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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"jethro@fortanix.com" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"b.thiel@posteo.de" <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 06/26] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 10:36:55 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YCuEHJ7a2HLG6jk/@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <af4798077c93450e8e30dddbc7c650d0@intel.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 05:03:26AM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > 
> > On Sun, Feb 14, 2021 at 02:29:05AM +1300, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > >
> > > The kernel will currently disable all SGX support if the hardware does
> > > not support launch control.  Make it more permissive to allow SGX
> > > virtualization on systems without Launch Control support.  This will
> > > allow KVM to expose SGX to guests that have less-strict requirements
> > > on the availability of flexible launch control.
> > >
> > > Improve error message to distinguish between three cases.  There are
> > > two cases where SGX support is completely disabled:
> > > 1) SGX has been disabled completely by the BIOS
> > > 2) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS.  Bare-metal support is disabled because
> > >    of LC unavailability.  SGX virtualization is unavailable (because of
> > >    Kconfig).
> > > One where it is partially available:
> > > 3) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS.  Bare-metal support is disabled because
> > >    of LC unavailability.  SGX virtualization is supported.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > > Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > > v4->v5:
> > >
> > >  - No code change.
> > >
> > > v3->v4:
> > >
> > >  - Removed cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX1) check in enable_sgx_any, since it
> > logically
> > >    is not related to KVM SGX series, per Sean.
> > >  - Changed declaration of variables to be in reverse-christmas tree style, per
> > >    Jarkko.
> > >
> > > v2->v3:
> > >
> > >  - Added to use 'enable_sgx_any', per Dave.
> > >  - Changed to call clear_cpu_cap() directly, rather than using clear_sgx_caps()
> > >    and clear_sgx_lc().
> > >  - Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, instead of
> > CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION.
> > >
> > > v1->v2:
> > >
> > >  - Refined commit message per Dave's comments.
> > >  - Added check to only enable SGX virtualization when VMX is supported, per
> > >    Dave's comment.
> > >  - Refined error msg print to explicitly call out SGX virtualization will be
> > >    supported when LC is locked by BIOS, per Dave's comment.
> > >
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 57
> > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> > >  1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
> > > b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index 27533a6e04fa..96c370284913
> > > 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
> > > @@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ early_param("nosgx", nosgx);  void
> > > init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)  {
> > >  	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
> > > -	bool enable_sgx;
> > > +	bool enable_sgx_any, enable_sgx_kvm, enable_sgx_driver;
> > > +	bool enable_vmx;
> > >  	u64 msr;
> > >
> > >  	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { @@ -114,13 +115,21
> > @@
> > > void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > >  		return;
> > >  	}
> > >
> > > +	enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
> > > +		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL);
> > 
> > It's less than 100 characters:
> 
> Just carious, shouldn't be 80 characters to wrap a new line, instead of 100?

Try with checkpatch.pl.

> 
> > 
> >         enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
> > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL);
> > 
> > This is better:
> > 
> >         enable_vmx = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) && cpu_has(c,
> > X86_FEATURE_VMX);
> > 
> > You only want to evaluate cpu_has() if COHNFIG_KVM_INTEL is enabled.
> 
> If you look at the original code, cpu_has() comes first. It's just one-time booting time code, and I don't think it matters.
> 
> Btw, are you also suggesting IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX) should come before cpu_has() for SGX in below code? 
> 
> That being said, cpu_has() comes first for both VMX and SGX in the original code. I don't know why I need to change the sequence in this patch.
> 
> > 
> > > +
> > >  	/*
> > > -	 * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control
> > > -	 * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written.
> > > +	 * Separate out SGX driver enabling from KVM.  This allows KVM
> > > +	 * guests to use SGX even if the kernel SGX driver refuses to
> > > +	 * use it.  This happens if flexible Faunch Control is not
> > > +	 * available.
> > >  	 */
> > > -	enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
> > > -		     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) &&
> > > -		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
> > > +	enable_sgx_any = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
> > > +			 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
> > > +	enable_sgx_driver = enable_sgx_any &&
> > > +			    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
> > > +	enable_sgx_kvm = enable_sgx_any && enable_vmx &&
> > > +			  IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM);
> > >
> > >  	if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
> > >  		goto update_caps;
> > > @@ -136,15 +145,18 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > >  	 * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
> > >  	 * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
> > >  	 */
> > > -	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
> > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
> > > +	if (enable_vmx) {
> > >  		msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> > >
> > >  		if (tboot)
> > >  			msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
> > >  	}
> > >
> > > -	if (enable_sgx)
> > > -		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED |
> > FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
> > > +	if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) {
> > > +		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
> > > +		if (enable_sgx_driver)
> > > +			msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
> > > +	}
> > >
> > >  	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
> > >
> > > @@ -167,10 +179,29 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > >  	}
> > >
> > >  update_sgx:
> > > -	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) ||
> > > -	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
> > > -		if (enable_sgx)
> > > -			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
> > > +	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED)) {
> > > +		if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver)
> > > +			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS.\n");
> > >  		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
> > 
> > Empty line before return statement.
> 
> It's just two statements inside the if() {} statement. Putting a new line here is too sparse IMHO.
> 
> I'd like to hear more.

This was a common review comment in original SGX series, so I'm
sticking to the pattern.

> 
> Dave, do you have any comment?
> 
> > 
> > > +		return;
> > > +	}
> > > +
> > > +	/*
> > > +	 * VMX feature bit may be cleared due to being disabled in BIOS,
> > > +	 * in which case SGX virtualization cannot be supported either.
> > > +	 */
> > > +	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && enable_sgx_kvm) {
> > > +		pr_err_once("SGX virtualization disabled due to lack of VMX.\n");
> > > +		enable_sgx_kvm = 0;
> > > +	}
> > > +
> > > +	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) && enable_sgx_driver) {
> > > +		if (!enable_sgx_kvm) {
> > > +			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Disable
> > SGX.\n");
> > > +			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
> > > +		} else {
> > > +			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Support
> > SGX virtualization only.\n");
> > > +			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
> > > +		}
> > >  	}
> > >  }
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > >
> > 
> > /Jarkko
> 

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-16  8:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-13 13:28 [RFC PATCH v5 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() Kai Huang
2021-02-16 17:04   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 20:42     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16 18:38   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-16 21:33       ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 21:34     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-17 22:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/26] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  5:03     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16  8:36       ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-02-16 10:24         ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 18:40   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 20:42     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Kai Huang
2021-02-16 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/26] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16 10:30     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 10:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 11:15         ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 11:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 11:56             ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 15:18             ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 18:47               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 18:53                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:18                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-17 22:20               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-18  9:09                 ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 16:28         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/26] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/26] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/26] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/26] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-02-16  3:08   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  3:09     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  4:55       ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16  8:33         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  8:35           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  9:33             ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/26] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/26] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/26] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/26] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/26] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/26] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/26] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/26] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/26] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:30 ` [RFC PATCH v5 26/26] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Kai Huang
2021-02-16 18:48 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-16 20:58   ` Huang, Kai

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