From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755394AbdEEEod (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 May 2017 00:44:33 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.136]:34708 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755272AbdEEEob (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 May 2017 00:44:31 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170505043902.GP29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20170505003030.GM29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20170505043902.GP29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 21:44:04 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: new ...at() flag: AT_NO_JUMPS To: Al Viro Cc: Linus Torvalds , Jann Horn , Linux API , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-fsdevel , David Drysdale Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:39 PM, Al Viro wrote: > On Thu, May 04, 2017 at 08:46:49PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:47 PM, Jann Horn wrote: >> > >> > Thread 1 starts an AT_BENEATH path walk using an O_PATH fd >> > pointing to /srv/www/example.org/foo; the path given to the syscall is >> > "bar/../../../../etc/passwd". The path walk enters the "bar" directory. >> > Thread 2 moves /srv/www/example.org/foo/bar to >> > /srv/www/example.org/bar. >> > Thread 1 processes the rest of the path ("../../../../etc/passwd"), never >> > hitting /srv/www/example.org/foo in the process. >> > >> > I'm not really familiar with the VFS internals, but from a coarse look >> > at the patch, it seems like it wouldn't block this? >> >> I think you're right. >> >> I guess it would be safe for the RCU case due to the sequence number >> check, but not the non-RCU case. > > Yes and no... FWIW, to exclude that it would suffice to have > mount --rbind /src/www/example.org/foo /srv/www/example.org/foo done first. > Then this kind of race will end up with -ENOENT due to path_connected() > logics in follow_dotdot_rcu()/follow_dotdot(). I'm not sure about the > intended applications, though - is that thing supposed to be used along with > some horror like seccomp, or...? How hard would it be for the kernel to prevent this on its own? Asking users to do the mount --rbind seems like it's asking for users to forget to do it.