From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757406AbcH3Tzb (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Aug 2016 15:55:31 -0400 Received: from mail-ua0-f178.google.com ([209.85.217.178]:35701 "EHLO mail-ua0-f178.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754702AbcH3Tz2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Aug 2016 15:55:28 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:07 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing To: =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= Cc: LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development , Tejun Heo Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by mail.home.local id u7UJtY5t032164 On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the >>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security >>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called >>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create >>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the >>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of >>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications. >> >> Mickaël, will you be at KS and/or LPC? >> > > I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris) > for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :) There's a teeny tiny chance I'll be there. I've done way too much traveling lately. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:07 -0700 Message-ID: References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development , To: =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= Return-path: Received: from mail-ua0-f176.google.com ([209.85.217.176]:35701 "EHLO mail-ua0-f176.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755413AbcH3Tz2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Aug 2016 15:55:28 -0400 Received: by mail-ua0-f176.google.com with SMTP id i32so51996398uai.2 for ; Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:28 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: > > On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp = as the >>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic sec= urity >>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) ca= lled >>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to creat= e >>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or t= he >>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impa= ct of >>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications. >> >> Micka=C3=ABl, will you be at KS and/or LPC? >> > > I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris) > for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :) There's a teeny tiny chance I'll be there. I've done way too much traveling lately. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:07 -0700 Message-ID: References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Return-path: In-Reply-To: <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= Cc: LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: > > On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp = as the >>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic sec= urity >>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) ca= lled >>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to creat= e >>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or t= he >>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impa= ct of >>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications. >> >> Micka=C3=ABl, will you be at KS and/or LPC? >> > > I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris) > for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :) There's a teeny tiny chance I'll be there. I've done way too much traveling lately. From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <57C5E3C8.1080103@digikod.net> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:07 -0700 Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing To: =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= Cc: LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development , Tejun Heo List-ID: On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: > > On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp = as the >>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic sec= urity >>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) ca= lled >>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to creat= e >>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or t= he >>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impa= ct of >>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications. >> >> Micka=C3=ABl, will you be at KS and/or LPC? >> > > I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris) > for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :) There's a teeny tiny chance I'll be there. I've done way too much traveling lately.