From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755762AbaGYSYz (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Jul 2014 14:24:55 -0400 Received: from mail-vc0-f178.google.com ([209.85.220.178]:56694 "EHLO mail-vc0-f178.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753401AbaGYSYw (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Jul 2014 14:24:52 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1406296033-32693-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> <1406296033-32693-12-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 11:24:51 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data From: Julien Tinnes To: Kees Cook Cc: Andy Lutomirski , "Eric W. Biederman" , David Drysdale , Al Viro , Paolo Bonzini , LSM List , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Paul Moore , James Morris , Linux API , Meredydd Luff , Christoph Hellwig , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> [cc: Eric Biederman] >> >> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> Julien had been wanting something like this too (though he'd suggested >>> it via prctl): limit the signal functions to "self" only. I wonder if >>> adding a prctl like done for O_BENEATH could work for signal sending? >>> >> >> >> Can we do one better and add a flag to prevent any non-self pid >> lookups? This might actually be easy on top of the pid namespace work >> (e.g. we could change the way that find_task_by_vpid works). > > Ooh, that would be extremely interesting, yes. Kind of an extreme form > of pid namespace without actually being a namespace. > >> It's far from just being signals. There's access_process_vm, ptrace, >> all the signal functions, clock_gettime (see CPUCLOCK_PID -- yes, this >> is ridiculous), and probably some others that I've forgotten about or >> never noticed in the first place. > > Yeah, that would be very interesting. Yes, this would be incredibly useful. 1. For Chromium [1], I dislike relying on seccomp purely for "access-control" (to other processes or files). Because it's really hard to think about everything (things like CPUCLOCK_PID bite, seehttps://crbug.com/374479). Se we have a first layer of sandboxing (using PID + NET namespaces and chroot) for "access-control" and a second layer for kernel attack surface reduction and a few other things using seccomp-bpf. The first layer isn't currently very good; it's heavyweight and complex (you need an init(1) per namespace and that init cannot be multi-purposed as a useful process because pid = 1 can never receive signals). One PID namespace per process isn't something that scales well. (Also before USER_NS it required a setuid root program). 2. Even with a safe pure seccomp-bpf sandbox that prevents sending signals to other process / ptrace() et al and that restrict clock_gettime(2) properly, things become quickly very tedious because as far as the kernel is concerned, the process under this BPF program can still pass ptrace_may_access() to other processes. This means for instance that no matter what you do, a model where open() is allowed can't work if /proc is available. We need a mode that says "ptrace_may_access()" will never pass. So yes, I really would like: - a prctl that says: "I'm dropping privileges and I now can't interact with other thread groups (via signals, ptrace, etc..)". - Something to drop access to the file system. It could be an unprivileged way to chroot() to an empty directory (unprivileged namespaces work for that, - except if you're already in a chroot -). This is a little tricky without allowing chroot escapes, so I suspect we would want to express it in terms of mount namespace, or something else, rather than chroot. Then we have the primitives we need to build sandboxes in a simple way and we can add seccomp-bpf on top to do things such as open() hooking (via SECCOMP_RET_TRAP) and to restrict the kernel attack surface. Julien [1] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxing From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Julien Tinnes Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 11:24:51 -0700 Message-ID: References: <1406296033-32693-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> <1406296033-32693-12-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-api-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Kees Cook Cc: Andy Lutomirski , "Eric W. Biederman" , David Drysdale , Al Viro , Paolo Bonzini , LSM List , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Paul Moore , James Morris , Linux API , Meredydd Luff , Christoph Hellwig , "linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> [cc: Eric Biederman] >> >> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> Julien had been wanting something like this too (though he'd suggested >>> it via prctl): limit the signal functions to "self" only. I wonder if >>> adding a prctl like done for O_BENEATH could work for signal sending? >>> >> >> >> Can we do one better and add a flag to prevent any non-self pid >> lookups? This might actually be easy on top of the pid namespace work >> (e.g. we could change the way that find_task_by_vpid works). > > Ooh, that would be extremely interesting, yes. Kind of an extreme form > of pid namespace without actually being a namespace. > >> It's far from just being signals. There's access_process_vm, ptrace, >> all the signal functions, clock_gettime (see CPUCLOCK_PID -- yes, this >> is ridiculous), and probably some others that I've forgotten about or >> never noticed in the first place. > > Yeah, that would be very interesting. Yes, this would be incredibly useful. 1. For Chromium [1], I dislike relying on seccomp purely for "access-control" (to other processes or files). Because it's really hard to think about everything (things like CPUCLOCK_PID bite, seehttps://crbug.com/374479). Se we have a first layer of sandboxing (using PID + NET namespaces and chroot) for "access-control" and a second layer for kernel attack surface reduction and a few other things using seccomp-bpf. The first layer isn't currently very good; it's heavyweight and complex (you need an init(1) per namespace and that init cannot be multi-purposed as a useful process because pid = 1 can never receive signals). One PID namespace per process isn't something that scales well. (Also before USER_NS it required a setuid root program). 2. Even with a safe pure seccomp-bpf sandbox that prevents sending signals to other process / ptrace() et al and that restrict clock_gettime(2) properly, things become quickly very tedious because as far as the kernel is concerned, the process under this BPF program can still pass ptrace_may_access() to other processes. This means for instance that no matter what you do, a model where open() is allowed can't work if /proc is available. We need a mode that says "ptrace_may_access()" will never pass. So yes, I really would like: - a prctl that says: "I'm dropping privileges and I now can't interact with other thread groups (via signals, ptrace, etc..)". - Something to drop access to the file system. It could be an unprivileged way to chroot() to an empty directory (unprivileged namespaces work for that, - except if you're already in a chroot -). This is a little tricky without allowing chroot escapes, so I suspect we would want to express it in terms of mount namespace, or something else, rather than chroot. Then we have the primitives we need to build sandboxes in a simple way and we can add seccomp-bpf on top to do things such as open() hooking (via SECCOMP_RET_TRAP) and to restrict the kernel attack surface. Julien [1] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxing