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[209.85.161.47]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d21-v6sm1246679ywb.16.2018.09.12.15.57.23 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-f47.google.com with SMTP id m62-v6so397776ywd.6 for ; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a81:4e01:: with SMTP id c1-v6mr2197422ywb.237.1536793043085; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:a25:5f04:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:22 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:22 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs To: Casey Schaufler Cc: LSM , James Morris , LKLM , SE Linux , John Johansen , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , Alexey Dobriyan , "Schaufler, Casey" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious > mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. > The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate > the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar > interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did > likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the > security "context" of the process, but it will be different > depending on the security module you're using. > > This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for > Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in > this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting > SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the > old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case > may be) as before. > > The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on > the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. > > The original implementation is by Kees Cook. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 13 +++-- > fs/proc/base.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > fs/proc/internal.h | 1 + > include/linux/security.h | 15 ++++-- > security/security.c | 24 ++++++++-- > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > index c980dfe9abf1..9842e21afd4a 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > @@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide > specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available > in the core functionality of Linux itself. > > -Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the > -Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities > -system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks. > +The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be > +followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module. > For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux > man-pages project. > > @@ -30,6 +29,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always > be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then > the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured. > > +Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should > +be accessed and maintained using the special files in ``/proc/.../attr``. > +A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there, > +named after the module. ``/proc/.../attr/smack`` is provided by the Smack > +security module and contains all its special files. The files directly > +in ``/proc/.../attr`` remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide > +subdirectories. > + > .. toctree:: > :maxdepth: 1 > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index ccf86f16d9f0..bd2dd85310fe 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -140,9 +140,13 @@ struct pid_entry { > #define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \ > NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {}) > #define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \ > - NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \ > { .proc_show = show } ) > +#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \ > + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > + NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \ > + { .lsm = LSM }) > > /* > * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the . > @@ -2503,7 +2507,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, > if (!task) > return -ESRCH; > > - length = security_getprocattr(task, > + length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, > (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, > &p); > put_task_struct(task); > @@ -2552,7 +2556,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, > if (rv < 0) > goto out_free; > > - rv = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); > + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, > + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, > + count); > mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); > out_free: > kfree(page); > @@ -2566,13 +2572,53 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { > .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > }; > > +#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ > +static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \ > + struct dir_context *ctx) \ > +{ \ > + return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \ > + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ > + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ > +} \ > +\ > +static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \ > + .read = generic_read_dir, \ > + .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \ > + .llseek = default_llseek, \ > +}; \ > +\ > +static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \ > + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \ > +{ \ > + return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \ > + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ > + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ > +} \ > +\ > +static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \ > + .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \ > + .getattr = pid_getattr, \ > + .setattr = proc_setattr, \ > +} > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > +static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { > + ATTR("smack", "current", 0666), > +}; > +LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); > +#endif > + > static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > - REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > + ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444), > + ATTR(NULL, "exec", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > + DIR("smack", 0555, > + proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), > +#endif > }; > > static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) > diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h > index 5185d7f6a51e..d4f9989063d0 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/internal.h > +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h > @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ union proc_op { > int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, > struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, > struct task_struct *task); > + const char *lsm; > }; > > struct proc_inode { > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 75f4156c84d7..418de5d20ffb 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -390,8 +390,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd); > int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, > unsigned nsops, int alter); > void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); > -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); > -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); > +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > + char **value); > +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > + size_t size); > int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); > int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); > int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); > @@ -1139,15 +1141,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, > return 0; > } > > -static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) > +static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, > + struct inode *inode) > { } > > -static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > +static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, > + char *name, char **value) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > > -static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size) > +static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name, > + void *value, size_t size) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 736e78da1ab9..3dfe75d0d373 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1288,14 +1288,30 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); > > -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > + char **value) > { > - return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); > + } Walking this list to do strcmp() makes my eye twitch. ;) I see that procfs doesn't let us do a late evaluation and attr_dir_stuff is const. We already have security_initcall() exporting a per-LSM function, why not expand this slightly to include enough information that we could resolve all this at build time? Anyway, I view that as a potential improvement, and not something that should block this. So: Reviewed-by: Kees Cook > + return -EINVAL; > } > > -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) > +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > + size_t size) > { > - return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > + } > + return -EINVAL; > } > > int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > -- > 2.17.1 > > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:57:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 01/10] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious > mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. > The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate > the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar > interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did > likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the > security "context" of the process, but it will be different > depending on the security module you're using. > > This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for > Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in > this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting > SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the > old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case > may be) as before. > > The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on > the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. > > The original implementation is by Kees Cook. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 13 +++-- > fs/proc/base.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > fs/proc/internal.h | 1 + > include/linux/security.h | 15 ++++-- > security/security.c | 24 ++++++++-- > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > index c980dfe9abf1..9842e21afd4a 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > @@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide > specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available > in the core functionality of Linux itself. > > -Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the > -Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities > -system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks. > +The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be > +followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module. > For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux > man-pages project. > > @@ -30,6 +29,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always > be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then > the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured. > > +Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should > +be accessed and maintained using the special files in ``/proc/.../attr``. > +A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there, > +named after the module. ``/proc/.../attr/smack`` is provided by the Smack > +security module and contains all its special files. The files directly > +in ``/proc/.../attr`` remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide > +subdirectories. > + > .. toctree:: > :maxdepth: 1 > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index ccf86f16d9f0..bd2dd85310fe 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -140,9 +140,13 @@ struct pid_entry { > #define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \ > NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {}) > #define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \ > - NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \ > { .proc_show = show } ) > +#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \ > + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ > + NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \ > + { .lsm = LSM }) > > /* > * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the . > @@ -2503,7 +2507,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, > if (!task) > return -ESRCH; > > - length = security_getprocattr(task, > + length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, > (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, > &p); > put_task_struct(task); > @@ -2552,7 +2556,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, > if (rv < 0) > goto out_free; > > - rv = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); > + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, > + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, > + count); > mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); > out_free: > kfree(page); > @@ -2566,13 +2572,53 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { > .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > }; > > +#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ > +static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \ > + struct dir_context *ctx) \ > +{ \ > + return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \ > + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ > + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ > +} \ > +\ > +static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \ > + .read = generic_read_dir, \ > + .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \ > + .llseek = default_llseek, \ > +}; \ > +\ > +static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \ > + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \ > +{ \ > + return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \ > + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ > + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ > +} \ > +\ > +static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \ > + .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \ > + .getattr = pid_getattr, \ > + .setattr = proc_setattr, \ > +} > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > +static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { > + ATTR("smack", "current", 0666), > +}; > +LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); > +#endif > + > static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > - REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > - REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), > + ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444), > + ATTR(NULL, "exec", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > + DIR("smack", 0555, > + proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), > +#endif > }; > > static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) > diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h > index 5185d7f6a51e..d4f9989063d0 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/internal.h > +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h > @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ union proc_op { > int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, > struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, > struct task_struct *task); > + const char *lsm; > }; > > struct proc_inode { > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 75f4156c84d7..418de5d20ffb 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -390,8 +390,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd); > int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, > unsigned nsops, int alter); > void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); > -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); > -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); > +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > + char **value); > +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > + size_t size); > int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); > int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); > int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); > @@ -1139,15 +1141,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, > return 0; > } > > -static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) > +static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, > + struct inode *inode) > { } > > -static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > +static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, > + char *name, char **value) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > > -static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size) > +static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name, > + void *value, size_t size) > { > return -EINVAL; > } > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 736e78da1ab9..3dfe75d0d373 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1288,14 +1288,30 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); > > -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > + char **value) > { > - return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); > + } Walking this list to do strcmp() makes my eye twitch. ;) I see that procfs doesn't let us do a late evaluation and attr_dir_stuff is const. We already have security_initcall() exporting a per-LSM function, why not expand this slightly to include enough information that we could resolve all this at build time? Anyway, I view that as a potential improvement, and not something that should block this. So: Reviewed-by: Kees Cook > + return -EINVAL; > } > > -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) > +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > + size_t size) > { > - return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > + } > + return -EINVAL; > } > > int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) > -- > 2.17.1 > > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security