[oe-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] xserver-xorg: fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551

* [oe-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] xserver-xorg: fix CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
@ 2022-11-25 16:44 Soumya
  2022-11-25 17:59 ` Steve Sakoman
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Soumya @ 2022-11-25 16:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core; +Cc: hari.gpillai, Soumya

A vulnerability classified as critical was found in X.org Server. Affected
by this vulnerability is the function _GetCountedString of the file
xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to buffer overflow. It is recommended to
apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this
vulnerability is VDB-211051.

A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in
X.org Server. Affected by this issue is the function ProcXkbGetKbdByName
of the file xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to memory leak. It is
recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this
vulnerability is VDB-211052.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3550
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3551

Upstream patches:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2

Signed-off-by: Soumya <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
---
 ...possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch | 63 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...ntedString-against-request-length-at.patch | 38 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e61ec5953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+CVE: CVE-2022-3551
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+
+GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
+fail somewhere.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
+     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
+     status = Success;
+     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
+-    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
+-        return BadMatch;
++    {
++        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
++        if (keymap) {
++            free(keymap);
++            return BadMatch;
++        }
++    }
+     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+-    if (status != Success)
++    if (status == Success) {
++        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
++        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
++            status = BadLength;
++    }
++
++    if (status != Success) {
++        free(names.keycodes);
++        free(names.types);
++        free(names.compat);
++        free(names.symbols);
++        free(names.geometry);
+         return status;
+-    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+-    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+-        return BadLength;
++    }
+ 
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f862e82f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+CVE: CVE-2022-3550
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
+
+GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
+request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
+field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
+swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
+     CARD16 len;
+ 
+     wire = *wire_inout;
++
++    if (client->req_len <
++        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
++        return BadValue;
++
+     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
+     if (client->swapped) {
+         swaps(&len);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
-- 
2.25.1



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