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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
	"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
	"npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
	"Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
	"Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
	"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	"andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com" 
	<andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"josh@joshtriplett.org" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"rientjes@google.com" <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19,RESEND 24/27] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:54:23 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWdc2d2HJ-aoE7-889sHN-YJiKXrEkssyWJ6QQTykb+EQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F4E85E989@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com>

On Sun, Mar 24, 2019 at 1:59 AM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@intel.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Andy,
>
> Thank you for your valuable feedbacks!
>
> Per what you have been saying, your feedbacks come from different angles - i.e. functionality vs. security, but they are mixed up somehow.

I think you're misunderstanding me.  I'm not talking about security at
all here.  SGX isn't a sandbox, full stop.  I'm talking about the
degree to which an SGX enclave acts like a well-behaved black box.

>
> > I’m going to put my vDSO maintainer hat on for a minute.  Cedric, your
> > proposal has the following issues related specifically to the vDSO:
> >
> > It inherently contains indirect branches.  This means that, on retpoline
> > configurations, it probably needs to use retpolines.  This is doable,
> > but it’s nasty, and you need to worry about register clobbers.
>
> Only the weakest link matters in security. With dynamic linking in use, this additional indirect CALL can't make things worse. But I'm open to, and in fact also willing to, apply whatever mitigation that you think is satisfactory (or that has been applied to other indirect branches, such as in PLT), such as retpoline. Btw, don't worry about register clobbers because we have at least %rax at our disposal.

There is no actual fundamental reason that dynamic linking has to work
this way, and in principle, one could even use retpolines to the call
the vDSO.  In any event, the vDSO is currently compiled with
retpolines enabled, and if we decide to turn that off, it would be
decision to be made independently of SGX.

>
> >
> > It uses effectively unbounded stack space. The vDSO timing functions are
> > already a problem for Go, and this is worse.
>
> If targeting the same functionality (i.e. no exit callback), my API uses exactly 24 bytes more than Sean's. Is it really the case that those 24 bytes will break Go?

You're counting wrong.  Your version uses 24 bytes + the stack size of
the exit handler + the amount of stack consumed by the enclave, which
is effectively unbounded.  So this whole scheme becomes unusable on
anything other than a stack that is "large" for a totally undefined
value of large and that has guard pages.

>
> >
> > Cedric, your proposal allows an enclave to muck with RSP, but not in a
> > way that’s particularly pleasant.
>
> From security perspective, it is SGX ISA, but NOT any particular ABI, that allows enclaves "to muck with RSP".

Again, this has nothing to do with security.  With your proposal, it's
not possible for the caller of an enclave to decide, in an ocall
handler, to pause and do something else.  This isn't just theoretical.
Suppose someone wants to send a network request in an ocall handler.
With the current RSP approach, it's difficult to do this in a program
that uses poll / select / epoll -- you can't return out from the ocall
until you have an answer.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-25 23:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-20 16:20 [PATCH v19,RESEND 00/27] Intel SGX1 support Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX feature bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 19:41   ` Neil Horman
2019-03-21 14:16     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX sub-features (as Linux-defined bits) Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 03/27] x86/msr: Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE definition Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 04/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX_LC feature bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 05/27] x86/msr: Add SGX Launch Control MSR definitions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 06/27] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Add new 'PF_SGX' page fault error code bit Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:20 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 07/27] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV for userspace #PFs w/ PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 08/27] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support and update caps appropriately Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-26 12:17   ` Huang, Kai
2019-03-26 14:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-26 21:25       ` Huang, Kai
2019-03-26 21:57         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-26 23:19           ` Huang, Kai
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 09/27] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 10/27] x86/sgx: Add SGX1 and SGX2 architectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 11/27] x86/sgx: Add definitions for SGX's CPUID leaf and variable sub-leafs Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 12/27] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 13/27] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 14/27] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 15/27] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for initializing enclaves Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 16/27] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-26 12:01   ` Huang, Kai
2019-03-26 12:40     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-26 14:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-26 21:11         ` Huang, Kai
2019-03-27  5:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 17/27] x86/sgx: Add provisioning Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 18/27] x86/sgx: Add swapping code to the core and SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 19/27] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the " Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 20/27] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 21/27] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 22/27] x86/fault: Attempt to fixup unhandled #PF in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 23/27] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions " Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 24/27] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 18:30   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-20 18:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-20 19:57       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-20 21:03         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-21  0:17           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-22 21:20             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-21 17:17         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-22 20:31           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-20 19:02     ` Jethro Beekman
2019-03-20 20:10       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-20 19:13     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-20 20:38       ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-22 21:59         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-23 17:36           ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-23 21:38             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-24  8:59               ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-25 18:03                 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-25 23:59                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26  4:53                     ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-26 17:08                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28  4:23                         ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-28 19:18                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28 23:19                             ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-29  9:48                               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-31  8:43                                 ` Dr. Greg
2019-04-03 23:03                             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-25 23:54                 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-03-26  4:16                   ` Xing, Cedric
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 25/27] x86/sgx: SGX documentation Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 26/27] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-20 16:21 ` [PATCH v19,RESEND 27/27] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen

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