From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E69BC433F5 for ; Mon, 4 Oct 2021 15:08:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5713F6124D for ; Mon, 4 Oct 2021 15:08:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235556AbhJDPKi (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Oct 2021 11:10:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59146 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233728AbhJDPKh (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Oct 2021 11:10:37 -0400 Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [IPv6:2a01:4f8:190:11c2::b:1457]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 854C6C061745 for ; Mon, 4 Oct 2021 08:08:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from zn.tnic (p200300ec2f08d80044cec3b734c8017c.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [IPv6:2003:ec:2f08:d800:44ce:c3b7:34c8:17c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id B807E1EC03D5; Mon, 4 Oct 2021 17:08:45 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1633360125; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=ggal+4qNmiBMoIpJ/kVznwCxxMAmbQKX5Lqka/nSR5Q=; b=Y8g6T+ftcyQ8lEts04ildOYPWTdFSbgR0dA6bLBRlZmNNrIjEnPtjqj5PwZ9qjyNRMNY/J MA/YjbtKXXRPS8yF7JVStR4lqs585WZFAT8bLC0z5ULeItsow4SSFSGLARBdjFHOw1FHbW /wn0ULoBWU+hag4xkoZSJqL+Ks4ZJx4= Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 17:08:39 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov To: Joerg Roedel Cc: Tom Lendacky , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage Message-ID: References: <113eca80a14cd280540c38488fd31ac0fa7bf36c.1633063250.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- From: Borislav Petkov Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 21:41:20 +0200 The size of the exception stacks was increased by the commit in Fixes, resulting in stack sizes greater than a page in size. The #VC exception handling was only mapping the first (bottom) page, resulting in an SEV-ES guest failing to boot. Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default exception stacks storage and allocate them with a CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y .config. Map them only when a SEV-ES guest has been detected. Rip out the custom VC stacks mapping and storage code. [ bp: Steal and adapt Tom's commit message. ] Fixes: 7fae4c24a2b8 ("x86: Increase exception stack sizes") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 16 +++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 32 --------------------------- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 7 ++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h index 3d52b094850a..2512e1f5ac02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h @@ -10,8 +10,14 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ EXCEPTION_STKSZ +#else +#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0 +#endif + /* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */ -#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size) \ +#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize) \ char DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ char DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ char NMI_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ @@ -21,19 +27,19 @@ char MCE_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ char MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ char VC_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ + char VC_stack[VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ - char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ + char VC2_stack[VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ]; \ char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \ /* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */ struct exception_stacks { - ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0, 0) + ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0) }; /* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */ struct cea_exception_stacks { - ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ) + ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE) }; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index a6895e440bc3..88401675dabb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb; struct sev_es_runtime_data { struct ghcb ghcb_page; - /* Physical storage for the per-CPU IST stack of the #VC handler */ - char ist_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); - - /* - * Physical storage for the per-CPU fall-back stack of the #VC handler. - * The fall-back stack is used when it is not safe to switch back to the - * interrupted stack in the #VC entry code. - */ - char fallback_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); - /* * Reserve one page per CPU as backup storage for the unencrypted GHCB. * It is needed when an NMI happens while the #VC handler uses the real @@ -99,27 +89,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enable_key); /* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */ void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr); -static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu) -{ - struct sev_es_runtime_data *data; - struct cpu_entry_area *cea; - unsigned long vaddr; - phys_addr_t pa; - - data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu); - cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu); - - /* Map #VC IST stack */ - vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC); - pa = __pa(data->ist_stack); - cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL); - - /* Map VC fall-back stack */ - vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2); - pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack); - cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL); -} - static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long sp = regs->sp; @@ -787,7 +756,6 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { alloc_runtime_data(cpu); init_ghcb(cpu); - setup_vc_stacks(cpu); } sev_es_setup_play_dead(); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index f5e1e60c9095..82d062414f19 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu) cea_map_stack(NMI); cea_map_stack(DB); cea_map_stack(MCE); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + if (sev_es_active()) { + cea_map_stack(VC); + cea_map_stack(VC2); + } + } } #else static inline void percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu) -- 2.29.2 -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette