Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH] docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping

["Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>]

On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 11:42:22AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 01:04:27PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied
> > by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the
> > remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access
> > control rules.
> > 
> > For example if 'trusted.*' which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN is remapped
> > to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can
> > write to 'user.*' can bypass the CAP_SYS_ADMIN control. Thus the
> > target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes
> > by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.
> > 
> > The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right
> > thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting
> > this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins
> > and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
> > index 00554c75bd..6370ab927c 100644
> > --- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
> > +++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
> > @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options
> >    timeout.  ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency.
> >    The default is ``auto``.
> >  
> > -xattr-mapping
> > --------------
> > +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping
> > +----------------------------------
> >  
> >  By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server
> >  file system.  This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used
> > @@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the
> >  virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot
> >  access some attributes.
> >  
> > +Mapping syntax
> > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > +
> >  A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping``
> >  string consists of a series of rules.
> >  
> > @@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do
> >  extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally
> >  does itself.
> >  
> > -xattr-mapping Examples
> > -----------------------
> > +Security considerations
> > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > +
> > +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using
> > +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different
> > +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple
> > +partitions
> > +
> > + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem
> > + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> > + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> > + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership
> > +
> > +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes
> > +and access control rules.
> > +
> > +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to
> > +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to
> > +evade the guest access control rules.
> > +
> > +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to
> > +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged
> > +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs
> > +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access
> > +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing
> > +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``.
> > +
> > +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls
> > +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to
> > +try to predict what the guest OS will use.
> > +
> > +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is
> > +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.
> 
> Remapping all xattrs seem to make sense. It probably will lead
> to less confusion. Nested guests add another level of redirection.
> 
> BTW, remapping xattr has limitation that it does not work on
> symlinks. So "user.*" can't be set on symlink. And that means
> selinux relabeling of symlinks fails with remapped xattrs.
> 
> Not sure how to address this limitation. Host kernel imposes
> this limit. (man xattr).

Oh fun, I had not noticed this limitation before :-(

Here are some ideas I had, none especially nice

 - Use 'trusted.*' namespace for remapping instead of 'user.'
 
   virtiofsd needs to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN though which is
   quite horrible if your goal is to confine its privileges
   in any meaningful way

 - Store a symlinks' xattr on the target of the symlink

   if the symlink has dev:inode  54:224, and points to
   a file 'foo', then on 'foo' create an xattr
   "user.virtiofs.link:54:224.<original xattrpath>"

   This gets quite horrendous when you have symlinks
   pointing to symlinks pointing to symlinks. Does
   not work too well if the 'st_dev' value is
   not stable across reboots either.

 - Don't use xattrs at all for remapping, instead use
   hidden files.

   eg for a file 'foo', if an xattr is set then create
   a file '.foo.xattr' in the same directory and store
   the xattrs in that file in some format. Need to hide
   this lookaside files from the guest of course.

> > +This is shown in example (1) below.
> > +
> > +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes,
> > +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct
> > +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown
> > +in example (2) below.
> 
> Example (2) seems to block all the xattrs with prefix even
> if only one xattr has been remapped.
> 
> So if we remapped "trusted." to "user.virtiofs.trusted.", then
> client can't set any xattr starting with "user.virtiofs". I am
> wondering should it be limted to only blocking only
> "user.virtiofs.trusted.".

Or maybe illustrate with two mappings, so we can show how blocking
the parent xattr covers both

Regards,
Daniel
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