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From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Brown, Len" <len.brown@intel.com>,
	"Liu, Jing2" <jing2.liu@intel.com>,
	"Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 14/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Prevent unauthorised use of dynamic user state
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:13:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <D147640C-0248-4934-8F11-69706E0EE5CB@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <842d8e8a-44c6-a8c5-c580-a77fc52d267f@intel.com>

On Jun 29, 2021, at 11:50, Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
> On 6/29/21 11:35 AM, Bae, Chang Seok wrote:
>>        if (likely(use_xsave())) {
>> +               /*
>> +                * MSR IA32_XFD write follows after this XSAVE(S). So if a
>> +                * state component is in use, XFD should not be armed for
>> +                * current. But, for potential changes in the future,
>> +                * cross-check XINUSE and XFD values. If a XINUSE state
>> +                * is XFD-armed, the following XSAVE(S) does not save the
>> +                * state.
>> +                *
>> +                * Reference the shadow XFD value instead of reading the
>> +                * MSR.
>> +                */
>> +               if (xfd_capable() && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1)) {
>> +                       u64 current_xfd = (fpu->state_mask & xfd_capable()) ^ xfd_capable();
>> +
>> +                       WARN_ON_FPU(xgetbv(1) & current_xfd);
>> +               }
> 
> The code looks fine.  But, as usual, I hate the comment.  Maybe:
> 
> 		/*
> 		 * If XFD is armed for an xfeature, XSAVE* will not save
> 		 * its state.  Ensure XFD is clear for all features that
> 		 * are in use before XSAVE*.
> 		 */
> 
> BTW, the ->state_mask calculation is a little confusing to me.  I
> understand that fpu->state_mask shouldn't have any bits set that are
> unset in xgetbv(1).
> 
> This code seems to be asking the question: Are any dynamic features in
> their init state *and* XFD-armed?
> 
> Is it actually important to make sure that they are dynamic features?
> Is there *any* case where a feature (dynamic or not) can have XFD armed
> and be out of its init state?

In this AMX series, XFD is only used for the xstate buffer management. The
code is made in a such way that XFD and dynamic states are a bit coupled.

But I think XFD can be extended for other usages in the future. Then, yes.
(This warning is also for future code changes.)

So, reading the MSR is just simple and clean here, but it consumes cycles. Or,
a task may have a field for XFD value per se unless this conversion is
acceptable.

Thanks,
Chang

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-29 19:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-23 19:32 [PATCH v5 00/28] x86: Support Intel Advanced Matrix Extensions Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 01/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify the initialization helper to handle both static and dynamic buffers Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 02/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify state copy helpers " Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 03/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify address finders " Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 04/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify the context restore helper " Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 05/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Add a new variable to indicate dynamic user states Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 06/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Add new variables to indicate dynamic xstate buffer size Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 07/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Calculate and remember dynamic xstate buffer sizes Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 08/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Convert the struct fpu 'state' field to a pointer Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 09/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce helpers to manage the xstate buffer dynamically Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 10/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Define the scope of the initial xstate data Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 11/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the xstate save function to support dynamic states Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 12/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the xstate buffer address finder " Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 13/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the xstate context copy function " Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 14/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Prevent unauthorised use of dynamic user state Chang S. Bae
2021-06-16 16:17   ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-16 16:27   ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-16 18:12     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-16 18:47       ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-06-16 19:01         ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-16 19:23           ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-06-16 19:28             ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-16 19:37               ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-06-28 10:11               ` Liu, Jing2
2021-06-29 17:43           ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-06-29 17:54             ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-29 18:35               ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-06-29 18:50                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-29 19:13                   ` Bae, Chang Seok [this message]
2021-06-29 19:26                     ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 15/28] x86/arch_prctl: Create ARCH_GET_XSTATE/ARCH_PUT_XSTATE Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24 23:10   ` Len Brown
2021-05-25 17:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-25 17:33       ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-26  0:38     ` Len Brown
2021-05-27 11:14       ` second, sync-alloc syscall Borislav Petkov
2021-05-27 13:59         ` Len Brown
2021-05-27 19:35           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-25 15:46   ` [PATCH v5 15/28] x86/arch_prctl: Create ARCH_GET_XSTATE/ARCH_PUT_XSTATE Dave Hansen
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 16/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Support ptracer-induced xstate buffer expansion Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 17/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Adjust the XSAVE feature table to address gaps in state component numbers Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 18/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Disable xstate support if an inconsistent state is detected Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 19/28] x86/cpufeatures/amx: Enumerate Advanced Matrix Extension (AMX) feature bits Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 20/28] x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 21/28] x86/fpu/amx: Initialize child's AMX state Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24  3:09   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-24 17:37     ` Len Brown
2021-05-24 18:13       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-24 18:21         ` Len Brown
2021-05-25  3:44           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 22/28] x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 23/28] selftest/x86/amx: Test cases for the AMX state management Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 24/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Use per-task xstate mask for saving xstate in signal frame Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24  3:15   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-24 18:06     ` Len Brown
2021-05-25  4:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-25 14:04         ` Len Brown
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 25/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Skip writing zeros to signal frame for dynamic user states if in INIT-state Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24  3:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-24 18:15     ` Len Brown
2021-05-24 18:29       ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-25  4:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 26/28] selftest/x86/amx: Test case for AMX state copy optimization in signal delivery Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 27/28] x86/insn/amx: Add TILERELEASE instruction to the opcode map Chang S. Bae
2021-05-23 19:32 ` [PATCH v5 28/28] x86/fpu/amx: Clear the AMX state when appropriate Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24  3:13   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-24 14:10     ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-24 17:32       ` Len Brown
2021-05-24 17:39         ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-24 18:24           ` Len Brown
2021-05-27 11:56             ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-05-27 14:02               ` Len Brown
2021-05-24 14:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-05-24 17:34     ` Len Brown
2021-05-24 21:11       ` [PATCH v5-fix " Chang S. Bae

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