From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA8BCC3F2CD for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:52:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F0AD2080C for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:52:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1583160742; bh=FpLJgWkkh8fCmPgOKqDhlneGC4YvaWwoXzMAYLaCZFc=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:List-ID:From; b=kIShn+X/Ba2igN+Hp4E84SmL7nfW5CzyqKPRL3hXWmSdG/4nkm09XyNIJA1bic7d1 9XX9nYyhYrPTdudN4qfTpa7bztpc1NYUy7b2ZiQT0G4rNRr3mgMB2YCoY9zY6Pu80x 51t/08u3J9OMfy6dnMrAN6+FXA22tolNFdrfe8aA= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727316AbgCBOwV (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Mar 2020 09:52:21 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51568 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727250AbgCBOwV (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Mar 2020 09:52:21 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-f44.google.com (mail-wr1-f44.google.com [209.85.221.44]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EE25C24682 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:52:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1583160740; bh=FpLJgWkkh8fCmPgOKqDhlneGC4YvaWwoXzMAYLaCZFc=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=SGSSjUABSQVozTtC4IWs3ii/v+T7bjwhLiRSJ9WKhHMAbVymnYUgl6eLt2glMy+JQ 1GVbHa/nmCYdBBcKMYo2Qm4GRvgRJaFHR81rzUoCHnVmF2MSkIQPuVY4ezpIX40JYM f4ynofaR4Q/5EBzsHz1lGGs/fus8RBXk16Fm644E= Received: by mail-wr1-f44.google.com with SMTP id v2so12870702wrp.12 for ; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 06:52:19 -0800 (PST) X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0Ttt44pKSwYqTceAicFFHxmjasOYsgCTanWSJKIxRY1lOBWejd kf2FrHDstkJ+b5sXWzbq+VP4yUwWORsyUe/UfimSeg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vuD/JTTM+IbJxK5SJVF+H1KyJRiVk8Ouz9HW+yomY1Ty4oAkjWVxkJixOQT9AmMZ6uSsXE+x/HFSCoPrWL29PI= X-Received: by 2002:a5d:6051:: with SMTP id j17mr2737207wrt.151.1583160738331; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 06:52:18 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 15:52:07 +0100 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies To: Mimi Zohar Cc: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity , linuxppc-dev , linux-efi , linux-s390 , Martin Schwidefsky , Philipp Rudo , Michael Ellerman , Linux Kernel Mailing List Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2 Mar 2020 at 15:48, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 14:10 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific > > functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA > > include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch > > defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing > > the different architectures to select it. > > > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > > Cc: Martin Schwidefsky > > Cc: Philipp Rudo > > Cc: Michael Ellerman > > --- > > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-- > > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > > 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > index 497b7d0b2d7e..b8ce1b995633 100644 > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ config PPC > > select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE > > select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK > > select VIRT_TO_BUS if !PPC64 > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > # > > # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically. > > # > > @@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > prompt "Enable secure boot support" > > bool > > depends on PPC_POWERNV > > - depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > help > > Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security > > policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user > > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > index 8abe77536d9d..90ff3633ade6 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390 > > select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > > select SWIOTLB > > select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > > > > > config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > index beea77046f9b..cafa66313fe2 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86 > > select VIRT_TO_BUS > > select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS > > select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI > > Not everyone is interested in enabling IMA or requiring IMA runtime > policies. With this patch, enabling IMA_ARCH_POLICY is therefore > still left up to the person building the kernel. As a result, I'm > seeing the following warning, which is kind of cool. > > WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && IMA [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=n] > Selected by [y]: > - X86 [=y] && EFI [=y] > > Ard, Michael, Martin, just making sure this type of warning is > acceptable before upstreaming this patch. I would appreciate your > tags. > Ehm, no, warnings like these are not really acceptable. It means there is an inconsistency in the way the Kconfig dependencies are defined. Does this help: select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI && IMA_ARCH_POLICY ? > > > > > config INSTRUCTION_DECODER > > def_bool y > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > > index 1659217e9b60..aefe758f4466 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > > @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > > #endif > > > > -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ > > - || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); > > extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); > > #else > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > index 3f3ee4e2eb0d..d17972aa413a 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > @@ -327,3 +327,12 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS > > depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > > default y > > + > > +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > + bool > > + depends on IMA > > + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > + default n > > + help > > + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or > > + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies. > > > > From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7AA3C3F2D1 for ; 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helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=ardb@kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=default header.b=SGSSjUAB; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48WNQt5V12zDqYt for ; Tue, 3 Mar 2020 01:52:22 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from mail-wr1-f51.google.com (mail-wr1-f51.google.com [209.85.221.51]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D624622B48 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:52:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1583160740; bh=FpLJgWkkh8fCmPgOKqDhlneGC4YvaWwoXzMAYLaCZFc=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=SGSSjUABSQVozTtC4IWs3ii/v+T7bjwhLiRSJ9WKhHMAbVymnYUgl6eLt2glMy+JQ 1GVbHa/nmCYdBBcKMYo2Qm4GRvgRJaFHR81rzUoCHnVmF2MSkIQPuVY4ezpIX40JYM f4ynofaR4Q/5EBzsHz1lGGs/fus8RBXk16Fm644E= Received: by mail-wr1-f51.google.com with SMTP id z11so4201677wro.9 for ; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 06:52:19 -0800 (PST) X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ2/GI10ecycxvWwXpG/EL4a573XzOKFGoeVqh3b9ZY0+wzus5Mw u2Cwu8pt8R2CGweyIZ50OanDYx/4SzQIUPaufZK0Fg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vuD/JTTM+IbJxK5SJVF+H1KyJRiVk8Ouz9HW+yomY1Ty4oAkjWVxkJixOQT9AmMZ6uSsXE+x/HFSCoPrWL29PI= X-Received: by 2002:a5d:6051:: with SMTP id j17mr2737207wrt.151.1583160738331; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 06:52:18 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 15:52:07 +0100 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies To: Mimi Zohar Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-s390 , linux-efi , Nayna Jain , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Philipp Rudo , Martin Schwidefsky , linux-integrity , linuxppc-dev Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On Mon, 2 Mar 2020 at 15:48, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 14:10 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific > > functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA > > include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch > > defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing > > the different architectures to select it. > > > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > > Cc: Martin Schwidefsky > > Cc: Philipp Rudo > > Cc: Michael Ellerman > > --- > > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-- > > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > > 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > index 497b7d0b2d7e..b8ce1b995633 100644 > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ config PPC > > select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE > > select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK > > select VIRT_TO_BUS if !PPC64 > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > # > > # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically. > > # > > @@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > prompt "Enable secure boot support" > > bool > > depends on PPC_POWERNV > > - depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > help > > Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security > > policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user > > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > index 8abe77536d9d..90ff3633ade6 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390 > > select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > > select SWIOTLB > > select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > > > > > config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > index beea77046f9b..cafa66313fe2 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86 > > select VIRT_TO_BUS > > select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS > > select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI > > Not everyone is interested in enabling IMA or requiring IMA runtime > policies. With this patch, enabling IMA_ARCH_POLICY is therefore > still left up to the person building the kernel. As a result, I'm > seeing the following warning, which is kind of cool. > > WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && IMA [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=n] > Selected by [y]: > - X86 [=y] && EFI [=y] > > Ard, Michael, Martin, just making sure this type of warning is > acceptable before upstreaming this patch. I would appreciate your > tags. > Ehm, no, warnings like these are not really acceptable. It means there is an inconsistency in the way the Kconfig dependencies are defined. Does this help: select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI && IMA_ARCH_POLICY ? > > > > > config INSTRUCTION_DECODER > > def_bool y > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > > index 1659217e9b60..aefe758f4466 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > > @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > > #endif > > > > -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ > > - || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); > > extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); > > #else > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > index 3f3ee4e2eb0d..d17972aa413a 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > @@ -327,3 +327,12 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS > > depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > > default y > > + > > +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > + bool > > + depends on IMA > > + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > + default n > > + help > > + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or > > + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies. > > > >