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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Arusekk <arek_koz@o2.pl>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] proc: Use seq_read_iter for /proc/*/maps
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 13:24:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=whCMLJB4FafaqHOrpE0UOLkq5Wc4EyNSJLzq3NZAwN0-w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1777114.atdPhlSkOF@swift.dev.arusekk.pl>

On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 1:21 PM Arusekk <arek_koz@o2.pl> wrote:
>
> Keeping it the way it is for the sake of security of userspace applications
> looks more like security through obscurity to me.

No, it's simply "no valid use" and "why expose interfaces that don't
need to be exposed".

splice() _has_ been a security issue before. It's why I want to limit
it now. I want to enable it only for cases that seem to be worth
enabling for.

Have we fixed all the splice security issues? I certainly hope so. Are
you correct in stating that there are probably other places that might
be more interesting to attackers? Sure. But none of that changes the
basic issue: why expose this?

                Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-04 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-27 18:34 [PATCH] proc: Use seq_read_iter where possible Arkadiusz Kozdra (Arusekk)
2021-04-28  6:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-04-28 13:02   ` Arusekk
2021-04-28 13:03     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-04-28 17:46       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-04-29 10:05         ` [PATCH v2] proc: Use seq_read_iter for /proc/*/maps Arkadiusz Kozdra (Arusekk)
2021-04-29 10:07           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-05-04 11:53             ` [PATCH v3] " Arkadiusz Kozdra (Arusekk)
2021-05-04 16:01               ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-04 20:23                 ` Arusekk
2021-05-04 20:24                   ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2021-04-29 16:36           ` [PATCH v2] " Linus Torvalds

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