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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	jakub.kicinski@netronome.com,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: stable backport for the BPF speculation series? [was: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation]
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 18:12:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1Cm4EP9UwDyZRfW5q+CEyQDzd0RMCk4GwfcrsUFQuVJg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190123170454.GC30381@kroah.com>

On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 6:04 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 03:36:54PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 1:08 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> > <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 03, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> > > > This set fixes an out of bounds case under speculative execution
> > > > by implementing masking of pointer alu into the verifier. For
> > > > details please see the individual patches.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks!
> > > >
> > > > v2 -> v3:
> > > >   - 8/9: change states_equal condition into old->speculative &&
> > > >     !cur->speculative, thanks Jakub!
> > > >   - 8/9: remove incorrect speculative state test in
> > > >     propagate_liveness(), thanks Jakub!
> > > > v1 -> v2:
> > > >   - Typo fixes in commit msg and a comment, thanks David!
> > >
> > > Applied, Thanks
> >
> > This series and the followup fix ("bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with
> > pointer / scalar type from different paths") have been in Linus' tree
> > for six days, but from what I can tell, they aren't queued up for
> > stable yet.
>
> What are the git commit ids of the patches you think should be
> backported?

Daniel Borkmann said at
https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=154820859831443&w=2 :

| Will get this to stable towards end of week. We wanted to let this sit
| for a while in Linus' tree given the complexity of the fix to get some
| more coverage. We also need 9d5564ddcf2a ("bpf: fix inner map masking
|to prevent oob under speculation") in addition.

, so I expect that he's going to submit a request for stable inclusion
in the next few days. The git commits are:

c08435ec7f2bc8f4109401f696fd55159b4b40cb
144cd91c4c2bced6eb8a7e25e590f6618a11e854
9b73bfdd08e73231d6a90ae6db4b46b3fbf56c30
0d6303db7970e6f56ae700fa07e11eb510cda125
e4298d25830a866cc0f427d4bccb858e76715859
9d7eceede769f90b66cfa06ad5b357140d5141ed
b7137c4eab85c1cf3d46acdde90ce1163b28c873
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38
d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda
9d5564ddcf2a0f5ba3fa1c3a1f8a1b59ad309553

  reply	other threads:[~2019-01-23 17:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-02 23:58 [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 1/9] bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/9] bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 3/9] bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 4/9] bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 5/9] bpf: restrict stack " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 6/9] bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 7/9] bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 8/9] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-03 21:13   ` Jann Horn
2019-01-03 23:22     ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 9/9] bpf: add various test cases to selftests Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-03  0:08 ` [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation Alexei Starovoitov
2019-01-22 14:36   ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? [was: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation] Jann Horn
2019-01-22 16:44     ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? David Miller
2019-01-23  1:55       ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-23 17:04     ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? [was: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation] Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-23 17:12       ` Jann Horn [this message]
2019-01-24 11:53         ` Daniel Borkmann

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