From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9771C48BE5 for ; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:18:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1188B6135C for ; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:18:12 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1188B6135C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:43476 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1ltScc-0005zQ-Tn for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 06:18:10 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:55092) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1ltSbL-0004rM-6d for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 06:16:51 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:49843) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1ltSbG-0001Ou-AG for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 06:16:48 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1623838604; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ik4Vc8uu/LpuuV1ZHuyniYlXu5s/hB47MUL5RgttNjs=; b=aYsnCdwIXtmVVT3K2ORl89XRWIs+NCL5v4o7zYs2ByAEq36uk3yTpKi9/aIOv028Csmmk5 rR4/ke+lsOc7yUWwiq8SupsrkdF13t2/vAcQl2zu8rIiMRhl7j+H1tNbnD2XtakuLGkUof 3DEY3P14/atvZeK4dchAFX//+ngZZgM= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-254-8BjIpLWwO0KOlFAOhaNFzw-1; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 06:16:40 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 8BjIpLWwO0KOlFAOhaNFzw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE12C9F94D for ; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:16:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from work-vm (ovpn-115-42.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.115.42]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65EC816E4C; Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:16:13 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 11:16:10 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" To: Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping Message-ID: References: <20210611120427.49736-1-berrange@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20210611120427.49736-1-berrange@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/2.0.7 (2021-05-04) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dgilbert@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.133.124; envelope-from=dgilbert@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -29 X-Spam_score: -3.0 X-Spam_bar: --- X-Spam_report: (-3.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.197, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Stefan Hajnoczi Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" * Daniel P. Berrangé (berrange@redhat.com) wrote: > Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied > by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the > remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access > control rules. > > For example if 'trusted.*' which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN is remapped > to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can > write to 'user.*' can bypass the CAP_SYS_ADMIN control. Thus the > target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes > by the guest, to prevent access control bypass. > > The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right > thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting > this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins > and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert Vivek's point about symlinks is something we should add but that's kind of separate to the clarification you've explained here. Dave > --- > docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > index 00554c75bd..6370ab927c 100644 > --- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > +++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options > timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. > The default is ``auto``. > > -xattr-mapping > -------------- > +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping > +---------------------------------- > > By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server > file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used > @@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the > virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot > access some attributes. > > +Mapping syntax > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > + > A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` > string consists of a series of rules. > > @@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do > extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally > does itself. > > -xattr-mapping Examples > ----------------------- > +Security considerations > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > + > +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using > +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different > +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple > +partitions > + > + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem > + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN > + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN > + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership > + > +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes > +and access control rules. > + > +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to > +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to > +evade the guest access control rules. > + > +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to > +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged > +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs > +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access > +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing > +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. > + > +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls > +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to > +try to predict what the guest OS will use. > + > +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is > +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix. > +This is shown in example (1) below. > + > +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, > +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct > +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown > +in example (2) below. > + > +Mapping examples > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.' > > @@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. > The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes > on the host. > The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting > -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. > +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access > +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix > +remapping. > Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes > through. > > -- > 2.31.1 > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 11:16:10 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Message-ID: References: <20210611120427.49736-1-berrange@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In-Reply-To: <20210611120427.49736-1-berrange@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH] docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping List-Id: Development discussions about virtio-fs List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org * Daniel P. Berrang=E9 (berrange@redhat.com) wrote: > Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied > by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the > remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access > control rules. >=20 > For example if 'trusted.*' which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN is remapped > to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can > write to 'user.*' can bypass the CAP_SYS_ADMIN control. Thus the > target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes > by the guest, to prevent access control bypass. >=20 > The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right > thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting > this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins > and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations. >=20 > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrang=E9 Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert Vivek's point about symlinks is something we should add but that's kind of separate to the clarification you've explained here. Dave > --- > docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >=20 > diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > index 00554c75bd..6370ab927c 100644 > --- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > +++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst > @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options > timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of cohe= rency. > The default is ``auto``. > =20 > -xattr-mapping > -------------- > +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping > +---------------------------------- > =20 > By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to = the server > file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are u= sed > @@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/serve= r confusion) or if the > virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it = cannot > access some attributes. > =20 > +Mapping syntax > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > + > A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=3Dmapping where t= he ``mapping`` > string consists of a series of rules. > =20 > @@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapp= ed, the daemon has to do > extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel no= rmally > does itself. > =20 > -xattr-mapping Examples > ----------------------- > +Security considerations > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > + > +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using > +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different > +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple > +partitions > + > + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem > + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN > + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN > + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership > + > +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes > +and access control rules. > + > +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to > +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to > +evade the guest access control rules. > + > +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to > +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged > +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs > +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access > +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing > +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. > + > +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls > +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to > +try to predict what the guest OS will use. > + > +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is > +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix. > +This is shown in example (1) below. > + > +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, > +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct > +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown > +in example (2) below. > + > +Mapping examples > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > =20 > 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.' > =20 > @@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. > The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes > on the host. > The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting > -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. > +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access > +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix > +remapping. > Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes > through. > =20 > --=20 > 2.31.1 >=20 --=20 Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK