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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig()
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 15:12:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YLeDx+EohkPpjabd@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210602101618.462908825@linutronix.de>

On Wed, Jun 02, 2021 at 11:55:45AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> The non-compacted slowpath uses __copy_from_user() and copies the entire
> user buffer into the kernel buffer, verbatim.  This means that the kernel
> buffer may now contain entirely invalid state on which XRSTOR will #GP.
> validate_user_xstate_header() can detect some of that corruption, but that
> leaves the onus on callers to clear the buffer.
> 
> Prior to XSAVES support it was possible just to reinitialize the buffer,
> completely, but with supervisor states that is not longer possible as the
> buffer clearing code split got it backwards. Fixing that is possible, but
> not corrupting the state in the first place is more robust.
> 
> Avoid corruption of the kernel XSAVE buffer by using copy_user_to_xstate()
> which validates the XSAVE header contents before copying the actual states
> to the kernel. copy_user_to_xstate() was previously only called for
> compacted-format kernel buffers, but it works for both compacted and
> non-compacted forms.
> 
> Using it for the non-compacted form is slower because of multiple
> __copy_from_user() operations, but that cost is less important than robust
> code in an already slow path.
> 
> [ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]

Nice polishing!

> Fixes: b860eb8dce59 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Define new functions for clearing fpregs and xstates")
> Reported-by: syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |    4 ----
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c      |    9 +--------
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |    2 +-
>  3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
> @@ -112,8 +112,4 @@ void copy_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xr
>  void copy_dynamic_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
>  void copy_kernel_to_dynamic_supervisor(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
>  
> -
> -/* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
> -int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr);
> -
>  #endif
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> @@ -405,14 +405,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __use
>  	if (use_xsave() && !fx_only) {
>  		u64 init_bv = xfeatures_mask_user() & ~user_xfeatures;
>  
> -		if (using_compacted_format()) {
> -			ret = copy_user_to_xstate(&fpu->state.xsave, buf_fx);
> -		} else {
> -			ret = __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, buf_fx, state_size);
> -
> -			if (!ret && state_size > offsetof(struct xregs_state, header))
> -				ret = validate_user_xstate_header(&fpu->state.xsave.header);
> -		}
> +		ret = copy_user_to_xstate(&fpu->state.xsave, buf_fx);
>  		if (ret)
>  			goto err_out;
>  
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
> @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ int using_compacted_format(void)
>  }
>  
>  /* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
> -int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
> +static int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)

Can't do that yet - that one is still called from regset.c:

arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c: In function ‘xstateregs_set’:
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:135:10: error: implicit declaration of function ‘validate_user_xstate_header’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
  135 |    ret = validate_user_xstate_header(&xsave->header);
      |          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

Maybe after the 5th patch which kills that usage too.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-02 13:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02  9:55 [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16       ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02     ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-06-02 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24   ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 11:56     ` Thomas Gleixner

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