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From: Gregory Farnum <gfarnum@redhat.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	ceph-devel <ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/12] ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message()
Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 11:33:33 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJ4mKGbKVcvoYGi3go3-VtMhjXES5iMyof9qMfL+8AyHiPKBNA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cdd3f83fd64cc308a7694875c1e4a35f0d052429.camel@kernel.org>

On Tue, Jan 4, 2022 at 9:41 AM Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2022-01-04 at 15:04 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
> >
> > Inode operations that create a new filesystem object such as ->mknod,
> > ->create, ->mkdir() and others don't take a {g,u}id argument explicitly.
> > Instead the caller's fs{g,u}id is used for the {g,u}id of the new
> > filesystem object.
> >
> > Cephfs mds creation request argument structures mirror this filesystem
> > behavior. They don't encode a {g,u}id explicitly. Instead the caller's
> > fs{g,u}id that is always sent as part of any mds request is used by the
> > servers to set the {g,u}id of the new filesystem object.
> >
> > In order to ensure that the correct {g,u}id is used map the caller's
> > fs{g,u}id for creation requests. This doesn't require complex changes.
> > It suffices to pass in the relevant idmapping recorded in the request
> > message. If this request message was triggered from an inode operation
> > that creates filesystem objects it will have passed down the relevant
> > idmaping. If this is a request message that was triggered from an inode
> > operation that doens't need to take idmappings into account the initial
> > idmapping is passed down which is an identity mapping and thus is
> > guaranteed to leave the caller's fs{g,u}id unchanged.,u}id is sent.
> >
> > The last few weeks before Christmas 2021 I have spent time not just
> > reading and poking the cephfs kernel code but also took a look at the
> > ceph mds server userspace to ensure I didn't miss some subtlety.
> >
> > This made me aware of one complication to solve. All requests send the
> > caller's fs{g,u}id over the wire. The caller's fs{g,u}id matters for the
> > server in exactly two cases:
> >
> > 1. to set the ownership for creation requests
> > 2. to determine whether this client is allowed access on this server
> >
> > Case 1. we already covered and explained. Case 2. is only relevant for
> > servers where an explicit uid access restriction has been set. That is
> > to say the mds server restricts access to requests coming from a
> > specific uid. Servers without uid restrictions will grant access to
> > requests from any uid by setting MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY.
> >
> > Case 2. introduces the complication because the caller's fs{g,u}id is
> > not just used to record ownership but also serves as the {g,u}id used
> > when checking access to the server.
> >
> > Consider a user mounting a cephfs client and creating an idmapped mount
> > from it that maps files owned by uid 1000 to be owned uid 0:
> >
> > mount -t cephfs -o [...] /unmapped
> > mount-idmapped --map-mount 1000:0:1 /idmapped
> >
> > That is to say if the mounted cephfs filesystem contains a file "file1"
> > which is owned by uid 1000:
> >
> > - looking at it via /unmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> >   (One can think of this as the on-disk value.)
> > - looking at it via /idmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 0
> >
> > Now, consider creating new files via the idmapped mount at /idmapped.
> > When a caller with fs{g,u}id 1000 creates a file "file2" by going
> > through the idmapped mount mounted at /idmapped it will create a file
> > that is owned by uid 1000 on-disk, i.e.:
> >
> > - looking at it via /unmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> > - looking at it via /idmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 0
> >
> > Now consider an mds server that has a uid access restriction set and
> > only grants access to requests from uid 0.
> >
> > If the client sends a creation request for a file e.g. /idmapped/file2
> > it will send the caller's fs{g,u}id idmapped according to the idmapped
> > mount. So if the caller has fs{g,u}id 1000 it will be mapped to {g,u}id
> > 0 in the idmapped mount and will be sent over the wire allowing the
> > caller access to the mds server.
> >
> > However, if the caller is not issuing a creation request the caller's
> > fs{g,u}id will be send without the mount's idmapping applied. So if the
> > caller that just successfully created a new file on the restricted mds
> > server sends a request as fs{g,u}id 1000 access will be refused. This
> > however is inconsistent.
> >
>
> IDGI, why would you send the fs{g,u}id without the mount's idmapping
> applied in this case? ISTM that idmapping is wholly a client-side
> feature, and that you should always map id's regardless of whether
> you're creating or not.

Yeah, I'm confused. We want the fs {g,u}id to be consistent throughout
the request pipeline and to reflect the actual Ceph user all the way
through the server-side pipeline. What if client.greg is only
authorized to work as uid 12345 and access /users/greg/; why would you
send in a bunch of requests as root just because I mounted that way
inside my own space?

This might be more obvious in the userspace Client, which is already
set up to be friendlier to mapped users for Ganesha etc:
mknod (https://github.com/ceph/ceph/blob/master/src/client/Client.cc#L7297)
and similar calls receive a "UserPerm" from the caller specifying who
the call should be performed as, and they pass that in to the generic
make_requst() function
(https://github.com/ceph/ceph/blob/master/src/client/Client.cc#L1778)
which uses it to set the uid and gid fields you found in the message.
-Greg

> > From my perspective the root of the problem lies in the fact that
> > creation requests implicitly infer the ownership from the {g,u}id that
> > gets sent along with every mds request.
> >
> > I have thought of multiple ways of addressing this problem but the one I
> > prefer is to give all mds requests that create a filesystem object a
> > proper, separate {g,u}id field entry in the argument struct. This is,
> > for example how ->setattr mds requests work.
> >
> > This way the caller's fs{g,u}id can be used consistenly for server
> > access checks and is separated from the ownership for new filesystem
> > objects.
> >
> > Servers could then be updated to refuse creation requests whenever the
> > {g,u}id used for access checking doesn't match the {g,u}id used for
> > creating the filesystem object just as is done for setattr requests on a
> > uid restricted server. But I am, of course, open to other suggestions.
> >
> > Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
> > Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > index ae2cc4ce1d48..1fb43a8fd64c 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > @@ -2459,6 +2459,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
> >       void *p, *end;
> >       int ret;
> >       bool legacy = !(session->s_con.peer_features & CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME);
> > +     kuid_t caller_fsuid;
> > +     kgid_t caller_fsgid;
> >
> >       ret = set_request_path_attr(req->r_inode, req->r_dentry,
> >                             req->r_parent, req->r_path1, req->r_ino1.ino,
> > @@ -2524,10 +2526,22 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
> >
> >       head->mdsmap_epoch = cpu_to_le32(mdsc->mdsmap->m_epoch);
> >       head->op = cpu_to_le32(req->r_op);
> > -     head->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
> > -                                              req->r_cred->fsuid));
> > -     head->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns,
> > -                                              req->r_cred->fsgid));
> > +     /*
> > +      * Inode operations that create filesystem objects based on the
> > +      * caller's fs{g,u}id like ->mknod(), ->create(), ->mkdir() etc. don't
> > +      * have separate {g,u}id fields in their respective structs in the
> > +      * ceph_mds_request_args union. Instead the caller_{g,u}id field is
> > +      * used to set ownership of the newly created inode by the mds server.
> > +      * For these inode operations we need to send the mapped fs{g,u}id over
> > +      * the wire. For other cases we simple set req->mnt_userns to the
> > +      * initial idmapping meaning the unmapped fs{g,u}id is sent.
> > +      */
> > +     caller_fsuid = mapped_kuid_user(req->mnt_userns, &init_user_ns,
> > +                                     req->r_cred->fsuid);
> > +     caller_fsgid = mapped_kgid_user(req->mnt_userns, &init_user_ns,
> > +                                     req->r_cred->fsgid);
> > +     head->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, caller_fsuid));
> > +     head->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, caller_fsgid));
> >       head->ino = cpu_to_le64(req->r_deleg_ino);
> >       head->args = req->r_args;
> >
>
> --
> Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
>


  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-04 19:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-04 14:04 [PATCH 00/12] ceph: support idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 01/12] ceph: stash idmapping in mdsc request Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 17:22   ` Jeff Layton
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 02/12] ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message() Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 17:40   ` Jeff Layton
2022-01-04 19:33     ` Gregory Farnum [this message]
2022-01-05 14:11       ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-05 14:10     ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-05 15:03       ` Jeff Layton
2022-01-05 15:35         ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 03/12] ceph: allow idmapped mknod inode op Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 04/12] ceph: allow idmapped symlink " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 05/12] ceph: allow idmapped mkdir " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 06/12] ceph: allow idmapped rename " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 07/12] ceph: allow idmapped getattr " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 08/12] ceph: allow idmapped permission " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 09/12] ceph: allow idmapped setattr " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 10/12] ceph/acl: allow idmapped set_acl " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 11/12] ceph/file: allow idmapped atomic_open " Christian Brauner
2022-01-04 14:04 ` [PATCH 12/12] ceph: allow idmapped mounts Christian Brauner

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