootloader would be small enough that it
>> > would fit in an inline_data inode, but we're basically proofing the
>> > code against a malicious (or buggy) root-privileged program... such as
>> > syzbot.  :-)
>>
>> ... or paving the way to opening all of this to non-root users. Why
>> not if not bugs? ;)
>
> The intent behind this particular ioctl is used to install a boot
> loader.  It will *never* be opened to non-root users.  It doesn't even
> make sense to make it available to pseudo-containers-root users.  :-)

But it does not have to be executed on the root fs, right? Or is it?
For example, if I need to build a bootable image (which I actually
need to do for syzkaller). In the end it boils down to just creating a
local, private file with some particular contents. Should be nobody's
business, right? But for some reason on Linux creation of a local file
requires root privileges multiple times along the way. As the result I
have run the whole service as root, degrading overall security. And I
can't say that I fully trust all code and data involved, but Linux
simply does not give me any choice.

      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-30 12:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-08 16:18 WARNING in ext4_invalidatepage syzbot
2018-10-08 16:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-10-09  1:34   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-10-15 13:22     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-10-15 18:08       ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-10-16 14:02         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-10-16 15:53           ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-10-30 12:09             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-10-30 12:16             ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]

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