From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25494C433F5 for ; Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:12:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from phobos.denx.de (phobos.denx.de [85.214.62.61]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5070260E73 for ; Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:12:15 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org 5070260E73 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=lists.denx.de Received: from h2850616.stratoserver.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7215836BF; Thu, 4 Nov 2021 16:12:13 +0100 (CET) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="lvxrIJyz"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: by phobos.denx.de (Postfix, from userid 109) id 2C85F836BE; Thu, 4 Nov 2021 16:12:12 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail-vk1-xa34.google.com (mail-vk1-xa34.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::a34]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B17BD83281 for ; Thu, 4 Nov 2021 16:12:06 +0100 (CET) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sjg@google.com Received: by mail-vk1-xa34.google.com with SMTP id 84so1311189vkc.6 for ; Thu, 04 Nov 2021 08:12:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=dB8DcCuQpZeDHYaePCJniloTGKol7TNRXA68m6U7Z4M=; b=lvxrIJyznjFyK+1mM6YcaurIRmxDTOGPwemGqGL1/bABUmxBDHe8xPyqUtQV1kwa2v CRT6aLJ29f5IJ4tFXcvezMqaF6Cf3+ZjIUYTKe+f6ZW5sdZ2/+kZVl09ORHtZ1BcO3EX 3a4kTubLTpHdG0Yr8Er2vTtyTFOGoSKyOyhjM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=dB8DcCuQpZeDHYaePCJniloTGKol7TNRXA68m6U7Z4M=; b=xFlNC0cdkoPmaFrXxL8KRe025I/w0E9BCbhGGIh3sdnEveMose+vV909WWsOyEbQ/w 5aX+NgKNi5uBJFFo1yOvubT9A9gupn3wCbfloT8phEUIKgT2A4WoEEoIRZik19lwHJhF TCL0eP5eofvYKaZbsMPXlP3O7Y7HUCTv+/NVnMgz+5YX1jIEg0GbvcPdxxcxHC7hcTst 2i2Dr+pD26snk4qdc7Q4VQU1l5YK9vUEhaUL6zI3AwYKPHpNqV+Vdk7KYl++DuvOoRLh 2/sVZTiSoacrxyKOPrFKYTqP3u6MnXJ+4Me+yfjFZbafLxNZcfDF9C6V/aBAc//o56wx wRlQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530MAbD1ywFjjeY5IFMuqunr/DJ3oWWMKqF5luyteFTWifAblf2X pN8kOoyS2E9LCPO9nFuvpki8BmzgS6+7vtWgLrUYyA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxdvZ0u0LpT1XazualcyY98xk8BZl9Eoutkyozd1WlA4ijV7dtcVbWUZtXWuuyofmcrCbAiJNWbz6j90mYoP6g= X-Received: by 2002:a1f:1841:: with SMTP id 62mr60103526vky.26.1636038724673; Thu, 04 Nov 2021 08:12:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20211028062356.98224-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> <20211028062356.98224-5-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> <20211029052030.GB33977@laputa> <20211104014926.GA46422@laputa> In-Reply-To: <20211104014926.GA46422@laputa> From: Simon Glass Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 09:11:51 -0600 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 04/11] doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule To: AKASHI Takahiro , Simon Glass , Heinrich Schuchardt , Alex Graf , Ilias Apalodimas , Sughosh Ganu , Masami Hiramatsu , U-Boot Mailing List Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.2 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean Hi Takahiro, On Wed, 3 Nov 2021 at 19:49, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 02, 2021 at 08:57:48AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote: > > Hi Takahiro, > > > > On Thu, 28 Oct 2021 at 23:20, AKASHI Takahiro > > wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Oct 28, 2021 at 09:17:48PM -0600, Simon Glass wrote: > > > > Hi Takahiro, > > > > > > > > On Thu, 28 Oct 2021 at 00:25, AKASHI Takahiro > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Now we can use mkeficapsule command instead of EDK-II's script > > > > > to create a signed capsule file. So update the instruction for > > > > > capsule authentication. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro > > > > > --- > > > > > doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 143 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- > > > > > 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Simon Glass > > > > > > > > thoughts below > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst > > > > > index f17138f5c765..864d61734bee 100644 > > > > > --- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst > > > > > +++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst > > > > > @@ -284,37 +284,52 @@ Support has been added for the UEFI capsule update feature which > > > > > enables updating the U-Boot image using the UEFI firmware management > > > > > protocol (FMP). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through > > > > > the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk > > > > > -functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System > > > > > -Partition (ESP) by placing the capsule file under the > > > > > -\EFI\UpdateCapsule directory. > > > > > - > > > > > -The directory \EFI\UpdateCapsule is checked for capsules only within the > > > > > -EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option > > > > > -determined by reference to BootNext variable or BootOrder variable processing. > > > > > -The active Boot Variable is the variable with highest priority BootNext or > > > > > -within BootOrder that refers to a device found to be present. Boot variables > > > > > -in BootOrder but referring to devices not present are ignored when determining > > > > > -active boot variable. > > > > > -Before starting a capsule update make sure your capsules are installed in the > > > > > -correct ESP partition or set BootNext. > > > > > +functionality is used for fetching capsules from the EFI System > > > > > +Partition (ESP) by placing capsule files under the directory:: > > > > > + > > > > > + \EFI\UpdateCapsule > > > > > > > > Can we use forward slashes please? > > > > > > > > What is a backslash, even? DOS? Windows? > > > > > > UEFI specification. > > > In this document, all the file paths are presented with backslashes. > > > (See section 8.5.5 in version 2.9) > > > > > > Anyhow U-Boot UEFI internally converts the path with slashes. > > > > So do we need to use backslashes in U-Boot and in the docs? Can we use > > a forward slash instead? I had hoped those days were behind us. The > > backslash is used for C escapes, after all. > > I'd defer to the maintainer, Heinrich here. > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > +The directory is checked for capsules only within the > > > > > +EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option, > > > > > +which is determined by BootXXXX variable in BootNext, or if not, the highest > > > > > +priority one within BootOrder. Any BootXXXX variables referring to devices > > > > > +not present are ignored when determining the active boot option. > > > > > + > > > > > +Please note that capsules will be applied in the alphabetic order of > > > > > +capsule file names. > > > > > + > > > > > +Creating a capsule file > > > > > +*********************** > > > > > + > > > > > +A capsule file can be created by using tools/mkeficapsule. > > > > > +To build this tool, enable:: > > > > > + > > > > > + CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y > > > > > + CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO=y > > > > > + > > > > > +Run the following command:: > > > > > + > > > > > + $ mkeficapsule \ > > > > > + --index 1 --instance 0 \ > > > > > + [--fit | --raw ] \ > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > Performing the update > > > > > ********************* > > > > > > > > > > -Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime there's a Kconfig > > > > > -option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) to disable the OsIndications variable > > > > > -check. If that option is enabled just copy your capsule to \EFI\UpdateCapsule. > > > > > - > > > > > -If that option is disabled, you'll need to set the OsIndications variable with:: > > > > > +Put capsule files under the directory mentioned above. > > > > > +Then, following the UEFI specification, you'll need to set > > > > > +the EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_FILE_CAPSULE_DELIVERY_SUPPORTED > > > > > +bit in OsIndications variable with:: > > > > > > > > > > => setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04 > > > > > > > > > > -Finally, the capsule update can be initiated either by rebooting the board, > > > > > -which is the preferred method, or by issuing the following command:: > > > > > +Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime, its value > > > > > +won't be taken over across the reboot. If this is the case, you can skip > > > > > +this feature check with the Kconfig option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) > > > > > +set. > > > > > > > > > > - => efidebug capsule disk-update > > > > > - > > > > > -**The efidebug command is should only be used during debugging/development.** > > > > > +Finally, the capsule update can be initiated by rebooting the board. > > > > > > > > > > Enabling Capsule Authentication > > > > > ******************************* > > > > > @@ -324,82 +339,58 @@ be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature > > > > > is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of > > > > > capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the > > > > > public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is > > > > > -in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as > > > > > -part of U-Boot. > > > > > +in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded in > > > > > +a device tree. > > > > > > > > > > The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the > > > > > following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule > > > > > update:: > > > > > > > > > > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y > > > > > - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH= > > > > > > > > > > The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated > > > > > -and used by the steps highlighted below:: > > > > > +and used by the steps highlighted below. > > > > > > > > > > - 1. Install utility commands on your host > > > > > - * OPENSSL > > > > > +1. Install utility commands on your host > > > > > + * openssl > > > > > * efitools > > > > > > > > > > - 2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host > > > > > +2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host:: > > > > > > > > > > $ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \ > > > > > -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365 > > > > > $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl > > > > > > > > > > - $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER > > > > > - $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem > > > > > - > > > > > - $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt > > > > > - $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem > > > > > - > > > > > -The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py > > > > > -script in EDKII:: > > > > > - > > > > > - $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \ > > > > > - --monotonic-count --fw-version \ > > > > > - --lsv --guid \ > > > > > - e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \ > > > > > - --update-image-index --signer-private-cert \ > > > > > - /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \ > > > > > - /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \ > > > > > - > > > > > - > > > > > -Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System > > > > > -Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory > > > > > - > > > > > -Testing on QEMU > > > > > -*************** > > > > > +3. Run the following command to create and sign the capsule file:: > > > > > > > > > > -Currently, support has been added on the QEMU ARM64 virt platform for > > > > > -updating the U-Boot binary as a raw image when the platform is booted > > > > > -in non-secure mode, i.e. with CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this > > > > > -configuration, the QEMU platform needs to be booted with > > > > > -'secure=off'. The U-Boot binary placed on the first bank of the NOR > > > > > -flash at offset 0x0. The U-Boot environment is placed on the second > > > > > -NOR flash bank at offset 0x4000000. > > > > > + $ mkeficapsule --monotonic-count 1 \ > > > > > + --private-key CRT.key \ > > > > > + --certificate CRT.crt \ > > > > > + --index 1 --instance 0 \ > > > > > + [--fit | --raw ] \ > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > -The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configuration > > > > > -settings:: > > > > > +4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format:: > > > > > > > > > > - CONFIG_MTD=y > > > > > - CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y > > > > > - CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y > > > > > - CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y > > > > > - CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y > > > > > - CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y > > > > > - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y > > > > > - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y > > > > > - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y > > > > > - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y > > > > > + { > > > > > + signature { > > > > > + capsule-key = [ ]; > > > > > + } > > > > > > > > > > Can you add this feature to binman? A new entry type that takes the > > > > capsule key could do it. We need some way of handling this a bit > > > > better. > > > > > > As I said in the previous version, I don't know yet if binman > > > is the best place. > > > Can you give me a pointer where a similar feature is implemented > > > in binman, please? > > > > See tools/binman/etype/vblock.py > > I'll check it out. > > > > > > > > > > > > + ... > > > > > + } > > > > > > > > > > -In addition, the following config needs to be disabled(QEMU ARM specific):: > > > > > + You can do this manually with:: > > > > > > > > > > - CONFIG_TFABOOT > > > > > + $ dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts > > > > > + $ fdtoverlay -i orig.dtb -o new.dtb -v signature.dtbo > > > > > > > > > > -The capsule file can be generated by using the tools/mkeficapsule:: > > > > > + where signature.dts looks like:: > > > > > > > > > > - $ mkeficapsule --raw --index 1 > > > > > + &{/} { > > > > > + signature { > > > > > + capsule-key = /incbin/("CRT.esl"); > > > > > + }; > > > > > + }; > > > > > > > > Ick. I think your tool should just support adding the signature. > > > > > > # I may misunderstand your point. > > > > > > The whole purpose of this tool is to create a capsule file. > > > Adding the signature to that file is simply an optional behavior. > > > I don't see any reason that we should have those features in > > > separate tools. > > > > > > On the other hand, step.4 mentioned above is to add public keys (x509 > > > certificate list or signature list in UEFI terminology) to a device tree. > > > This is a separate step. > > > Clear? > > > > It just seems a pain to create a DT overlay to add the signature. > > Pain in what sense? > I have provided fdtsig.sh to avoid bothering users. > > > I hope Binman can help here if you don't want to put it in your tool. > > I can write something if it would help. > > I think it's up to you to add the feature to binman, > but also believe we should not and don't have to impose always > using binman for this purpose on everyone, thinking of > various situations that users may have. I am reading TLOTR at present so this came to mind... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wcASKPX1Ot8 What I would like is a simple way to build an image automatically, with as few steps as possible and have it work. For U-Boot we are trying to use binman internally, but binman can also be used for the 'final step'. See this talk. There is also a video somewhere. https://2019.osfc.io/talks/binman-a-data-controlled-firmware-packer-for-u-boot.html Let's try to collaborate on the firmware packaging. It is the wild west at present and the series you have here shows some of the challenges. Regards, Simon