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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>,
	Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>,
	RDMA mailing list <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>,
	Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, ddutile@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 16:52:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ7Ltrm6J0s5HxyjXJ90W0WQt-eqEDWeHPUix07JBn-eg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190202090945.4106-5-leon@kernel.org>

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 AM Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>
> When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet
> processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents
> are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled.
> Notifier chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With
> large numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously
> the CPUs spend too much time with interrupts disabled.
>
> Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification,
> maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this
> registration already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write
> mostly, so a normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents
> must be checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down
> per device.
>
> Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of
> similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings
> when notified.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
> CC: paul@paul-moore.com
> CC: ddutile@redhat.com
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
> ---
>  drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h |  5 +++
>  drivers/infiniband/core/device.c    |  1 +
>  drivers/infiniband/core/security.c  | 50 ++++++++++++++++-------------
>  include/rdma/ib_mad.h               |  3 +-
>  4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

This looks reasonable from a SELinux perspective.  I would still be
curious to see how this would compare to calling
security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() directly in
ip_mad_enforce_security(), but at least this patch should fix the
problem you're seeing.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> index 616734313f0c..6fd3d3d06d18 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h
> @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>                                 enum ib_qp_type qp_type);
>  void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent);
>  int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index);
> +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void);
>  #else
>  static inline void ib_security_destroy_port_pkey_list(struct ib_device *device)
>  {
> @@ -264,6 +265,10 @@ static inline int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map,
>  {
>         return 0;
>  }
> +
> +static inline void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
> +{
> +}
>  #endif
>
>  struct ib_device *ib_device_get_by_index(u32 ifindex);
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> index 238ec42778ef..8c1d8ffb09e2 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c
> @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int ib_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
>                 return NOTIFY_DONE;
>
>         schedule_work(&ib_policy_change_work);
> +       ib_mad_agent_security_change();
>
>         return NOTIFY_OK;
>  }
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> index 7662e9347238..a70d2ba312ed 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
>  #include "core_priv.h"
>  #include "mad_priv.h"
>
> +static LIST_HEAD(mad_agent_list);
> +/* Lock to protect mad_agent_list */
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mad_agent_list_lock);
> +
>  static struct pkey_index_qp_list *get_pkey_idx_qp_list(struct ib_port_pkey *pp)
>  {
>         struct pkey_index_qp_list *pkey = NULL;
> @@ -676,19 +680,18 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
>         return security_ib_pkey_access(sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
>  }
>
> -static int ib_mad_agent_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb,
> -                                       unsigned long event,
> -                                       void *data)
> +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void)
>  {
> -       struct ib_mad_agent *ag = container_of(nb, struct ib_mad_agent, lsm_nb);
> -
> -       if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE)
> -               return NOTIFY_DONE;
> -
> -       ag->smp_allowed = !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(
> -               ag->security, dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num);
> -
> -       return NOTIFY_OK;
> +       struct ib_mad_agent *ag;
> +
> +       spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +       list_for_each_entry(ag,
> +                           &mad_agent_list,
> +                           mad_agent_sec_list)
> +               WRITE_ONCE(ag->smp_allowed,
> +                          !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(ag->security,
> +                               dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num));
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>  }
>
>  int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
> @@ -699,6 +702,8 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>         if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
>                 return 0;
>
> +       INIT_LIST_HEAD(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
> +
>         ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
>         if (ret)
>                 return ret;
> @@ -706,22 +711,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>         if (qp_type != IB_QPT_SMI)
>                 return 0;
>
> +       spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         ret = security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(agent->security,
>                                                 dev_name(&agent->device->dev),
>                                                 agent->port_num);
>         if (ret)
>                 goto free_security;
>
> -       agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change;
> -       ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> -       if (ret)
> -               goto free_security;
> -
> -       agent->smp_allowed = true;
> -       agent->lsm_nb_reg = true;
> +       WRITE_ONCE(agent->smp_allowed, true);
> +       list_add(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list, &mad_agent_list);
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         return 0;
>
>  free_security:
> +       spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
>         security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
>         return ret;
>  }
> @@ -731,8 +734,11 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>         if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
>                 return;
>
> -       if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
> -               unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> +       if (agent->qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
> +               spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +               list_del(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list);
> +               spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock);
> +       }
>
>         security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
>  }
> @@ -743,7 +749,7 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
>                 return 0;
>
>         if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
> -               if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
> +               if (!READ_ONCE(map->agent.smp_allowed))
>                         return -EACCES;
>                 return 0;
>         }
> diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> index 1c0b914f199d..79ba8219e7dc 100644
> --- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> +++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
> @@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ struct ib_mad_agent {
>         u32                     hi_tid;
>         u32                     flags;
>         void                    *security;
> -       struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
> +       struct list_head        mad_agent_sec_list;
>         u8                      port_num;
>         u8                      rmpp_version;
>         bool                    smp_allowed;
> -       bool                    lsm_nb_reg;
>  };
>
>  /**
> --
> 2.19.1
>


-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-06 21:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe

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