Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels

[Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>]

On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 11:21 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
>> At entry userspace may have populated the extra registers outside the
>> syscall calling convention with values that could be useful in a
>> speculative execution attack. Clear them to minimize the kernel's attack
>> surface. Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused
>> registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments since those registers are
>> likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use
>> under speculation.
>>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: x86@kernel.org
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
>> Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/entry/calling.h  |   17 +++++++++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S |    1 +
>>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
>> index 3f48f695d5e6..daee2d19e73d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
>> @@ -147,6 +147,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
>>         UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
>>         .endm
>>
>> +       /*
>> +        * Sanitize extra registers of values that a speculation attack
>> +        * might want to exploit. In the CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y case,
>> +        * the expectation is that %ebp will be clobbered before it
>> +        * could be used.
>> +        */
>> +       .macro CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS_NOSPEC
>> +       xorq %r15, %r15
>> +       xorq %r14, %r14
>> +       xorq %r13, %r13
>> +       xorq %r12, %r12
>> +       xorl %ebx, %ebx
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
>> +       xorl %ebp, %ebp
>> +#endif
>> +       .endm
>> +
>
> Can we make the clears only happen if we have CONFIG_RETPOLINE?  Or is
> there maybe some reason why we want this even without retpolines on?

We have the other Spectre variant1 mitigations on by default. I'm not
opposed to adding a config to turn them all off, but I think we should
be consistent either way, and I don't think CONFIG_RETPOLINE is the
right config to gate those.

>>         .macro POP_EXTRA_REGS
>>         popq %r15
>>         popq %r14
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index c752abe89d80..46260e951da6 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
>>         TRACE_IRQS_OFF
>>
>>         /* IRQs are off. */
>> +       CLEAR_EXTRA_REGS_NOSPEC
>
> Please put the clears before TRACE_IRQS_OFF to protect users that use tracing.

Ok.