From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1517343198; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=fLTtsvf14JwuI7rSZlZs6knKq1wIcjhR5T093Apzws1B2MRiECVq8HaHVSug+Iu0Th mqYcppq2TQZbSpVlXAf621+TAO2pUEx5ZNc92tUJ07ZZIbLUtl6K/SFiiww6w6HrGk6f T3ZeQ/qPdR1/a+6rxMpNHhNa+UOuQiiAGbpsBiQtmy5n8Wk1y1PX72Ta8q7AdGwmHB2C /tJzD+yNqeYgDoPK5YKbEMiXGkFdQpCHhbCpev0a4UqKxHFUjvRDm/z4TmYwnjbTSHyG 3GrBY26ycHKXJDprVHnvtLcubxG2o4m2v62zlx0fMpX1VMPPZEV7zwt1e4P1VHGxBzbE XL/Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:references:in-reply-to :mime-version:dkim-signature:arc-authentication-results; bh=amzb0920NnVI7zS+8rvQzjWmkc5hlWr20I5DQZ1WnC4=; b=v+pHnzAgwXF/wbtNuh/WIrPyGyO1RsBWAa7T3XHzTENUZjTh4tUjZIR9sv8gIKt69m aINyGfFVAZHn2PJ4ourzuQ+iFH185BpzJCjwTLTgjD3Cy9+1TMY7p8n6UMqA4z1ysgN3 jdQaKln/aiyFQ7HCvFJvl8Li30/C9QUSaIqsDXd5FOx7tFr82g+zx4amYAPBb1pBDkmZ o7lrD1lC//1zhA/ivVytb0KzLCcKGS5S+4IPmkSjXw2te1/s3iSmzIQwXY+tChsOIQFO zQH52qdcZnvK1d96io1PZ3LD1Pm7J3kkhL98MOw3V59cClK/1eSfV/lhBueIM2TakW/C FZ1w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@intel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.s=20150623 header.b=JxZjnKy6; spf=pass (google.com: domain of dan.j.williams@intel.com designates 209.85.220.41 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=dan.j.williams@intel.com Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@intel-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.s=20150623 header.b=JxZjnKy6; spf=pass (google.com: domain of dan.j.williams@intel.com designates 209.85.220.41 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=dan.j.williams@intel.com X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x224tur3fcca8uIo7BmjKJyuwTd1J/pH9T4SWgfdTgyCjEr2ojDpyaLvOmvHQ2fl69jqt6/xFdVF/q7c2ni2ByMQ= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <151703972396.26578.7326612698912543866.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <20180128085500.djlm5rlbhjlpfj4i@gmail.com> From: Dan Williams Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 12:13:18 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-arch , Cyril Novikov , Kernel Hardening , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , X86 ML , Will Deacon , Russell King , Ingo Molnar , Greg KH , "H. Peter Anvin" , Alan Cox , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Arjan Van De Ven Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1590732017653801778?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1591049662152300993?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: [ adding Arjan ] On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 11:38 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote: [..] > Anyway, I do think the patches I've seen so far are ok, and the real > reason I'm writing this email is actually more about future patches: > do we have a good handle on where these array index sanitations will > be needed? > > Also, while array limit checking was obviously the official > "spectre-v1" issue, I do wonder if there are possible other issues > where mispredicted conditional branches can end up leaking > information? > > IOW, is there some work on tooling/analysis/similar? Not asking for > near-term, but more of a "big picture" question.. > > Linus