From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 14:57:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJN4Z8RiweDjRTpEbhVsb=js0N2-w1Xy12o6nrkZE9gwA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181031210245.GA3537@mail.hallyn.com>
On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 2:02 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> Just to be sure - your end-goal is to have a set of tasks which have
> some privileges, including CAP_SETUID, but which cannot transition to
> certain uids, perhaps including root?
AIUI, the issue is that CAP_SETUID is TOO permissive. Instead, run
_without_ CAP_SETUID and still allow whitelisted uid transitions.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-31 21:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-31 15:28 [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-10-31 21:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 21:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-31 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 1:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 15:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:18 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:11 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:22 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:41 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 19:52 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 16:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 17:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 18:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 18:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-02 19:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 19:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-08 20:53 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-08 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-09 0:30 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-09 23:21 ` [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-11-21 16:54 ` [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-12-06 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2018-12-06 17:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-11 17:13 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-15 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c mortonm
2019-01-15 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2019-01-15 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 21:50 ` [PATCH v4 " mortonm
2019-01-15 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 15:46 ` [PATCH v5 " mortonm
2019-01-16 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-22 20:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:28 ` James Morris
2019-01-22 22:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:42 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] " mortonm
2019-01-25 15:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-25 20:15 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] " James Morris
2019-01-25 21:06 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:47 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-28 20:09 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 20:19 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 20:30 ` [PATCH] LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM mortonm
2019-01-28 22:12 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 22:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-29 17:25 ` James Morris
2019-01-29 21:14 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-30 7:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-06 19:03 ` [PATCH] LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest mortonm
2019-02-06 19:26 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-07 21:54 ` Micah Morton
2019-02-12 19:01 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 21:58 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 4:07 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 19:42 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 19:28 ` [PATCH] " Micah Morton
2018-11-06 19:09 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2018-11-06 20:59 ` [PATCH] " James Morris
2018-11-06 21:21 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2018-11-02 18:07 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2018-11-02 19:13 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-19 18:54 ` [PATCH] [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-12-13 22:29 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-13 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-14 0:05 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-18 22:37 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-07 17:55 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 18:36 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 19:02 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 22:57 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2019-01-07 23:13 ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v4] " mortonm
2019-01-08 0:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 18:39 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-10 22:31 ` James Morris
2019-01-10 23:03 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
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