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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 12:37:54 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4i5oORdk-Fzypxw_+gCLUa8f=w1e_n0=47P7uHR-jT6GQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxYHX3=HN4P5M0ziSJ08WfjccyhE2T7epS-EC6ZJ6LyjQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 12:26 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> Just to clarify, when you say "this patch" you mean:
>>
>>      2fbd7af5af86 x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references
>> under speculation
>>
>> ...not this early MASK_NOSPEC version of the patch, right?
>
> I suspect not. If that patch is broken, the system wouldn't even boot.
>
> That said, looking at 2fbd7af5af86, I do note that the code generation
> is horribly stupid.
>
> It's due to two different issues:
>
>  (a) the x86 asm constraints for that inline asm is nasty, and
> requires a register for 'size', even though an immediate works just
> fine.
>
>  (b) the "cmp" is inside the asm, so gcc can't combine it with the
> *other* cmp in the C code.
>
> Fixing (a) is easy:
>
>   +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
>   @@ -43 +43 @@ static inline unsigned long
> array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
>   -                       :"r"(size),"r" (index)
>   +                       :"ir"(size),"r" (index)
>
> but fixing (b) looks fundamentally hard. Gcc generates (for do_syscall()):
>
>         cmpq    $332, %rbp      #, nr
>         ja      .L295   #,
>         cmp $333,%rbp
>         sbb %rax,%rax;   #, nr, mask
>
> note how it completely pointlessly does the comparison twice, even
> though it could have just done
>
>         cmp $333,%rbp
>         jae      .L295   #,
>         sbb %rax,%rax;   #, nr, mask
>
> Ho humm. Sad.

Are there any compilers that would miscompile:

    mask = 0 - (index < size);

That might be a way to improve the assembly.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06 20:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-19  0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20   ` Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48     ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-25  7:09   ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25  7:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-24 14:40     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby
2018-02-06 19:29   ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37         ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-02-06 20:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37                 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07  0:33                     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07  1:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51       ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51         ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  8:42   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  8:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37   ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-20  6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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