From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 09:34:32 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKg=5XrAEeRWXAjV8GdLdL6zhiMChQDya0uzWrLiZ5Fsg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9a8a38e0-d502-d6fc-5ea6-77f45539eba6@redhat.com>
On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 8:26 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 02/13/2017 06:59 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 2:33 AM, Tetsuo Handa
>> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>>> James Morris wrote:
>>>> As the regsitration of LSMs is performed during init and then does
>>>> not change, we can mark all of the regsitration hooks as __ro_after_init.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
>>>
>>> This patch makes LKM based LSMs (e.g. AKARI) impossible.
>>> I'm not happy with this patch.
>>
>> LKM based LSMs don't exist yet, and when they do, we may also have the
>> "write rarely" infrastructure done, which LKM based LSMs can use to
>> update the structures.
>
> Is someone actually working on the write rarely patches? If a version
> has been sent out, I don't recall seeing it.
Still mostly just discussion. I've been toying with the PaX-style of
it on x86, and I think Mark Rutland had some ideas for arm64, but I
don't know if he's actually written code.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-02-13 17:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-13 5:32 [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init James Morris
2017-02-13 10:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-02-13 14:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-02-13 16:26 ` Laura Abbott
2017-02-13 17:34 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-02-13 17:57 ` Mark Rutland
2017-02-13 22:23 ` James Morris
2017-02-14 10:37 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-02-14 11:07 ` James Morris
2017-02-14 12:34 ` James Morris
2017-02-14 12:50 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-02-14 12:59 ` James Morris
2017-02-13 20:44 ` Casey Schaufler
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