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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXBDVe9AzHnD1B5r=GGVNsU5gsC92iqD0S94mQBZOzOBQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-19-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Add a new flag CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS for each cgroup. This flag is initially
> set for all cgroup except the root. The flag is clear when a new process
> without the no_new_privs flags is attached to the cgroup.
>
> If a cgroup is landlocked, then any new attempt, from an unprivileged
> process, to attach a process without no_new_privs to this cgroup will
> be denied.

Until and unless everyone can agree on a way to properly namespace,
delegate, etc cgroups, I think that trying to add unprivileged
semantics to cgroups is nuts.  Given the big thread about cgroup v2,
no-internal-tasks, etc, I just don't see how this approach can be
viable.

Can we try to make landlock work completely independently of cgroups
so that it doesn't get stuck and so that programs can use it without
worrying about cgroup v1 vs v2, interactions with cgroup managers,
cgroup managers that (supposedly?) will start migrating processes
around piecemeal and almost certainly blowing up landlock in the
process, etc?

I have no problem with looking at prototypes for how landlock +
cgroups would work, but I can't imagine the result being mergeable.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linu
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXBDVe9AzHnD1B5r=GGVNsU5gsC92iqD0S94mQBZOzOBQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-19-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Add a new flag CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS for each cgroup. This flag is initially
> set for all cgroup except the root. The flag is clear when a new process
> without the no_new_privs flags is attached to the cgroup.
>
> If a cgroup is landlocked, then any new attempt, from an unprivileged
> process, to attach a process without no_new_privs to this cgroup will
> be denied.

Until and unless everyone can agree on a way to properly namespace,
delegate, etc cgroups, I think that trying to add unprivileged
semantics to cgroups is nuts.  Given the big thread about cgroup v2,
no-internal-tasks, etc, I just don't see how this approach can be
viable.

Can we try to make landlock work completely independently of cgroups
so that it doesn't get stuck and so that programs can use it without
worrying about cgroup v1 vs v2, interactions with cgroup managers,
cgroup managers that (supposedly?) will start migrating processes
around piecemeal and almost certainly blowing up landlock in the
process, etc?

I have no problem with looking at prototypes for how landlock +
cgroups would work, but I can't imagine the result being mergeable.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>Linux API <linu>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXBDVe9AzHnD1B5r=GGVNsU5gsC92iqD0S94mQBZOzOBQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-19-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Add a new flag CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS for each cgroup. This flag is initially
> set for all cgroup except the root. The flag is clear when a new process
> without the no_new_privs flags is attached to the cgroup.
>
> If a cgroup is landlocked, then any new attempt, from an unprivileged
> process, to attach a process without no_new_privs to this cgroup will
> be denied.

Until and unless everyone can agree on a way to properly namespace,
delegate, etc cgroups, I think that trying to add unprivileged
semantics to cgroups is nuts.  Given the big thread about cgroup v2,
no-internal-tasks, etc, I just don't see how this approach can be
viable.

Can we try to make landlock work completely independently of cgroups
so that it doesn't get stuck and so that programs can use it without
worrying about cgroup v1 vs v2, interactions with cgroup managers,
cgroup managers that (supposedly?) will start migrating processes
around piecemeal and almost certainly blowing up landlock in the
process, etc?

I have no problem with looking at prototypes for how landlock +
cgroups would work, but I can't imagine the result being mergeable.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXBDVe9AzHnD1B5r=GGVNsU5gsC92iqD0S94mQBZOzOBQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-19-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Add a new flag CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS for each cgroup. This flag is initially
> set for all cgroup except the root. The flag is clear when a new process
> without the no_new_privs flags is attached to the cgroup.
>
> If a cgroup is landlocked, then any new attempt, from an unprivileged
> process, to attach a process without no_new_privs to this cgroup will
> be denied.

Until and unless everyone can agree on a way to properly namespace,
delegate, etc cgroups, I think that trying to add unprivileged
semantics to cgroups is nuts.  Given the big thread about cgroup v2,
no-internal-tasks, etc, I just don't see how this approach can be
viable.

Can we try to make landlock work completely independently of cgroups
so that it doesn't get stuck and so that programs can use it without
worrying about cgroup v1 vs v2, interactions with cgroup managers,
cgroup managers that (supposedly?) will start migrating processes
around piecemeal and almost certainly blowing up landlock in the
process, etc?

I have no problem with looking at prototypes for how landlock +
cgroups would work, but I can't imagine the result being mergeable.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Linux API <linu>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:27:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXBDVe9AzHnD1B5r=GGVNsU5gsC92iqD0S94mQBZOzOBQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-19-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Add a new flag CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS for each cgroup. This flag is initially
> set for all cgroup except the root. The flag is clear when a new process
> without the no_new_privs flags is attached to the cgroup.
>
> If a cgroup is landlocked, then any new attempt, from an unprivileged
> process, to attach a process without no_new_privs to this cgroup will
> be denied.

Until and unless everyone can agree on a way to properly namespace,
delegate, etc cgroups, I think that trying to add unprivileged
semantics to cgroups is nuts.  Given the big thread about cgroup v2,
no-internal-tasks, etc, I just don't see how this approach can be
viable.

Can we try to make landlock work completely independently of cgroups
so that it doesn't get stuck and so that programs can use it without
worrying about cgroup v1 vs v2, interactions with cgroup managers,
cgroup managers that (supposedly?) will start migrating processes
around piecemeal and almost certainly blowing up landlock in the
process, etc?

I have no problem with looking at prototypes for how landlock +
cgroups would work, but I can't imagine the result being mergeable.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-14 18:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 260+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-14  7:23 [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:51   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:22     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:22       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:22       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:28       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28         ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:51         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:51           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:51           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:53   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:53     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:53     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 22:02     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 14:54   ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 14:54     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 14:54     ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:10     ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10       ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10       ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:01   ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:01     ` Thomas Graf
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:19   ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 22:42     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 22:42       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 22:42       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 19:07   ` Jann Horn
2016-09-14 19:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-09-14 19:07     ` Jann Horn
2016-09-14 22:39     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:39       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:06   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:06     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:02     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:02       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:02       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:24       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:24         ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:24         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:25         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:25           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:25           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20  0:12           ` lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20  0:12             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20  0:12             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20  1:10             ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20  1:10               ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20  1:10               ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 16:58               ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 16:58                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 16:58                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:30   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:30     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:30     ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:43   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:34     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:52       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:05         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:16   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:16     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:43   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:43     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:43     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 20:58     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:25         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:25         ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:27   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-09-14 18:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:11     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15  1:25       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:25         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:25         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:25         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:25         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  2:19         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  2:19           ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  2:19           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  2:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  2:27             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  2:27             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  2:27             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:00             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:00               ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:00               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:00               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:08               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:08                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:08                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:08                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:31                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:31                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:31                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:31                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:38                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:38                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:38                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:38                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:48                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:48                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:48                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:48                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 19:41                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20  4:37                         ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20  4:37                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20  4:37                           ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 17:02                           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:29   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:14     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15  1:19       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:19         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:46         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:46           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:46           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:01           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01             ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:20   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:20     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 22:46     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:46       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:46       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:24   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:24     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 14:36 ` [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36   ` David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36   ` David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36   ` David Laight

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