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From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
To: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Nick Finco" <nifi@google.com>,
	"Andrew Honig" <ahonig@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 12:17:20 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALMp9eTCTj-V0ihi0sQAkjOpKA2HzNY85WiX9LxRQODGvGN1aw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191211204753.242298-5-pomonis@google.com>

On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 12:48 PM Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com> wrote:
>
> This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
> This function contains index computations based on the
> (attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.
>
> Fixes: commit a2c118bfab8b ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")
>
> Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-06 20:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:16   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12  9:43   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11     ` Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 17:31   ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44     ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16         ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson [this message]
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
     [not found]   ` <20191225235523.470232075B@mail.kernel.org>
2019-12-30 23:14     ` Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini

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