From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2ECB93FB15 for ; Tue, 14 Nov 2023 15:14:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="CDbCkxBO" Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 01EB9FF for ; Tue, 14 Nov 2023 07:14:30 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type: MIME-Version:Message-ID:References:In-Reply-To:Subject:CC:To:From:Date:Sender :Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=zLWRl6fuh+QlAq2JcSTCgSqOD3rW63ZP4Laj6regjn0=; b=CDbCkxBOGqoE0okEs41cvDk5fY avC36PbcnvrY2oGlWB+RQPF4liPIPZGR3EmI5Av83WCkoqFq/6JecFkFY7vUWsvo7/8BmYzi44D1g Ws5geOrtzOEM5Q+9dgkqYhjuO8CCj0m7FwKXRyGH/otFSxezkrYf7thCJcuan3UovTroWWy1VVTp0 pnd+C2RYiX9iD91nqIjI4v94iVedb61DZAmiijnR8rGW40PapOik1v9uw6WmF0h27udRo7vUsUI+/ CdQBeD4lSkTeDsX/DqpzXtj+VzppGTN+wtPUM4BmDuIgnKf9HDMxmYUNaj5vpn46oYHJTmkvPF/K5 uuDkjPBA==; Received: from [12.186.190.2] (helo=[127.0.0.1]) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1r2v73-008dEf-2f; Tue, 14 Nov 2023 15:14:01 +0000 Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 10:13:58 -0500 From: David Woodhouse To: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Philippe_Mathieu-Daud=E9?= , David Woodhouse , qemu-devel@nongnu.org CC: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Alex_Benn=E9e?= , Paul Durrant , qemu-arm@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Stefano Stabellini , Richard Henderson , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org, Anthony Perard , kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Huth , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Marcel Apfelbaum Subject: =?US-ASCII?Q?Re=3A_=5BPATCH-for-9=2E0_v2_06/19=5D_hw/pci/msi?= =?US-ASCII?Q?=3A_Restrict_xen=5Fis=5Fpirq=5Fmsi=28=29_call_to_Xen?= User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: <20231114143816.71079-7-philmd@linaro.org> References: <20231114143816.71079-1-philmd@linaro.org> <20231114143816.71079-7-philmd@linaro.org> Message-ID: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by casper.infradead.org. See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html On 14 November 2023 09:38:02 GMT-05:00, "Philippe Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9" wrote: >Similarly to the restriction in hw/pci/msix=2Ec (see commit >e1e4bf2252 "msix: fix msix_vector_masked"), restrict the >xen_is_pirq_msi() call in msi_is_masked() to Xen=2E > >Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9 Hm, we do also support the Xen abomination of snooping on MSI table writes= to see if they're targeted at a Xen PIRQ, then actually unmasking the MSI = from QEMU when the guest binds the corresponding event channel to that PIRQ= =2E I think this is going to break in CI as kvm_xen_guest=2Epy does deliberate= ly exercise that use case, doesn't it? I deliberately *didn't* switch to testing the Xen PV net device, with a co= mment that testing MSI and irqchip permutations was far more entertaining= =2E So I hope it should catch this?