All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
To: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>,
	Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>,
	Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@lagarcavilla.org>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v8 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop into common.
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 16:28:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAErYnsgt0unZtFPLWjKm0a0Ov7d3vr-s8ZonTVDWa_Ft2A_2bQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5421825E.1040607@bitdefender.com>


[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3083 bytes --]

On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 4:23 PM, Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
wrote:

> On 09/23/2014 05:13 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 4:07 PM, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com
> > <mailto:JBeulich@suse.com>> wrote:
> >
> >     >>> On 23.09.14 at 16:00, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com <mailto:
> rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
> >     > On 09/23/2014 04:32 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >     >>>>> On 23.09.14 at 15:14, <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de <mailto:
> tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>> wrote:
> >     >>> --- a/xen/common/mem_event.c
> >     >>> +++ b/xen/common/mem_event.c
> >     >>> @@ -623,12 +623,9 @@ int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d,
> >     >>> xen_domctl_mem_event_op_t *mec,
> >     >>>                                      HVM_PARAM_ACCESS_RING_PFN,
> >     >>>                                      mem_access_notification);
> >     >>>
> >     >>> -            if ( mec->op !=
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE &&
> >     >>> -                 rc == 0 &&
> hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception )
> >     >>> -            {
> >     >>> -                d->arch.hvm_domain.introspection_enabled = 1;
> >     >>> -                hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
> >     >>> -            }
> >     >>> +            if ( !rc && mec->op !=
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE )
> >     >>> +                p2m_enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
> >     >>
> >     >> The name is clearly not suitable for an abstraction - there's
> certainly
> >     >> not going to be MSRs on each and every CPU architecture. Maybe
> >     >> consult with Razvan on an agreeable more suitable name.
> >     >
> >     > P2m_set_up_introspection() perhaps? With the MSR HVM code where
> >     > applicable, nothing (or something else) where not? Would this be
> too
> >     > generic?
> >
> >     I'd be fine with that name provided the != above gets converted
> >     to a == XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE_INTROSPECTION.
> >
> >     Jan
> >
> >
> > My problem with this name is that introspection is really way too
> > generic of a term. You can certainly do all sorts of introspection
> > without having this feature or using this feature.. Ultimately its just
> > a name so if this becomes Xen's terminology to mean this particular
> > feature I'm fine with it but that's going to be confusing when other
> > people talk about 'introspection'.
>
> "Introspection" in general, yes, is a bit generic. However, the
> "MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS" part of
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE_INTROSPECTION, and the "p2m_" part
> of "p2m_set_up_introspection()" would, I think, narrow it down a bit more.
>
> But it is, of course, ultimately up to you (and the Xen maintainers). It
> was merely a suggestion.
>
>
> Regards,
> Razvan Cojocaru
>

Thanks, I guess we can keep that name for the function with a comment
saying this is used to enable additional arch-specific introspection
options, such as MSR interception on x86. Maybe there will be more in the
future which could be put in here beside what it is used for at the moment.

Tamas

[-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 4426 bytes --]

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-23 14:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-23 13:14 [PATCH for-4.5 v8 00/19] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 01/19] xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 02/19] xen: Relocate struct npfec definition " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 03/19] xen: Relocate p2m_access_t into common and swap the order Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 04/19] xen: Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to mem_access common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:28   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-23 14:04     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 14:08       ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-23 14:15         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 15:02           ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 05/19] xen: Relocate set_access_required domctl into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 14:18   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 15:05     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:32   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-23 14:00     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-23 14:07       ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-23 14:13         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 14:23           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-23 14:28             ` Tamas K Lengyel [this message]
2014-09-23 14:19         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-23 14:08       ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 07/19] x86/p2m: Typo fix for spelling ambiguous Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 08/19] xen/mem_event: Clean out superfluous white-spaces Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 09/19] xen/mem_event: Relax error condition on debug builds Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 10/19] xen/mem_event: Abstract architecture specific sanity checks Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 11/19] xen/mem_access: Abstract architecture specific sanity check Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 12/19] xen/arm: p2m changes for mem_access support Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 14:40   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-24 16:58     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 17:14       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-24 14:43   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 16:48     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 13/19] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 14/19] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 14:48   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 15/19] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:02   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-24 16:17     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:35   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 16:27     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 16:51       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 17:13         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 20:52           ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 21:24             ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 22:07               ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 16/19] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:05   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-24 17:04     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:41   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-24 17:08     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 17/19] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:08   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-24 15:42   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 18/19] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-23 13:14 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v8 19/19] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-24 15:12   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-24 16:05     ` Tamas K Lengyel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAErYnsgt0unZtFPLWjKm0a0Ov7d3vr-s8ZonTVDWa_Ft2A_2bQ@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=tamas.lengyel@zentific.com \
    --cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=andres@lagarcavilla.org \
    --cc=dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=ian.campbell@citrix.com \
    --cc=ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=julien.grall@linaro.org \
    --cc=rcojocaru@bitdefender.com \
    --cc=stefano.stabellini@citrix.com \
    --cc=tim@xen.org \
    --cc=tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.