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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-audit@redhat.com,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 17:30:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXpUZsUOoFgG4GRvStjLkWCn5=pNDFPTm-t5g=8HRaDhw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140610003234.GB20728@kroah.com>

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:55:20PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> >> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> >> >> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> >> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>> >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>> >> >> ---
>> >> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>> >> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>> >> >
>> >> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
>> >> > miss a later conversation about this?
>> >>
>> >> Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.
>> >>
>> >> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
>> >> security@.
>> >
>> > That seems to be my mbox at times :)
>> >
>> > But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
>> > right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
>> > usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
>> >
>>
>> There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
>> in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.
>
> That was next on my list to poke people about...
>
>> And there's the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got
>> forgotten, but that isn't really a security issue.
>
> What is that, where was that reported?

commit 2d7a85f4b06e9c27ff629f07a524c48074f07f81
Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date:   Fri May 30 11:04:00 2014 -0700

    netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations


The security issue got fixed quickly, but the fix turned out to be problematic.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2014-06-10  0:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-05-29  3:09 [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking Eric Paris
2014-05-29  3:09 ` [PATCH 2/2] audit: do not select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL on x32 Eric Paris
2014-06-09 22:30 ` [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:35   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-09 22:46     ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-10  0:32         ` Greg KH
2014-06-10  0:30           ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2014-06-10  0:37             ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 23:35       ` Josh Boyer
2014-06-10  0:31         ` Greg KH
2014-06-10  0:51           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-10  2:57             ` Greg KH
2014-06-10  4:04               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-10  4:14                 ` Greg KH
2014-06-09 22:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-09 22:56       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-09 23:36         ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 12:50           ` Eric Paris
2014-06-10 12:50             ` Eric Paris
2014-06-10 15:42             ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 15:48               ` Linus Torvalds
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-05-28 22:21 [PATCH 0/2] Fix auditsc DoS and move it to staging Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-28 22:21 ` [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking Andy Lutomirski

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