From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 23:00:37 +0000 Message-ID: References: <20161215203003.31989-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> <20161215224224.21447.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net> Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Cc: djb@cr.yp.to To: George Spelvin , ak@linux.intel.com, davem@davemloft.net, David.Laight@aculab.com, ebiggers3@gmail.com, hannes@stressinduktion.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, tom@herbertland.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tytso@mit.edu, vegard.nossum@gmail.com Return-path: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: In-Reply-To: <20161215224224.21447.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net> List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org --94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 If a halved version of SipHash can bring significant performance boost (with 32b words instead of 64b words) with an acceptable security level (64-bit enough?) then we may design such a version. Regarding output size, are 64 bits sufficient? On Thu, 15 Dec 2016 at 23:42, George Spelvin wrote: > > While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, > > it is likely a tiny bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so > replacements > > will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the > > difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash > usage > > poses a real security risk. > > To quantify that, jhash is 27 instructions per 12 bytes of input, with a > dependency path length of 13 instructions. (24/12 in __jash_mix, plus > 3/1 for adding the input to the state.) The final add + __jhash_final > is 24 instructions with a path length of 15, which is close enough for > this handwaving. Call it 18n instructions and 8n cycles for 8n bytes. > > SipHash (on a 64-bit machine) is 14 instructions with a dependency path > length of 4 *per round*. Two rounds per 8 bytes, plus plus two adds > and one cycle per input word, plus four rounds to finish makes 30n+46 > instructions and 9n+16 cycles for 8n bytes. > > So *if* you have a 64-bit 4-way superscalar machine, it's not that much > slower once it gets going, but the four-round finalization is quite > noticeable for short inputs. > > For typical kernel input lengths "within a factor of 2" is > probably more accurate than "a tiny bit". > > You lose a factor of 2 if you machine is 2-way or non-superscalar, > and a second factor of 2 if it's a 32-bit machine. > > I mention this because there are a lot of home routers and other netwoek > appliances running Linux on 32-bit ARM and MIPS processors. For those, > it's a factor of *eight*, which is a lot more than "a tiny bit". > > The real killer is if you don't have enough registers; SipHash performs > horribly on i386 because it uses more state than i386 has registers. > > (If i386 performance is desired, you might ask Jean-Philippe for some > rotate constants for a 32-bit variant with 64 bits of key. Note that > SipHash's security proof requires that key length + input length is > strictly less than the state size, so for a 4x32-bit variant, while > you could stretch the key length a little, you'd have a hard limit at > 95 bits.) > > > A second point, the final XOR in SipHash is either a (very minor) design > mistake, or an opportunity for optimization, depending on how you look > at it. Look at the end of the function: > > >+ SIPROUND; > >+ SIPROUND; > >+ return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3); > > Expanding that out, you get: > + v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); > + v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; > + v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; > + v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); > + return v0 ^ v1 ^ v2 ^ v3; > > Since the final XOR includes both v0 and v3, it's undoing the "v3 ^= v0" > two lines earlier, so the value of v0 doesn't matter after its XOR into > v1 on line one. > > The final SIPROUND and return can then be optimized to > > + v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; > + v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; > + v3 = rol64(v3, 21); > + v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); > + return v1 ^ v2 ^ v3; > > A 32-bit implementation could further tweak the 4 instructions of > v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); v1 ^= v2; > > gcc 6.2.1 -O3 compiles it to basically: > v1.low ^= v2.low; > v1.high ^= v2.high; > v1.low ^= v2.high; > v1.high ^= v2.low; > but it could be written as: > v2.low ^= v2.high; > v1.low ^= v2.low; > v1.high ^= v2.low; > > Alternatively, if it's for private use only (key not shared with other > systems), a slightly stronger variant would "return v1 ^ v3;". > (The final swap of v2 is dead code, but a compiler can spot that easily.) > --94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable If a halved version of SipHash can bring significant performance boost (wit= h 32b words instead of 64b words) with an acceptable security level (64-bit= enough?) then we may design such a version.

Regarding output size, = are 64 bits sufficient?
On T= hu, 15 Dec 2016 at 23:42, George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net> wrote:
> While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptograph= ically secure function,
> it is likely a tiny bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replace= ments
> will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> > difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash= usage
> poses a real security risk.

To quantify that, jhash is 27 instructions per 12 bytes of input, with a dependency path length of 13 instructions.=C2=A0 (24/12 in __jash_mix, plus=
3/1 for adding the input to the state.) The final add + __jhash_final
is 24 instructions with a path length of 15, which is close enough for
this handwaving.=C2=A0 Call it 18n instructions and 8n cycles for 8n bytes.=

SipHash (on a 64-bit machine) is 14 instructions with a dependency path
length of 4 *per round*.=C2=A0 Two rounds per 8 bytes, plus plus two adds and one cycle per input word, plus four rounds to finish makes 30n+46
instructions and 9n+16 cycles for 8n bytes.

So *if* you have a 64-bit 4-way superscalar machine, it's not that much=
slower once it gets going, but the four-round finalization is quite
noticeable for short inputs.

For typical kernel input lengths "within a factor of 2" is
probably more accurate than "a tiny bit".

You lose a factor of 2 if you machine is 2-way or non-superscalar,
and a second factor of 2 if it's a 32-bit machine.

I mention this because there are a lot of home routers and other netwoek appliances running Linux on 32-bit ARM and MIPS processors.=C2=A0 For those= ,
it's a factor of *eight*, which is a lot more than "a tiny bit&quo= t;.

The real killer is if you don't have enough registers; SipHash performs=
horribly on i386 because it uses more state than i386 has registers.

(If i386 performance is desired, you might ask Jean-Philippe for some
rotate constants for a 32-bit variant with 64 bits of key.=C2=A0 Note that<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> SipHash's security proof requires that key length + input length is
strictly less than the state size, so for a 4x32-bit variant, while
you could stretch the key length a little, you'd have a hard limit at 95 bits.)


A second point, the final XOR in SipHash is either a (very minor) design mistake, or an opportunity for optimization, depending on how you look
at it.=C2=A0 Look at the end of the function:

>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SIPROUND;
>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SIPROUND;
>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3);

Expanding that out, you get:
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^=3D v0; v= 0 =3D rol64(v0, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^=3D v2; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^=3D v0; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^=3D v2; v= 2 =3D rol64(v2, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return v0 ^ v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;

Since the final XOR includes both v0 and v3, it's undoing the "v3 = ^=3D v0"
two lines earlier, so the value of v0 doesn't matter after its XOR into=
v1 on line one.

The final SIPROUND and return can then be optimized to

+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^=3D v0; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^=3D v2; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v3 =3D rol64(v3, 21);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^=3D v2; v= 2 =3D rol64(v2, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;

A 32-bit implementation could further tweak the 4 instructions of
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1 ^=3D v2; v2 =3D rol64(v2, 32); v1 ^=3D v2;
gcc 6.2.1 -O3 compiles it to basically:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.low;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.low;
but it could be written as:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v2.low ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.low;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.low;

Alternatively, if it's for private use only (key not shared with other<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> systems), a slightly stronger variant would "return v1 ^ v3;". (The final swap of v2 is dead code, but a compiler can spot that easily.)
--94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1-- From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20161215203003.31989-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> <20161215224224.21447.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net> In-Reply-To: <20161215224224.21447.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net> From: Jean-Philippe Aumasson Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 23:00:37 +0000 Message-ID: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF To: George Spelvin , ak@linux.intel.com, davem@davemloft.net, David.Laight@aculab.com, ebiggers3@gmail.com, hannes@stressinduktion.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, tom@herbertland.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tytso@mit.edu, vegard.nossum@gmail.com Cc: djb@cr.yp.to List-ID: --94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 If a halved version of SipHash can bring significant performance boost (with 32b words instead of 64b words) with an acceptable security level (64-bit enough?) then we may design such a version. Regarding output size, are 64 bits sufficient? On Thu, 15 Dec 2016 at 23:42, George Spelvin wrote: > > While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, > > it is likely a tiny bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so > replacements > > will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the > > difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash > usage > > poses a real security risk. > > To quantify that, jhash is 27 instructions per 12 bytes of input, with a > dependency path length of 13 instructions. (24/12 in __jash_mix, plus > 3/1 for adding the input to the state.) The final add + __jhash_final > is 24 instructions with a path length of 15, which is close enough for > this handwaving. Call it 18n instructions and 8n cycles for 8n bytes. > > SipHash (on a 64-bit machine) is 14 instructions with a dependency path > length of 4 *per round*. Two rounds per 8 bytes, plus plus two adds > and one cycle per input word, plus four rounds to finish makes 30n+46 > instructions and 9n+16 cycles for 8n bytes. > > So *if* you have a 64-bit 4-way superscalar machine, it's not that much > slower once it gets going, but the four-round finalization is quite > noticeable for short inputs. > > For typical kernel input lengths "within a factor of 2" is > probably more accurate than "a tiny bit". > > You lose a factor of 2 if you machine is 2-way or non-superscalar, > and a second factor of 2 if it's a 32-bit machine. > > I mention this because there are a lot of home routers and other netwoek > appliances running Linux on 32-bit ARM and MIPS processors. For those, > it's a factor of *eight*, which is a lot more than "a tiny bit". > > The real killer is if you don't have enough registers; SipHash performs > horribly on i386 because it uses more state than i386 has registers. > > (If i386 performance is desired, you might ask Jean-Philippe for some > rotate constants for a 32-bit variant with 64 bits of key. Note that > SipHash's security proof requires that key length + input length is > strictly less than the state size, so for a 4x32-bit variant, while > you could stretch the key length a little, you'd have a hard limit at > 95 bits.) > > > A second point, the final XOR in SipHash is either a (very minor) design > mistake, or an opportunity for optimization, depending on how you look > at it. Look at the end of the function: > > >+ SIPROUND; > >+ SIPROUND; > >+ return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3); > > Expanding that out, you get: > + v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); > + v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; > + v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; > + v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); > + return v0 ^ v1 ^ v2 ^ v3; > > Since the final XOR includes both v0 and v3, it's undoing the "v3 ^= v0" > two lines earlier, so the value of v0 doesn't matter after its XOR into > v1 on line one. > > The final SIPROUND and return can then be optimized to > > + v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; > + v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; > + v3 = rol64(v3, 21); > + v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); > + return v1 ^ v2 ^ v3; > > A 32-bit implementation could further tweak the 4 instructions of > v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); v1 ^= v2; > > gcc 6.2.1 -O3 compiles it to basically: > v1.low ^= v2.low; > v1.high ^= v2.high; > v1.low ^= v2.high; > v1.high ^= v2.low; > but it could be written as: > v2.low ^= v2.high; > v1.low ^= v2.low; > v1.high ^= v2.low; > > Alternatively, if it's for private use only (key not shared with other > systems), a slightly stronger variant would "return v1 ^ v3;". > (The final swap of v2 is dead code, but a compiler can spot that easily.) > --94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable If a halved version of SipHash can bring significant performance boost (wit= h 32b words instead of 64b words) with an acceptable security level (64-bit= enough?) then we may design such a version.

Regarding output size, = are 64 bits sufficient?
On T= hu, 15 Dec 2016 at 23:42, George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net> wrote:
> While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptograph= ically secure function,
> it is likely a tiny bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replace= ments
> will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> > difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash= usage
> poses a real security risk.

To quantify that, jhash is 27 instructions per 12 bytes of input, with a dependency path length of 13 instructions.=C2=A0 (24/12 in __jash_mix, plus=
3/1 for adding the input to the state.) The final add + __jhash_final
is 24 instructions with a path length of 15, which is close enough for
this handwaving.=C2=A0 Call it 18n instructions and 8n cycles for 8n bytes.=

SipHash (on a 64-bit machine) is 14 instructions with a dependency path
length of 4 *per round*.=C2=A0 Two rounds per 8 bytes, plus plus two adds and one cycle per input word, plus four rounds to finish makes 30n+46
instructions and 9n+16 cycles for 8n bytes.

So *if* you have a 64-bit 4-way superscalar machine, it's not that much=
slower once it gets going, but the four-round finalization is quite
noticeable for short inputs.

For typical kernel input lengths "within a factor of 2" is
probably more accurate than "a tiny bit".

You lose a factor of 2 if you machine is 2-way or non-superscalar,
and a second factor of 2 if it's a 32-bit machine.

I mention this because there are a lot of home routers and other netwoek appliances running Linux on 32-bit ARM and MIPS processors.=C2=A0 For those= ,
it's a factor of *eight*, which is a lot more than "a tiny bit&quo= t;.

The real killer is if you don't have enough registers; SipHash performs=
horribly on i386 because it uses more state than i386 has registers.

(If i386 performance is desired, you might ask Jean-Philippe for some
rotate constants for a 32-bit variant with 64 bits of key.=C2=A0 Note that<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> SipHash's security proof requires that key length + input length is
strictly less than the state size, so for a 4x32-bit variant, while
you could stretch the key length a little, you'd have a hard limit at 95 bits.)


A second point, the final XOR in SipHash is either a (very minor) design mistake, or an opportunity for optimization, depending on how you look
at it.=C2=A0 Look at the end of the function:

>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SIPROUND;
>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SIPROUND;
>+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3);

Expanding that out, you get:
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^=3D v0; v= 0 =3D rol64(v0, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^=3D v2; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^=3D v0; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^=3D v2; v= 2 =3D rol64(v2, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return v0 ^ v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;

Since the final XOR includes both v0 and v3, it's undoing the "v3 = ^=3D v0"
two lines earlier, so the value of v0 doesn't matter after its XOR into=
v1 on line one.

The final SIPROUND and return can then be optimized to

+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v0 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^=3D v0; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v3; v3 =3D rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^=3D v2; +=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v3 =3D rol64(v3, 21);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0v2 +=3D v1; v1 =3D rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^=3D v2; v= 2 =3D rol64(v2, 32);
+=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0return v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;

A 32-bit implementation could further tweak the 4 instructions of
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1 ^=3D v2; v2 =3D rol64(v2, 32); v1 ^=3D v2;
gcc 6.2.1 -O3 compiles it to basically:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.low;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.low;
but it could be written as:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v2.low ^=3D v2.high;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.low ^=3D v2.low;
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 v1.high ^=3D v2.low;

Alternatively, if it's for private use only (key not shared with other<= br class=3D"gmail_msg"> systems), a slightly stronger variant would "return v1 ^ v3;". (The final swap of v2 is dead code, but a compiler can spot that easily.)
--94eb2c1a19e89ac3f70543ba6cd1--