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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
	Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/6] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 15:21:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jK5yN7zcPUMzFYnUbRrVkLNE0YDCioYdNC3P6mF437+5g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181017202933.GB14047@cisco>

On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 1:29 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 02:31:24PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote:
>> > @@ -60,4 +62,29 @@ struct seccomp_data {
>> >         __u64 args[6];
>> >  };
>> >
>> > +struct seccomp_notif {
>> > +       __u16 len;
>> > +       __u64 id;
>> > +       __u32 pid;
>> > +       __u8 signaled;
>> > +       struct seccomp_data data;
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>> > +       __u16 len;
>> > +       __u64 id;
>> > +       __s32 error;
>> > +       __s64 val;
>> > +};
>>
>> So, len has to come first, for versioning. However, since it's ahead
>> of a u64, this leaves a struct padding hole. pahole output:
>>
>> struct seccomp_notif {
>>         __u16                      len;                  /*     0     2 */
>>
>>         /* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */
>>
>>         __u64                      id;                   /*     8     8 */
>>         __u32                      pid;                  /*    16     4 */
>>         __u8                       signaled;             /*    20     1 */
>>
>>         /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */
>>
>>         struct seccomp_data        data;                 /*    24    64 */
>>         /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) was 24 bytes ago --- */
>>
>>         /* size: 88, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */
>>         /* sum members: 79, holes: 2, sum holes: 9 */
>>         /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */
>> };
>> struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>>         __u16                      len;                  /*     0     2 */
>>
>>         /* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */
>>
>>         __u64                      id;                   /*     8     8 */
>>         __s32                      error;                /*    16     4 */
>>
>>         /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
>>
>>         __s64                      val;                  /*    24     8 */
>>
>>         /* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 4 */
>>         /* sum members: 22, holes: 2, sum holes: 10 */
>>         /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */
>> };
>>
>> How about making len u32, and moving pid and error above "id"? This
>> leaves a hole after signaled, so changing "len" won't be sufficient
>> for versioning here. Perhaps move it after data?
>
> Just to confirm my understanding; I've got these as:
>
> struct seccomp_notif {
>         __u32                      len;                  /*     0     4 */
>         __u32                      pid;                  /*     4     4 */
>         __u64                      id;                   /*     8     8 */
>         __u8                       signaled;             /*    16     1 */
>
>         /* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */
>
>         struct seccomp_data        data;                 /*    24    64 */
>         /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) was 24 bytes ago --- */
>
>         /* size: 88, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */
>         /* sum members: 81, holes: 1, sum holes: 7 */
>         /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */
> };
> struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>         __u32                      len;                  /*     0     4 */
>         __s32                      error;                /*     4     4 */
>         __u64                      id;                   /*     8     8 */
>         __s64                      val;                  /*    16     8 */
>
>         /* size: 24, cachelines: 1, members: 4 */
>         /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */
> };
>
> in the next version. Since the structure has no padding at the end of
> it, I think the Right Thing will happen. Note that this is slightly
> different than what Kees suggested, if I add signaled after data, then
> I end up with:
>
> struct seccomp_notif {
>         __u32                      len;                  /*     0     4 */
>         __u32                      pid;                  /*     4     4 */
>         __u64                      id;                   /*     8     8 */
>         struct seccomp_data        data;                 /*    16    64 */
>         /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) was 16 bytes ago --- */
>         __u8                       signaled;             /*    80     1 */
>
>         /* size: 88, cachelines: 2, members: 5 */
>         /* padding: 7 */
>         /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */
> };
>
> which I think will have the versioning problem if the next member
> introduces is < 7 bytes.

It'll be a problem in either place. What I was thinking was that
specific versioning is required instead of just length.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-17 22:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 95+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-27 15:11 [PATCH v7 0/6] seccomp trap to userspace Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 1/6] seccomp: add a return code to " Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 21:31   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-27 22:48     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 22:48       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 23:10       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 14:39         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-08 14:58       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 14:28         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-09 16:24           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 16:29             ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-17 20:29     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-17 22:21       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-17 22:33         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-21 16:04         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-22  9:42           ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-27 21:51   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 22:45     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-27 23:08       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 23:04     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 23:37       ` Jann Horn
2018-09-29  0:28   ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 2/6] seccomp: make get_nth_filter available outside of CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 16:51   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 21:42   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 13:55   ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 3/6] seccomp: add a way to get a listener fd from ptrace Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 16:20   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 16:34     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 17:35   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 18:09     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 21:53   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 15:16   ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-08 15:33     ` Jann Horn
2018-10-08 16:21       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-08 16:42         ` Jann Horn
2018-10-08 18:18           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 12:39             ` Jann Horn
2018-10-09 13:28               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 13:36                 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-09 13:49                   ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 13:50                     ` Jann Horn
2018-10-09 14:09                       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 15:26                         ` Jann Horn
2018-10-09 16:20                           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-09 16:26                             ` Jann Horn
2018-10-10 12:54                               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 13:09                                 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 13:10                                 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-10 13:18                                   ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 15:31                   ` Paul Moore
2018-10-10 15:33                     ` Jann Horn
2018-10-10 15:39                       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 16:54                         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-10 17:15                           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 17:26                             ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-10 18:28                               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-11  7:24                       ` Paul Moore
2018-10-11  7:24                         ` Paul Moore
2018-10-11 13:39                         ` Jann Horn
2018-10-11 23:10                           ` Paul Moore
2018-10-11 23:10                             ` Paul Moore
2018-10-12  1:02                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-12 20:02                               ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-12 20:06                                 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-12 20:06                                   ` Jann Horn
2018-10-12 20:11                                 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-08 18:00     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-08 18:41       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-10 17:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-10 18:26         ` Christian Brauner
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 4/6] files: add a replace_fd_files() function Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 16:49   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 18:04     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 21:59   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28  2:20     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28  2:46       ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28  5:23       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 5/6] seccomp: add a way to pass FDs via a notification fd Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 16:39   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 22:13     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 19:28   ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 22:14     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 22:17       ` Jann Horn
2018-09-27 22:49         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 22:09   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-27 22:15     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 15:11 ` [PATCH v7 6/6] samples: add an example of seccomp user trap Tycho Andersen
2018-09-27 22:11   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 21:57 ` [PATCH v7 0/6] seccomp trap to userspace Michael Kerrisk (man-opages)
2018-09-28 22:03   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-28 22:16     ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-09-28 22:34       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 22:46         ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2018-09-28 22:48           ` Jann Horn

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