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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	lasse.collin@tukaani.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 19/20] x86, kaslr: Allow random address to be below loaded address
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 12:54:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLvP15dVrF3CNwb09RaxE1ZV6+QQv9utX5DmNpebS8FDQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458631937-14593-20-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com>

On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 12:32 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> wrote:
> From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
>
> Now new randomized output can only be chosen from regions above loaded
> address. In this case, for bootloaders like kexec which always loads
> kernel near the end of ram, it doesn't do randomization at all. Or kernel
> is loaded in a very big starting address, we should not give up that area
> is loaded in a very large address, then the area below the large loaded
> address will be given up. This is not reasonable.
>
> With correct tracking in mem_avoid  we can allow random output below
> loaded address. With this change, though kexec can get random ouput
> below its loaded address of kernel.
>
> Now we just pick 512M as min_addr. If kernel loaded address is bigger than
> 512M, E.g 8G. Then [512M, 8G) can be added into random output candidate area.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 10 ++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> index ddfc3d0..d072ca7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> @@ -446,7 +446,8 @@ void choose_kernel_location(unsigned char *input,
>                                 unsigned long output_size,
>                                 unsigned char **virt_offset)
>  {
> -       unsigned long random;
> +       unsigned long random, min_addr;
> +
>         *virt_offset = (unsigned char *)LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR;
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
> @@ -467,8 +468,13 @@ void choose_kernel_location(unsigned char *input,
>         mem_avoid_init((unsigned long)input, input_size,
>                        (unsigned long)*output);
>
> +       /* start from 512M */
> +       min_addr = (unsigned long)*output;
> +       if (min_addr > (512UL<<20))
> +               min_addr = 512UL<<20;

The goal is to find a minimum address? I'm not sure this comment makes
sense. Shouldn't this be:

    /* Lower minimum to 512M. */
   min_addr = min_t(unsigned long, *output, 512UL << 20);

Or something like that?

> +
>         /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> -       random = find_random_phy_addr((unsigned long)*output, output_size);
> +       random = find_random_phy_addr(min_addr, output_size);
>         if (!random)
>                 debug_putstr("KASLR could not find suitable E820 region...\n");
>         else {
> --
> 2.5.0
>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-22 19:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-22  7:31 [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:31 ` [PATCH v4 01/20] x86, kaslr: Remove not needed parameter for choose_kernel_location Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:31 ` [PATCH v4 02/20] x86, kaslr: Fix a bug that relocation can not be handled when kernel is loaded above 2G Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 03/20] x86, boot: Move compressed kernel to end of buffer before decompressing Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 04/20] x86, boot: Move z_extract_offset calculation to header.S Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 05/20] x86, kaskr: Update the description for decompressor worst case Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 06/20] x86, boot: Fix run_size calculation Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:51   ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 07/20] x86, kaslr: Clean up useless code related to run_size Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:52   ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 08/20] x86, kaslr: Get correct max_addr for relocs pointer Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:52   ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 09/20] x86, kaslr: Consolidate mem_avoid array filling Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 10/20] x86, boot: Split kernel_ident_mapping_init to another file Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 11/20] x86, 64bit: Set ident_mapping for kaslr Baoquan He
2016-04-13 10:05   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 12/20] x86, boot: Add checking for memcpy Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 13/20] x86, kaslr: Introduce struct slot_area to manage randomization slot info Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 14/20] x86, kaslr: Add two functions which will be used later Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 15/20] x86, kaslr: Introduce fetch_random_virt_offset to randomize the kernel text mapping address Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 16/20] x86, kaslr: Randomize physical and virtual address of kernel separately Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 17/20] x86, kaslr: Add support of kernel physical address randomization above 4G Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 18/20] x86, kaslr: Remove useless codes Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 19/20] x86, kaslr: Allow random address to be below loaded address Baoquan He
2016-03-22 19:54   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-03-23  1:41     ` Baoquan He
2016-03-23  8:59   ` [PATCH v5 " Baoquan He
2016-03-22  7:32 ` [PATCH v4 20/20] x86, kaslr: Use KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as the offset max for kernel virtual randomization Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:46   ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22 20:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support Kees Cook
2016-03-23 22:40   ` Kees Cook
2016-04-05  1:56 ` Baoquan He
2016-04-05 20:00   ` Kees Cook
2016-04-05 20:00     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-13 10:19     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-04-13 10:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-04-13 14:11       ` Kees Cook
2016-04-13 14:11         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-14  6:02         ` Kees Cook
2016-04-14  6:02           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-14  6:24           ` Baoquan He
2016-04-14  6:24             ` [kernel-hardening] " Baoquan He
2016-04-14 15:06           ` Baoquan He
2016-04-14 15:06             ` [kernel-hardening] " Baoquan He
2016-04-14 17:56             ` Kees Cook
2016-04-14 17:56               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-15  4:08               ` Baoquan He
2016-04-15  4:08                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baoquan He
2016-04-15  4:52                 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-15  4:52                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-04-15  6:55                   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-04-15  6:55                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar

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