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From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jon Grimm <jon.grimm@amd.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
	Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>,
	Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 14:07:43 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YPV5H0A+HB/t6y+z@casper.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YPV27hDPZUoVsIZt@suse.de>

On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 02:58:22PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> I'd like to get some movement again into the discussion around how to
> implement runtime memory validation for confidential guests and wrote up
> some thoughts on it.
> Below are the results in form of a proposal I put together. Please let
> me know your thoughts on it and whether it fits everyones requirements.

I think this proposal skips (intentionally?) something that s390 already
implemented: the secure guest deliberately allowing the hypervisor to
access certain pages for a period and then re-validating them.  I hope x86
can use the same interface as s390 for this, or if not, the interface can
be modified to be usable by all architectures.  See commit f28d43636d6f
("mm/gup/writeback: add callbacks for inaccessible pages").

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-19 13:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-19 12:58 Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 13:07 ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2021-07-19 15:02   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 20:39 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20  8:55   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20  9:34     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-20 11:50       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20  0:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20  1:51   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20  2:00     ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20  3:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20 19:54       ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 22:01         ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:55           ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21  0:35             ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-21  8:51           ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20  5:17     ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20  9:11       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 17:32         ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:09       ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21  0:38         ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-22 17:31       ` Marc Orr
2021-07-26 18:55         ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20  8:44   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 14:14   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-20 17:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21  9:20   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:02     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:22       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:53       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21  9:25   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21 10:25     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:48       ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-22 15:46   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-26 19:02     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-27  9:34       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-02 10:19         ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 18:47           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 15:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 19:51 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-23 15:23   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-23 16:29     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-25  9:16       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-25 18:28         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 10:00           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-26 11:53             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 19:13   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-26 23:02   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-26 23:54     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-27  1:35       ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-23 11:04 ` Varad Gautam
2021-07-23 14:34   ` Kaplan, David

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