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From: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
To: "Xen.org security team" <security@xen.org>
Cc: xen-announce@lists.xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	 xen-users@lists.xen.org, oss-security@lists.openwall.com,
	 "Xen.org security team" <security-team-members@xen.org>
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 378 v3 (CVE-2021-28694,CVE-2021-28695,CVE-2021-28696) - IOMMU page mapping issues on x86
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 09:22:14 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKf6xpsAz7oPX+PdZokm+BAqreqL8rnrAd9UYvdz=F0M-bcMUQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1mLMZy-0006TJ-Rw@xenbits.xenproject.org>

On Wed, Sep 1, 2021 at 5:34 AM Xen.org security team <security@xen.org> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
>  Xen Security Advisory CVE-2021-28694,CVE-2021-28695,CVE-2021-28696 / XSA-378
>                                    version 3
>
>                    IOMMU page mapping issues on x86
>
> UPDATES IN VERSION 3
> ====================
>
> Warn about dom0=pvh breakage in Resolution section.
>
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
> =================
>
> Both AMD and Intel allow ACPI tables to specify regions of memory
> which should be left untranslated, which typically means these
> addresses should pass the translation phase unaltered.  While these
> are typically device specific ACPI properties, they can also be
> specified to apply to a range of devices, or even all devices.
>
> On all systems with such regions Xen failed to prevent guests from
> undoing/replacing such mappings (CVE-2021-28694).

Hi,

Is there a way to identify if a system's ACPI tables have untranslated
regions?  Does it show up in xen or linux dmesg or can it be
identified in sysfs?

Thanks,
Jason


  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-01 13:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-01  9:30 Xen Security Advisory 378 v3 (CVE-2021-28694,CVE-2021-28695,CVE-2021-28696) - IOMMU page mapping issues on x86 Xen.org security team
2021-09-01 13:22 ` Jason Andryuk [this message]
2021-09-01 13:45   ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 14:15   ` Andrew Cooper

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