>>> On 23.09.14 at 16:00, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> On 09/23/2014 04:32 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 23.09.14 at 15:14, <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de> wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/common/mem_event.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/mem_event.c
>>> @@ -623,12 +623,9 @@ int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d,
>>> xen_domctl_mem_event_op_t *mec,
>>> HVM_PARAM_ACCESS_RING_PFN,
>>> mem_access_notification);
>>>
>>> - if ( mec->op != XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE &&
>>> - rc == 0 && hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception )
>>> - {
>>> - d->arch.hvm_domain.introspection_enabled = 1;
>>> - hvm_funcs.enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
>>> - }
>>> + if ( !rc && mec->op != XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE )
>>> + p2m_enable_msr_exit_interception(d);
>>
>> The name is clearly not suitable for an abstraction - there's certainly
>> not going to be MSRs on each and every CPU architecture. Maybe
>> consult with Razvan on an agreeable more suitable name.
>
> P2m_set_up_introspection() perhaps? With the MSR HVM code where
> applicable, nothing (or something else) where not? Would this be too
> generic?
I'd be fine with that name provided the != above gets converted
to a == XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE_INTROSPECTION.
Jan