From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3226C43381 for ; Thu, 28 Mar 2019 08:01:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 720BD21773 for ; Thu, 28 Mar 2019 08:01:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726491AbfC1IB5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Mar 2019 04:01:57 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-f65.google.com ([209.85.210.65]:42462 "EHLO mail-ot1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725815AbfC1IB4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Mar 2019 04:01:56 -0400 Received: by mail-ot1-f65.google.com with SMTP id 103so17455137otd.9 for ; Thu, 28 Mar 2019 01:01:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=k+XP/msPMDDWMCufBD0fyJKy9ImxuB36vWQ+fBMq17A=; b=onp3IiVEuoAygoXiZJvZi7fWpeASFlSLHGJ7TwuOEXUc8II6FXdRT7/O9U5L/UaTEH XqCxrb2J0aP22Hac1qJdi/llM36Cvu5h75Qz9M9uMk1NnIvXID787/xsc2X51nxdvNXj he8KyH9JFtWSeVqjIZGbkSzyFuEOOm9UDHEDbtH4F/7VXeMGWzRD2kNzIrhMLjxfmW8M UsRRLpgwT4Hl0M8/ssquC+OET6QnZYbQolWdiXPxlESZJL667Y0rJXud/caP0nNlRMNy bC1oLIyZjMhKKJaGmijWUO4bvMMVQ61H4PbGdE/SvZM0UU7pJw+o85uB5KwPKC1y6sp6 AJnA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVDDZFwOOXu08fO2bFJrbQSipwpw1Ebi62QmxaRCmQcz82sKxei If1US+9YPwsXDeAZzb5eSCGtVrpRMcldlcrXM6F2Eg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyJj/GyXevuZQZifrRH/0rzp8n5Ac9tuOqdxyxyAhBedgKuwbLPza02IGf4bVHkSBO0gbiKnSS2mOJkw+N6Xao= X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6e17:: with SMTP id e23mr17357515otr.65.1553760115607; Thu, 28 Mar 2019 01:01:55 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <27473c84a274c64871cfa8e3636deaf05603c978.1552665316.git.rgb@redhat.com> <20190328011202.6raixwzdimn5b4zk@madcap2.tricolour.ca> In-Reply-To: <20190328011202.6raixwzdimn5b4zk@madcap2.tricolour.ca> From: Ondrej Mosnacek Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 09:01:44 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V5 09/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: nhorman@tuxdriver.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, LKML , David Howells , Linux-Audit Mailing List , netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W . Biederman" , Simo Sorce , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris , "Serge E. Hallyn" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 2:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2019-03-27 23:42, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:35 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task > > > context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing > > > rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network > > > namespace could be in use by multiple containers by association to the > > > tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute > > > these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network > > > namespace to track these audit container identifiiers. > > > > > > Add/increment the audit container identifier on: > > > - initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc > > > - clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > - unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > - setns call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on: > > > - an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set > > > - process exit > > > - unshare call that drops a net namespace > > > - setns call that drops a net namespace > > > > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > > > --- > > > include/linux/audit.h | 19 ++++++++++++ > > > kernel/audit.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > > kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ > > > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > > index fa19fa408931..70255c2dfb9f 100644 > > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include /* LOOKUP_* */ > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) > > > #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) > > > @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ struct audit_task_info { > > > > > > extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit; > > > > > > +struct audit_contid { > > > + struct list_head list; > > > + u64 id; > > > + refcount_t refcount; > > > > Hm, since we only ever touch the refcount under a spinlock, I wonder > > if we could just make it a regular unsigned int (we don't need the > > atomicity guarantees). OTOH, refcount_t comes with some extra overflow > > checking, so it's probably better to leave it as is... > > Since the update is done using rcu-safe methods, do we even need the > spin_lock? Neil? Paul? > > > > + struct rcu_head rcu; > > > +}; > > > + > > > extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which); > > > > > > extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list); > > > @@ -202,6 +210,10 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > } > > > > > > extern void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > > > + struct task_struct *p); > > > > > > extern u32 audit_enabled; > > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > > @@ -271,6 +283,13 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > > > > static inline void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid) > > > { } > > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ } > > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ } > > > +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > > > + struct task_struct *p) > > > +{ } > > > > > > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF > > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > > index cf448599ef34..7fa3194f5342 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > > @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #include "audit.h" > > > > > > @@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ > > > /** > > > * struct audit_net - audit private network namespace data > > > * @sk: communication socket > > > + * @contid_list: audit container identifier list > > > + * @contid_list_lock audit container identifier list lock > > > */ > > > struct audit_net { > > > struct sock *sk; > > > + struct list_head contid_list; > > > + spinlock_t contid_list_lock; > > > }; > > > > > > /** > > > @@ -275,8 +280,11 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > > > void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > { > > > struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit; > > > + struct nsproxy *ns = tsk->nsproxy; > > > > > > audit_free_syscall(tsk); > > > + if (ns) > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, audit_get_contid(tsk)); > > > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after > > > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. > > > */ > > > @@ -376,6 +384,73 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) > > > return aunet->sk; > > > } > > > > > > +void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ > > > + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > + struct list_head *contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > > > + struct audit_contid *cont; > > > + > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + if (!aunet) > > > + return; > > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > > > + if (cont->id == contid) { > > > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + cont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_contid), GFP_ATOMIC); > > > + if (cont) { > > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cont->list); > > > + cont->id = contid; > > > + refcount_set(&cont->refcount, 1); > > > + list_add_rcu(&cont->list, contid_list); > > > + } > > > +out: > > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > +} > > > + > > > +void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ > > > + struct audit_net *aunet; > > > + struct list_head *contid_list; > > > + struct audit_contid *cont = NULL; > > > + > > > + if (!net) > > > + return; > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > + if (!aunet) > > > + return; > > > + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > > > + if (cont->id == contid) { > > > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { > > > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); > > > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); > > > + } > > > + break; > > > + } > > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > +} > > > + > > > +void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) > > > +{ > > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(p); > > > + struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; > > > + > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, contid); > > > + if (new) > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); > > > +} > > > + > > > void audit_panic(const char *message) > > > { > > > switch (audit_failure) { > > > @@ -1619,7 +1694,6 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > > > .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, > > > .groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX, > > > }; > > > - > > > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > > > > aunet->sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_AUDIT, &cfg); > > > @@ -1628,7 +1702,8 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > > > return -ENOMEM; > > > } > > > aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; > > > - > > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aunet->contid_list); > > > + spin_lock_init(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > return 0; > > > } > > > > > > @@ -2380,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > uid_t uid; > > > struct tty_struct *tty; > > > char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > > > + struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns; > > > > > > task_lock(task); > > > /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > > > @@ -2401,8 +2477,12 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > > > rc = -EALREADY; > > > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > > > - if (!rc) > > > + if (!rc) { > > > + if (audit_contid_valid(oldcontid)) > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(net, oldcontid); > > > task->audit->contid = contid; > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(net, contid); > > > + } > > > task_unlock(task); > > > > > > if (!audit_enabled) > > > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > index f6c5d330059a..718b1201ae70 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep; > > > > > > @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > > > struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy; > > > struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns); > > > struct nsproxy *new_ns; > > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(tsk); > > > > > > if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | > > > CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET | > > > @@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > > > return PTR_ERR(new_ns); > > > > > > tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new_ns->net_ns, contid); > > > return 0; > > > } > > > > > > @@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) > > > ns = p->nsproxy; > > > p->nsproxy = new; > > > task_unlock(p); > > > + audit_switch_task_namespaces(ns, p); > > > > Since we call audit_switch_task_namespaces() after task_unlock(), > > could there be a potential race condition? I'm not going to dive too > > much into this now, because it's getting late here, but on first look > > it seems like p->nsproxy could change under our hands before we fetch > > it in audit_switch_task_namespaces()... > > The rules are defined in include/linux/nsproxy.h. > > Since the callers (sys_setns, do_exit, copy_process error path) are all > current or handing it a dead task and we are not writing nsproxy or its > pointers, which is only allowed by current anyway, we don't need the > lock. I see, so the task lock is taken during the swap only to protect against races with other tasks reading this task's nsproxy... makes sense. Thanks for clarifying! The refcount/spinlock issue is not blocking (and could be addressed in a follow-up patch later), so: Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek > > > > > > > if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count)) > > > free_nsproxy(ns); > > > -- > > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > Ondrej Mosnacek > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- Ondrej Mosnacek Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V5 09/10] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 09:01:44 +0100 Message-ID: References: <27473c84a274c64871cfa8e3636deaf05603c978.1552665316.git.rgb@redhat.com> <20190328011202.6raixwzdimn5b4zk@madcap2.tricolour.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20190328011202.6raixwzdimn5b4zk@madcap2.tricolour.ca> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: nhorman@tuxdriver.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, LKML , David Howells , Linux-Audit Mailing List , netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W . Biederman" , Simo Sorce , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris , "Serge E. Hallyn" List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 2:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2019-03-27 23:42, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:35 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task > > > context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing > > > rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network > > > namespace could be in use by multiple containers by association to the > > > tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute > > > these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network > > > namespace to track these audit container identifiiers. > > > > > > Add/increment the audit container identifier on: > > > - initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc > > > - clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > - unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > - setns call that inherits an audit container identifier > > > Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on: > > > - an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set > > > - process exit > > > - unshare call that drops a net namespace > > > - setns call that drops a net namespace > > > > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > > > --- > > > include/linux/audit.h | 19 ++++++++++++ > > > kernel/audit.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > > kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ > > > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > > index fa19fa408931..70255c2dfb9f 100644 > > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include /* LOOKUP_* */ > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) > > > #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) > > > @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ struct audit_task_info { > > > > > > extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit; > > > > > > +struct audit_contid { > > > + struct list_head list; > > > + u64 id; > > > + refcount_t refcount; > > > > Hm, since we only ever touch the refcount under a spinlock, I wonder > > if we could just make it a regular unsigned int (we don't need the > > atomicity guarantees). OTOH, refcount_t comes with some extra overflow > > checking, so it's probably better to leave it as is... > > Since the update is done using rcu-safe methods, do we even need the > spin_lock? Neil? Paul? > > > > + struct rcu_head rcu; > > > +}; > > > + > > > extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which); > > > > > > extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list); > > > @@ -202,6 +210,10 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > } > > > > > > extern void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid); > > > +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > > > + struct task_struct *p); > > > > > > extern u32 audit_enabled; > > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > > @@ -271,6 +283,13 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > > > > static inline void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid) > > > { } > > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ } > > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ } > > > +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > > > + struct task_struct *p) > > > +{ } > > > > > > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF > > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > > index cf448599ef34..7fa3194f5342 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > > @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #include "audit.h" > > > > > > @@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ > > > /** > > > * struct audit_net - audit private network namespace data > > > * @sk: communication socket > > > + * @contid_list: audit container identifier list > > > + * @contid_list_lock audit container identifier list lock > > > */ > > > struct audit_net { > > > struct sock *sk; > > > + struct list_head contid_list; > > > + spinlock_t contid_list_lock; > > > }; > > > > > > /** > > > @@ -275,8 +280,11 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > > > void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > { > > > struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit; > > > + struct nsproxy *ns = tsk->nsproxy; > > > > > > audit_free_syscall(tsk); > > > + if (ns) > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, audit_get_contid(tsk)); > > > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after > > > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. > > > */ > > > @@ -376,6 +384,73 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) > > > return aunet->sk; > > > } > > > > > > +void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ > > > + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > + struct list_head *contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > > > + struct audit_contid *cont; > > > + > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + if (!aunet) > > > + return; > > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > > > + if (cont->id == contid) { > > > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + cont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_contid), GFP_ATOMIC); > > > + if (cont) { > > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cont->list); > > > + cont->id = contid; > > > + refcount_set(&cont->refcount, 1); > > > + list_add_rcu(&cont->list, contid_list); > > > + } > > > +out: > > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > +} > > > + > > > +void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > > > +{ > > > + struct audit_net *aunet; > > > + struct list_head *contid_list; > > > + struct audit_contid *cont = NULL; > > > + > > > + if (!net) > > > + return; > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > + if (!aunet) > > > + return; > > > + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > > > + if (cont->id == contid) { > > > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { > > > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); > > > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); > > > + } > > > + break; > > > + } > > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > +} > > > + > > > +void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) > > > +{ > > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(p); > > > + struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; > > > + > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > + return; > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, contid); > > > + if (new) > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); > > > +} > > > + > > > void audit_panic(const char *message) > > > { > > > switch (audit_failure) { > > > @@ -1619,7 +1694,6 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > > > .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, > > > .groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX, > > > }; > > > - > > > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > > > > > aunet->sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_AUDIT, &cfg); > > > @@ -1628,7 +1702,8 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > > > return -ENOMEM; > > > } > > > aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; > > > - > > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aunet->contid_list); > > > + spin_lock_init(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > > > return 0; > > > } > > > > > > @@ -2380,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > uid_t uid; > > > struct tty_struct *tty; > > > char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > > > + struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns; > > > > > > task_lock(task); > > > /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > > > @@ -2401,8 +2477,12 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > > > rc = -EALREADY; > > > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > > > - if (!rc) > > > + if (!rc) { > > > + if (audit_contid_valid(oldcontid)) > > > + audit_netns_contid_del(net, oldcontid); > > > task->audit->contid = contid; > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(net, contid); > > > + } > > > task_unlock(task); > > > > > > if (!audit_enabled) > > > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > index f6c5d330059a..718b1201ae70 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep; > > > > > > @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > > > struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy; > > > struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns); > > > struct nsproxy *new_ns; > > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(tsk); > > > > > > if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | > > > CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET | > > > @@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > > > return PTR_ERR(new_ns); > > > > > > tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; > > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new_ns->net_ns, contid); > > > return 0; > > > } > > > > > > @@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) > > > ns = p->nsproxy; > > > p->nsproxy = new; > > > task_unlock(p); > > > + audit_switch_task_namespaces(ns, p); > > > > Since we call audit_switch_task_namespaces() after task_unlock(), > > could there be a potential race condition? I'm not going to dive too > > much into this now, because it's getting late here, but on first look > > it seems like p->nsproxy could change under our hands before we fetch > > it in audit_switch_task_namespaces()... > > The rules are defined in include/linux/nsproxy.h. > > Since the callers (sys_setns, do_exit, copy_process error path) are all > current or handing it a dead task and we are not writing nsproxy or its > pointers, which is only allowed by current anyway, we don't need the > lock. I see, so the task lock is taken during the swap only to protect against races with other tasks reading this task's nsproxy... makes sense. Thanks for clarifying! The refcount/spinlock issue is not blocking (and could be addressed in a follow-up patch later), so: Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek > > > > > > > if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count)) > > > free_nsproxy(ns); > > > -- > > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > Ondrej Mosnacek > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635