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From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>
Cc: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	gwendal@chromium.org, dianders@chromium.org,
	apronin@chromium.org, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
	rjw@rjwysocki.net, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	dlunev@google.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2023 15:04:55 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFftDdqUOiysgrAC4wPUXRaEWz4j9V6na3u4bm29AfxE8TAyXw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHSSk06sH6Ck11R7k8Pk_30KbzLzZVdBdj5MpsNfY-R_1kt_dA@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 2:43 PM Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 9:11 AM James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, 2022-11-11 at 15:16 -0800, Evan Green wrote:
> > > Introduce a new Kconfig, TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR, which if enabled
> > > restricts usermode's ability to extend or reset PCR 23.
> >
> > Could I re ask the question here that I asked of Matthew's patch set:
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/b0c4980c8fad14115daa3040979c52f07f7fbe2c.camel@linux.ibm.com/
> >
> > Which was could we use an NVRAM index in the TPM instead of a PCR?  The
> > reason for asking was that PCRs are rather precious and might get more
> > so now that Lennart has some grand scheme for using more of them in his
> > unified boot project.  Matthew promised to play with the idea but never
> > got back to the patch set to say whether he investigated this or not.
>
> Is there any way to get key creation data to include NV indexes?

Not that I am aware of and the spec seems to be a no.

> If not, no, we can't use NVRAM.

What's the use case of using the creation data and ticket in this
context? Who gets the
creationData and the ticket?
Could a user supplied outsideInfo work? IIRC I saw some patches flying around
where the sessions will get encrypted and presumably correctly as well. This
would allow the transfer of that outsideInfo, like the NV Index PCR value to
be included and integrity protected by the session HMAC.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-03 21:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-11 23:16 [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:31   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-27 16:06   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:07     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:46   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14 17:11   ` James Bottomley
2022-11-27 16:33     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:41       ` James Bottomley
2022-11-30 20:22         ` Dr. Greg
2022-11-30 21:34           ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-02  1:10             ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-03 20:42     ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-03 21:04       ` William Roberts [this message]
2023-01-03 21:10         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-14 14:55           ` James Bottomley
2023-01-14 15:11             ` William Roberts
2023-01-15  3:05             ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-15 14:41               ` William Roberts
2023-01-17 21:26               ` James Bottomley
2023-01-21  3:29             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-23 17:48               ` William Roberts
2023-01-24 11:51                 ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-24 12:38                 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-24 15:05                   ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 17:21                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:32                     ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 21:30                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 22:01                         ` William Roberts
2023-02-07 23:20                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:07                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:12                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:20                     ` William Roberts
2023-01-10 16:07       ` William Roberts
2022-11-27 16:29   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-13 21:20   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14  3:32     ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 16:32       ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 16:56         ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 17:43           ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 18:00             ` James Bottomley
2022-12-02 21:03               ` James Bottomley
2022-12-05 18:43                 ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:01   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:13   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:55   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:33   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:44   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:47   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:51   ` Eric Biggers
2022-12-07 23:54 ` [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green

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