From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([208.118.235.92]:60651) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UhsiV-0008U8-Ap for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 29 May 2013 22:35:56 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UhsiQ-0006Dw-5K for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 29 May 2013 22:35:51 -0400 Received: from mail-wg0-x231.google.com ([2a00:1450:400c:c00::231]:65257) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UhsiP-0006Do-Vh for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 29 May 2013 22:35:46 -0400 Received: by mail-wg0-f49.google.com with SMTP id y10so6819510wgg.28 for ; Wed, 29 May 2013 19:35:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <51A62680.2000808@os.inf.tu-dresden.de> References: <20130527093409.GH21969@stefanha-thinkpad.redhat.com> <51A496C4.1020602@os.inf.tu-dresden.de> <87r4grca4p.fsf@codemonkey.ws> <20130528171742.GB30296@redhat.com> <20130529074929.GC20199@stefanha-thinkpad.redhat.com> <20130529090859.GH4472@redhat.com> <20130529142143.GA9545@stefanha-thinkpad.redhat.com> <51A62680.2000808@os.inf.tu-dresden.de> Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 19:35:44 -0700 Message-ID: From: ronnie sahlberg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] snabbswitch integration with QEMU for userspace ethernet I/O List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Julian Stecklina Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi , "snabb-devel@googlegroups.com" , qemu-devel , Anthony Liguori , "Michael S. Tsirkin" Julian, Stefan's concerns are valid. (Hopefully, kernel is harder to exploit and more carefully audited.) On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 9:02 AM, Julian Stecklina wrote: > On 05/29/2013 04:21 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: >> The fact that a single switch process has shared memory access to all >> guests' RAM is critical. If the switch process is exploited, then that >> exposes other guests' data! (Think of a multi-tenant host with guests >> belonging to different users.) > > True. But people don't mind having instruction decoding and half of > virtio in the kernel these days, so it can't be that security critical... > > Julian >