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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	NitinGote <nitin.r.gote@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 20:09:10 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSApdqtMfrBgkYzMCtFr62NsDCKpfd6jYZVHmQrAOo3fQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190725135933.30046-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 9:59 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
> operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
> smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
> smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).
>
> This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
> and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
> atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
> lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
> consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
> regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
> fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).
>
> We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
> range again.
>
> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++--------------------
>  security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h |  8 +++---
>  2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

One of the things that is nice about atomic_t is that the type itself
helps indicate that this isn't a normal integer and you should look at
the stuff in atomic.h for fetching/setting the value.  While I
understand there is overhead involved, and this patch should help in
this regard, I think we lose on code readability and increase the
chance of someone manipulating these values incorrectly in the future.
I believe this is a lot of what Kees was getting at with the counter_t
idea.

At the very least I would like to see a comment in sidtab.h for the
sidtab struct explaining how users should access the count and rcache
fields.  However, what I would really like to see is some simple
macros/functions that handle the read/write accesses similar to the
way we do it with atomic_t (once again, I think this is what Kees was
getting at earlier).

> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index e63a90ff2728..dc6c078b6432 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/spinlock.h>
> -#include <linux/atomic.h>
> +#include <asm/barrier.h>
>  #include "flask.h"
>  #include "security.h"
>  #include "sidtab.h"
> @@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
>
>         memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
>
> +       /* max count is SIDTAB_MAX so valid index is always < SIDTAB_MAX */
>         for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
> -               atomic_set(&s->rcache[i], -1);
> +               s->rcache[i] = SIDTAB_MAX;
>
>         for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
>                 s->isids[i].set = 0;
>
> -       atomic_set(&s->count, 0);
> -
> +       s->count = 0;
>         s->convert = NULL;
>
>         spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
> @@ -130,14 +130,12 @@ static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)
>
>  static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
>  {
> -       u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
> +       /* read entries only after reading count */
> +       u32 count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
>
>         if (index >= count)
>                 return NULL;
>
> -       /* read entries after reading count */
> -       smp_rmb();
> -
>         return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
>  }
>
> @@ -210,10 +208,10 @@ static int sidtab_find_context(union sidtab_entry_inner entry,
>  static void sidtab_rcache_update(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, u32 pos)
>  {
>         while (pos > 0) {
> -               atomic_set(&s->rcache[pos], atomic_read(&s->rcache[pos - 1]));
> +               WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[pos], READ_ONCE(s->rcache[pos - 1]));
>                 --pos;
>         }
> -       atomic_set(&s->rcache[0], (int)index);
> +       WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[0], index);
>  }
>
>  static void sidtab_rcache_push(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
> @@ -227,14 +225,14 @@ static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>         u32 i;
>
>         for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++) {
> -               int v = atomic_read(&s->rcache[i]);
> +               u32 v = READ_ONCE(s->rcache[i]);
>
> -               if (v < 0)
> +               if (v >= SIDTAB_MAX)
>                         continue;
>
> -               if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, (u32)v, 0), context)) {
> -                       sidtab_rcache_update(s, (u32)v, i);
> -                       *index = (u32)v;
> +               if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, v, 0), context)) {
> +                       sidtab_rcache_update(s, v, i);
> +                       *index = v;
>                         return 0;
>                 }
>         }
> @@ -245,8 +243,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>                                  u32 *index)
>  {
>         unsigned long flags;
> -       u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
> -       u32 count_locked, level, pos;
> +       u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;
>         struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
>         struct context *dst, *dst_convert;
>         int rc;
> @@ -255,11 +252,10 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>         if (rc == 0)
>                 return 0;
>
> +       /* read entries only after reading count */
> +       count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
>         level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
>
> -       /* read entries after reading count */
> -       smp_rmb();
> -
>         pos = 0;
>         rc = sidtab_find_context(s->roots[level], &pos, count, level,
>                                  context, index);
> @@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>         spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
>
>         convert = s->convert;
> -       count_locked = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
> +       count_locked = s->count;
>         level = sidtab_level_from_count(count_locked);
>
>         /* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */
> @@ -315,7 +311,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>                 }
>
>                 /* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
> -               atomic_set(&convert->target->count, count + 1);
> +               convert->target->count = count + 1;
>         }
>
>         if (context->len)
> @@ -326,9 +322,7 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>         *index = count;
>
>         /* write entries before writing new count */
> -       smp_wmb();
> -
> -       atomic_set(&s->count, count + 1);
> +       smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
>
>         rc = 0;
>  out_unlock:
> @@ -418,7 +412,7 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
>                 return -EBUSY;
>         }
>
> -       count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
> +       count = s->count;
>         level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
>
>         /* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
> @@ -431,7 +425,7 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
>         }
>
>         /* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
> -       atomic_set(&params->target->count, count);
> +       params->target->count = count;
>
>         /* enable live convert of new entries */
>         s->convert = params;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
> index bbd5c0d1f3bd..b4561c5ec893 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
> @@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ union sidtab_entry_inner {
>  #define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
>         (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry_leaf))
>
> -#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 31 /* limited to INT_MAX due to atomic_t range */
> -#define SIDTAB_MAX (((u32)1 << SIDTAB_MAX_BITS) - 1)
> +#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
> +#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX
>  /* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
>  #define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
>         DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
> @@ -70,12 +70,12 @@ struct sidtab_convert_params {
>
>  struct sidtab {
>         union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
> -       atomic_t count;
> +       u32 count;
>         struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
>         spinlock_t lock;
>
>         /* reverse lookup cache */
> -       atomic_t rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
> +       u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
>
>         /* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
>         struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
> --
> 2.21.0
>


-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-01  0:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-25 13:59 [PATCH] selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-07-25 14:59 ` Jann Horn
2019-07-25 18:58   ` Gote, Nitin R
2019-08-01  0:09 ` Paul Moore [this message]

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