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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, fw@strlen.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] xfrm: fix regression introduced by xdst pcpu cache
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 16:39:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT6b1DJ0E65syC7XoVxfSTs3RUq9-HNLuzt2H-vrj69RA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171030145843.13496-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> Since 4.14-rc1, the selinux-testsuite has been encountering sporadic
> failures during testing of labeled IPSEC. git bisect pointed to
> commit ec30d78c14a813db39a647b6a348b4286 ("xfrm: add xdst pcpu cache").
> The xdst pcpu cache is only checking that the policies are the same,
> but does not validate that the policy, state, and flow match with respect
> to security context labeling.  As a result, the wrong SA could be used
> and the receiver could end up performing permission checking and
> providing SO_PEERSEC or SCM_SECURITY values for the wrong security context.
> security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() exists for this purpose and is
> already called from xfrm_state_look_at() for matching purposes.
> Further, xfrm_state_look_at() also performs a xfrm_selector_match() test,
> which is also missing from the xdst pcpu cache logic.  Add calls to both
> of these functions when validating the cache entry.  With these changes,
> the selinux-testsuite passes all tests again.
>
> Fixes: ec30d78c14a813db39a647b6a348b4286ba4abf5 ("xfrm: add xdst pcpu cache")
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Thanks for chasing this down while I was on vacation :)

> This is an RFC because I am not entirely confident in the fix, e.g. is it
> sufficient to perform this matching only on the first xfrm or do they all
> need to be walked as in xfrm_bundle_ok()?

If you look at how we handle outgoing labeled IPsec traffic, e.g.
selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(), you'll see that we only check the first
xfrm because I don't believe it is ever possible for us to create a
xfrm bundle with mis-matching SELinux labels.

Inbound traffic is another story, we need to check the entire bundle.

> ... Also, should we perform this
> matching before (as in this patch) or after calling xfrm_bundle_ok()?

I would probably make the LSM call the last check, as you've done; but
I have to say that is just so it is consistent with the "LSM last"
philosophy and not because of any performance related argument.

> ... Also,
> do we need to test xfrm->sel.family before calling xfrm_selector_match
> (as in this patch) or not - xfrm_state_look_at() does so when the
> state is XFRM_STATE_VALID but not when it is _ERROR or _EXPIRED?

Speaking purely from a SELinux perspective, I'm not sure it matters:
as long as the labels match we are happy.  However, from a general
IPsec perspective it does seem like a reasonable thing.

Granted I'm probably missing something, but it seems a little odd that
the code isn't already checking that the selectors match (... what am
I missing?).  It does check the policies, maybe that is enough in the
normal IPsec case?

> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> index 2746b62..171818b 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> @@ -1820,6 +1820,11 @@ xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(struct xfrm_policy **pols, int num_pols,
>             !xfrm_pol_dead(xdst) &&
>             memcmp(xdst->pols, pols,
>                    sizeof(struct xfrm_policy *) * num_pols) == 0 &&
> +           (!xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel.family ||
> +            xfrm_selector_match(&xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel, fl,
> +                                xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel.family)) &&
> +           security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(xdst->u.dst.xfrm,
> +                                              xdst->pols[0], fl) &&
>             xfrm_bundle_ok(xdst)) {
>                 dst_hold(&xdst->u.dst);
>                 return xdst;
> --
> 2.9.5
>

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: paul@paul-moore.com (Paul Moore)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH] xfrm: fix regression introduced by xdst pcpu cache
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 16:39:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT6b1DJ0E65syC7XoVxfSTs3RUq9-HNLuzt2H-vrj69RA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171030145843.13496-1-sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> Since 4.14-rc1, the selinux-testsuite has been encountering sporadic
> failures during testing of labeled IPSEC. git bisect pointed to
> commit ec30d78c14a813db39a647b6a348b4286 ("xfrm: add xdst pcpu cache").
> The xdst pcpu cache is only checking that the policies are the same,
> but does not validate that the policy, state, and flow match with respect
> to security context labeling.  As a result, the wrong SA could be used
> and the receiver could end up performing permission checking and
> providing SO_PEERSEC or SCM_SECURITY values for the wrong security context.
> security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() exists for this purpose and is
> already called from xfrm_state_look_at() for matching purposes.
> Further, xfrm_state_look_at() also performs a xfrm_selector_match() test,
> which is also missing from the xdst pcpu cache logic.  Add calls to both
> of these functions when validating the cache entry.  With these changes,
> the selinux-testsuite passes all tests again.
>
> Fixes: ec30d78c14a813db39a647b6a348b4286ba4abf5 ("xfrm: add xdst pcpu cache")
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Thanks for chasing this down while I was on vacation :)

> This is an RFC because I am not entirely confident in the fix, e.g. is it
> sufficient to perform this matching only on the first xfrm or do they all
> need to be walked as in xfrm_bundle_ok()?

If you look at how we handle outgoing labeled IPsec traffic, e.g.
selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(), you'll see that we only check the first
xfrm because I don't believe it is ever possible for us to create a
xfrm bundle with mis-matching SELinux labels.

Inbound traffic is another story, we need to check the entire bundle.

> ... Also, should we perform this
> matching before (as in this patch) or after calling xfrm_bundle_ok()?

I would probably make the LSM call the last check, as you've done; but
I have to say that is just so it is consistent with the "LSM last"
philosophy and not because of any performance related argument.

> ... Also,
> do we need to test xfrm->sel.family before calling xfrm_selector_match
> (as in this patch) or not - xfrm_state_look_at() does so when the
> state is XFRM_STATE_VALID but not when it is _ERROR or _EXPIRED?

Speaking purely from a SELinux perspective, I'm not sure it matters:
as long as the labels match we are happy.  However, from a general
IPsec perspective it does seem like a reasonable thing.

Granted I'm probably missing something, but it seems a little odd that
the code isn't already checking that the selectors match (... what am
I missing?).  It does check the policies, maybe that is enough in the
normal IPsec case?

> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> index 2746b62..171818b 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> @@ -1820,6 +1820,11 @@ xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(struct xfrm_policy **pols, int num_pols,
>             !xfrm_pol_dead(xdst) &&
>             memcmp(xdst->pols, pols,
>                    sizeof(struct xfrm_policy *) * num_pols) == 0 &&
> +           (!xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel.family ||
> +            xfrm_selector_match(&xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel, fl,
> +                                xdst->u.dst.xfrm->sel.family)) &&
> +           security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(xdst->u.dst.xfrm,
> +                                              xdst->pols[0], fl) &&
>             xfrm_bundle_ok(xdst)) {
>                 dst_hold(&xdst->u.dst);
>                 return xdst;
> --
> 2.9.5
>

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-31 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-30 14:58 [RFC PATCH] xfrm: fix regression introduced by xdst pcpu cache Stephen Smalley
2017-10-30 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 11:11 ` Florian Westphal
2017-10-31 11:11   ` Florian Westphal
     [not found]   ` <20171031111122.GB7663-E0PNVn5OA6ohrxcnuTQ+TQ@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-31 13:43     ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 13:43       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 13:43       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 14:00       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 14:00         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-31 14:15       ` Florian Westphal
2017-10-31 14:15         ` Florian Westphal
2017-10-31 20:39 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2017-10-31 20:39   ` Paul Moore
2017-10-31 23:08   ` Florian Westphal
2017-10-31 23:08     ` Florian Westphal
2017-11-01 14:05     ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-01 14:05       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-01 21:39     ` Paul Moore
2017-11-01 21:39       ` Paul Moore
2017-11-02 12:58       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-02 12:58         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-02 22:37         ` Paul Moore
2017-11-02 22:37           ` Paul Moore
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-10-27 15:28 Stephen Smalley
2017-10-27 15:28 ` Stephen Smalley

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