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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for random address requests
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 12:47:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJVM=LXA10z06zVcFDSbf8s72HcOPRc_nUeuU7W=-3JWg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160731205632.GY4541@io.lakedaemon.net>

On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 09:46:53AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 8:42 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
>> > To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
>> > check for a zero return value.  For the current callers, the only way
>> > to get zero returned is if end <= start.  Since they are all adding a
>> > constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
>> >
>> > We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do
>> > just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start +
>> > range).
>> >
>> > While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.  No current call
>> > site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
>> > requests are < UINT_MAX.  However, we should match caller expectations
>> > to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
>> >
>> > All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address
>> > if randomize_range() failed.  Therefore, we simplify things by just
>> > returning the start address on error.
>> >
>> > randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
>> > over to randomize_addr().
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
>> > ---
>> > Changes from v1:
>> >  - Explicitly mention page_aligned start assumption (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - pick random pages vice random addresses (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - catch range=0 last
>> >
>> >  drivers/char/random.c  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> >  include/linux/random.h |  1 +
>> >  2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > index 0158d3bff7e5..3bedf69546d6 100644
>> > --- a/drivers/char/random.c
>> > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > @@ -1840,6 +1840,34 @@ randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
>> >         return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
>> >  }
>> >
>> > +/**
>> > + * randomize_addr - Generate a random, page aligned address
>> > + * @start:     The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
>> > + * @range:     The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
>> > + *             random address must fall.
>> > + *
>> > + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
>> > + *
>> > + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
>> > + * @start was already page aligned.  This assumption still holds.
>> > + *
>> > + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
>> > + * @start is returned.
>> > + */
>> > +unsigned long
>> > +randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
>>
>> Since we're changing other things about this, let's try to document
>> its behavior in its name too and call this "randomize_page" instead.
>
> Ack.  Definitely more accurate.
>
>> If it requires a page-aligned value, we should probably also BUG_ON
>> it, or adjust the start too.
>
> merf.  So, this whole series started from a suggested cleanup by William
> to s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.
>
> The current users have all been stable the way they are for a long time.
> Like pre-git long.  So, if this is just a cleanup for those callers, I
> don't think we need to do more than we already are.
>
> However, if the intent is for this function to see wider use, then by
> all means, we need to handle start != PAGE_ALIGN(start).
>
> Do you have any new call sites in mind?

I have no new call sites in mind, but it seems safe to add a BUG_ON to
verify we don't gain callers that don't follow the correct
expectations. (Or maybe WARN and return start.)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for random address requests
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 12:47:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJVM=LXA10z06zVcFDSbf8s72HcOPRc_nUeuU7W=-3JWg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160731205632.GY4541@io.lakedaemon.net>

On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 09:46:53AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 8:42 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
>> > To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
>> > check for a zero return value.  For the current callers, the only way
>> > to get zero returned is if end <= start.  Since they are all adding a
>> > constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
>> >
>> > We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do
>> > just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start +
>> > range).
>> >
>> > While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.  No current call
>> > site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
>> > requests are < UINT_MAX.  However, we should match caller expectations
>> > to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
>> >
>> > All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address
>> > if randomize_range() failed.  Therefore, we simplify things by just
>> > returning the start address on error.
>> >
>> > randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
>> > over to randomize_addr().
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
>> > ---
>> > Changes from v1:
>> >  - Explicitly mention page_aligned start assumption (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - pick random pages vice random addresses (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - catch range=0 last
>> >
>> >  drivers/char/random.c  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> >  include/linux/random.h |  1 +
>> >  2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > index 0158d3bff7e5..3bedf69546d6 100644
>> > --- a/drivers/char/random.c
>> > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > @@ -1840,6 +1840,34 @@ randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
>> >         return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
>> >  }
>> >
>> > +/**
>> > + * randomize_addr - Generate a random, page aligned address
>> > + * @start:     The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
>> > + * @range:     The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
>> > + *             random address must fall.
>> > + *
>> > + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
>> > + *
>> > + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
>> > + * @start was already page aligned.  This assumption still holds.
>> > + *
>> > + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
>> > + * @start is returned.
>> > + */
>> > +unsigned long
>> > +randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
>>
>> Since we're changing other things about this, let's try to document
>> its behavior in its name too and call this "randomize_page" instead.
>
> Ack.  Definitely more accurate.
>
>> If it requires a page-aligned value, we should probably also BUG_ON
>> it, or adjust the start too.
>
> merf.  So, this whole series started from a suggested cleanup by William
> to s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.
>
> The current users have all been stable the way they are for a long time.
> Like pre-git long.  So, if this is just a cleanup for those callers, I
> don't think we need to do more than we already are.
>
> However, if the intent is for this function to see wider use, then by
> all means, we need to handle start != PAGE_ALIGN(start).
>
> Do you have any new call sites in mind?

I have no new call sites in mind, but it seems safe to add a BUG_ON to
verify we don't gain callers that don't follow the correct
expectations. (Or maybe WARN and return start.)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for random address requests
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 12:47:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJVM=LXA10z06zVcFDSbf8s72HcOPRc_nUeuU7W=-3JWg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160731205632.GY4541@io.lakedaemon.net>

On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 09:46:53AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 8:42 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> wrote:
>> > To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
>> > check for a zero return value.  For the current callers, the only way
>> > to get zero returned is if end <= start.  Since they are all adding a
>> > constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
>> >
>> > We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do
>> > just what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start +
>> > range).
>> >
>> > While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.  No current call
>> > site is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
>> > requests are < UINT_MAX.  However, we should match caller expectations
>> > to avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
>> >
>> > All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address
>> > if randomize_range() failed.  Therefore, we simplify things by just
>> > returning the start address on error.
>> >
>> > randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
>> > over to randomize_addr().
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
>> > ---
>> > Changes from v1:
>> >  - Explicitly mention page_aligned start assumption (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - pick random pages vice random addresses (Yann Droneaud)
>> >  - catch range=0 last
>> >
>> >  drivers/char/random.c  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> >  include/linux/random.h |  1 +
>> >  2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > index 0158d3bff7e5..3bedf69546d6 100644
>> > --- a/drivers/char/random.c
>> > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
>> > @@ -1840,6 +1840,34 @@ randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
>> >         return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
>> >  }
>> >
>> > +/**
>> > + * randomize_addr - Generate a random, page aligned address
>> > + * @start:     The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
>> > + * @range:     The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
>> > + *             random address must fall.
>> > + *
>> > + * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
>> > + *
>> > + * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
>> > + * @start was already page aligned.  This assumption still holds.
>> > + *
>> > + * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
>> > + * @start is returned.
>> > + */
>> > +unsigned long
>> > +randomize_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
>>
>> Since we're changing other things about this, let's try to document
>> its behavior in its name too and call this "randomize_page" instead.
>
> Ack.  Definitely more accurate.
>
>> If it requires a page-aligned value, we should probably also BUG_ON
>> it, or adjust the start too.
>
> merf.  So, this whole series started from a suggested cleanup by William
> to s/get_random_int/get_random_long/.
>
> The current users have all been stable the way they are for a long time.
> Like pre-git long.  So, if this is just a cleanup for those callers, I
> don't think we need to do more than we already are.
>
> However, if the intent is for this function to see wider use, then by
> all means, we need to handle start != PAGE_ALIGN(start).
>
> Do you have any new call sites in mind?

I have no new call sites in mind, but it seems safe to add a BUG_ON to
verify we don't gain callers that don't follow the correct
expectations. (Or maybe WARN and return start.)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-01 19:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-28 20:47 [PATCH 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-29  8:59   ` Yann Droneaud
2016-07-29  8:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Yann Droneaud
2016-07-29  8:59     ` Yann Droneaud
2016-07-29 18:20     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 18:20       ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 18:20       ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 13:48   ` Will Deacon
2016-07-29 13:48     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-07-29 13:48     ` Will Deacon
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47 ` [PATCH 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 20:47   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-31 16:46     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-31 16:46       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-31 16:46       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-31 20:56       ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-31 20:56         ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-31 20:56         ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-01 19:47         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-08-01 19:47           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-08-01 19:47           ` Kees Cook
2016-08-01 23:17           ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-01 23:17             ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-01 23:17             ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-02  3:35             ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-08-02  3:35               ` Michael Ellerman
2016-08-02  3:35               ` Michael Ellerman
2016-08-03 18:42               ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 18:42                 ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 18:42                 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42   ` [PATCH v2 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-30 15:42     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 1/7] random: Simplify API for " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-04 12:47     ` Yann Droneaud
2016-08-04 12:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Yann Droneaud
2016-08-04 12:47       ` Yann Droneaud
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86: Use simpler " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 3/7] ARM: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 5/7] tile: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 6/7] unicore32: " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39   ` [PATCH v3 7/7] random: Remove unused randomize_range() Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:39     ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-03 23:48     ` Andrew Morton
2016-08-03 23:48       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2016-08-03 23:48       ` Andrew Morton
2016-08-04  0:19       ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-04  0:19         ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-08-04  0:19         ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-04  2:41   ` [PATCH v3 0/7] char/random: Simplify random address requests Kees Cook
2016-08-04  2:41     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-08-04  2:41     ` Kees Cook

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