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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 09:47:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLBP-95aEF2refYimAJ=ea42C_3Ywb+1dZAaVR1rbmP9Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3F1480E2-3D58-4A79-8609-2A9F7991804F@amacapital.net>

On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> Doesn’t this just leak some of the canary to user code through side channels?

Erf, yes, good point. Let's just use prandom and be done with it.

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-28 16:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-18  9:41 [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall Elena Reshetova
2019-03-18 20:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-18 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-03-26 10:35     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-03-27  4:31       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28 15:45         ` Kees Cook
2019-03-28 16:29           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28 16:47             ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-03-29  7:50               ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-03-18 23:31   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-20 12:10     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-03-20 11:12   ` David Laight
2019-03-20 14:51     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-20 12:04   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-03-20  7:27 Elena Reshetova
2019-03-20  7:29 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-03-29  8:13 Elena Reshetova
2019-04-03 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-04 11:41   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-04 17:03     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-05 10:14       ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-04-05 13:14         ` Andy Lutomirski

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