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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
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	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 12:17:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YefzQuqrV8kdLr9z@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220119011806.av5rtxfv4et2sfkl@amd.com>

On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 07:18:06PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> If 'fake_count'/'reported_count' is greater than the actual number of
> entries in the table, 'actual_count', then all table entries up to
> 'fake_count' will also need to pass validation. Generally the table
> will be zero'd out initially, so those additional/bogus entries will
> be interpreted as a CPUID leaves where all fields are 0. Unfortunately,
> that's still considered a valid leaf, even if it's a duplicate of the
> *actual* 0x0 leaf present earlier in the table. The current code will
> handle this fine, since it scans the table in order, and uses the
> valid 0x0 leaf earlier in the table.

I guess it would be prudent to have some warnings when enumerating those
leafs and when the count index "goes off into the weeds", so to speak,
and starts reading 0-CPUID entries. I.e., "dear guest owner, your HV is
giving you a big lie: a weird/bogus CPUID leaf count..."

:-)

And lemme make sure I understand it: the ->count itself is not
measured/encrypted because you want to be flexible here and supply
different blobs with different CPUID leafs?

> This is isn't really a special case though, it falls under the general
> category of a hypervisor inserting garbage entries that happen to pass
> validation, but don't reflect values that a guest would normally see.
> This will be detectable as part of guest owner attestation, since the
> guest code is careful to guarantee that the values seen after boot,
> once the attestation stage is reached, will be identical to the values
> seen during boot, so if this sort of manipulation of CPUID values
> occurred, the guest owner will notice this during attestation, and can
> abort the boot at that point. The Documentation patch addresses this
> in more detail.

Yap, it is important this is properly explained there so that people can
pay attention to during attestation.

> If 'fake_count' is less than 'actual_count', then the PSP skips
> validation for anything >= 'fake_count', and leaves them in the table.
> That should also be fine though, since guest code should never exceed
> 'fake_count'/'reported_count', as that's a blatant violation of the
> spec, and it doesn't make any sense for a guest to do this. This will
> effectively 'hide' entries, but those resulting missing CPUID leaves
> will be noticeable to the guest owner once attestation phase is
> reached.

Noticeable because the guest owner did supply a CPUID table with X
entries but the HV is reporting Y?

If so, you can make this part of the attestation process: guest owners
should always check the CPUID entries count to be of a certain value.

> This does all highlight the need for some very thorough guidelines
> on how a guest owner should implement their attestation checks for
> cpuid, however. I think a section in the reference implementation
> notes/document that covers this would be a good starting point. I'll
> also check with the PSP team on tightening up some of these CPUID
> page checks to rule out some of these possibilities in the future.

Now you're starting to grow the right amount of paranoia - I'm glad I
was able to sensitize you properly!

:-)))

> Nevermind, that doesn't work since snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr() is also called
> by snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr() *prior* to initializing the table, so it ends
> seeing cpuid->count==0 and fails right away. So your initial suggestion
> of checking cpuid->count==0 at the call-sites to determine if the table
> is enabled is probably the best option.
> 
> Sorry for the noise/confusion.

No worries - the end result is important!

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-19 11:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 183+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-10 15:42 [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:47   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 19:23     ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-13 19:09   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-13 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-14 17:46       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 19:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15  0:14           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 11:57             ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 14:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-15 17:49               ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 18:17                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:17                     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 20:38                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 21:22                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-03 19:10                           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:34                             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 20:46                               ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 21:17                                 ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-10 21:38                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:43                   ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 19:54                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:58               ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 17:51             ` Michael Roth
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 02/40] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:36   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 03/40] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 04/40] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:13   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 22:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 05/40] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:32   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 06/40] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 15:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 16:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 16:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 19:01   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 07/40] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:20   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 08/40] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:24   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-16 23:39     ` Mikolaj Lisik
2021-12-17 22:19       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 22:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-20 18:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:23             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 09/40] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-17 23:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 18:43       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-21 13:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 10/40] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 19:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 11/40] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-22 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-22 15:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-12-23 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 23:28   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:22     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 21:51       ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:57         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 22:42           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 13/40] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 17:56   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 20:27       ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-05 21:39         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 17:40           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 19:06             ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-06 20:16               ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:50                 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 14/40] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 15/40] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-12-29 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 22:31   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 16/40] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-01-04 22:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 17/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-05  1:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 18/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:41   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 19/40] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:50   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-12 16:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-31 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-03 18:10     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-01-12 16:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-12 17:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-13 12:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-13 12:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 21/40] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 16:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 22/40] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-04 20:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 23:36     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 18:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:21     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 20:36       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 23/40] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 18:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 24/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:47     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-13 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 18:00         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-11  8:59       ` Chao Fan
2022-01-05 23:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 19:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 25/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:33   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 26/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 27/40] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:30       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 14:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 15:08           ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:55             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 11:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 22:48   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 28/40] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 13:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-01-13 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-13 16:39     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-14 16:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18  4:35         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 14:23             ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:32               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:37                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 16:34                   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 17:20                     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 17:41                       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 18:49                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19  1:18                           ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19 11:17                             ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-01-19 16:27                               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-27 17:23                                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-28 22:58                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 30/40] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-01-17 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 31/40] x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-19 12:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 32/40] x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-20 12:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 33/40] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:52   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 17:54     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-25 13:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 34/40] x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-25 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 35/40] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-26 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-01-27 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-27 17:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 10:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-29 11:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 12:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 37/40] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 38/40] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 39/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 22:27   ` Liam Merwick
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 40/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:20   ` Brijesh Singh

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