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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:43:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YfFP6OHqBVNWKL2C@iki.fi> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220126025834.255493-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 09:58:26PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Back in 2013 Linus requested a feature to allow end-users to have the 
> ability "to add their own keys and sign modules they trust". This was
> his *second* order outlined here [1]. There have been many attempts 
> over the years to solve this problem, all have been rejected.  Many 
> of the failed attempts loaded all preboot firmware keys into the kernel,
> including the Secure Boot keys. Many distributions carry one of these 
> rejected attempts [2], [3], [4]. This series tries to solve this problem 
> with a solution that takes into account all the problems brought up in 
> the previous attempts.
> 
> On UEFI based systems, this series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring 
> containing the Machine Owner Keys (MOK) called machine. It also defines
> a new MOK variable in shim. This variable allows the end-user to decide 
> if they want to load MOK keys into the machine keyring. 
> 
> By default, nothing changes; MOK keys are not loaded into the machine
> keyring.  They are only loaded after the end-user makes the decision 
> themselves.  The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new 
> --trust-mok option [5]. This would work similar to how the kernel uses 
> MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore 
> the db. Any kernel operation that uses either the builtin or secondary 
> trusted keys as a trust source shall also reference the new machine 
> keyring as a trust source.
> 
> Secure Boot keys will never be loaded into the machine keyring.  They
> will always be loaded into the platform keyring.  If an end-user wanted 
> to load one, they would need to enroll it into the MOK.
> 
> Unlike previous versions of this patch set, IMA support has been removed
> to simplify the series. After acceptance, a follow-on series will add IMA 
> support.
> 
> Steps required by the end user:
> 
> Sign kernel module with user created key:
> $ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha512 \
>    machine_signing_key.priv machine_signing_key.x509 my_module.ko
> 
> Import the key into the MOK
> $ mokutil --import machine_signing_key.x509
> 
> Setup the kernel to load MOK keys into the .machine keyring
> $ mokutil --trust-mok
> 
> Then reboot, the MokManager will load and ask if you want to trust the
> MOK key and enroll the MOK into the MOKList.  Afterwards the signed kernel
> module will load.
> 
> I have included  a link to the mokutil [5] changes I have made to support 
> this new functionality.  The shim changes have now been accepted
> upstream [6].
> 
> Upstream shim is located here [7], the build instructions are here [8].
> TLDR:
> 
> $ git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/rhboot/shim
> $ cd shim
> $ make
> 
> After building shim, move shimx64.efi and mmx64.efi to the vendor or 
> distribution specific directory on your EFI System Partition (assuming
> you are building on x86). The instructions above are the minimal
> steps needed to build shim to test this feature. It is assumed
> Secure Boot shall not be enabled for this testing. To do testing
> with Secure Boot enabled, all steps in the build instructions [8]
> must be followed.
> 
> Instructions for building mokutil (including the new changes):
> 
> $ git clone -b mokvars-v3 https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil.git
> $ cd mokutil/
> $ ./autogen.sh
> $ make
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=136185386310140&w=2
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1479737095.2487.34.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com/
> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1556221605.24945.3.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/1e41f22b1f11784f1e943f32bf62034d4e054cdb.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> [5] https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/mokvars-v3
> [6] https://github.com/rhboot/shim/commit/4e513405b4f1641710115780d19dcec130c5208f
> [7] https://github.com/rhboot/shim
> [8] https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/BUILDING
> 
> Eric Snowberg (8):
>   integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes
>   integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
>   integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
>   KEYS: store reference to machine keyring
>   KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
>   efi/mokvar: move up init order
>   integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
>   integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is
>     true
> 
>  certs/system_keyring.c                        | 44 ++++++++++-
>  drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c           |  2 +-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 14 ++++
>  security/integrity/Kconfig                    | 13 ++++
>  security/integrity/Makefile                   |  1 +
>  security/integrity/digsig.c                   | 15 +++-
>  security/integrity/integrity.h                | 17 +++-
>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 18 ++++-
>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++
>  security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c |  4 +-
>  .../platform_certs/machine_keyring.c          | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
>  11 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
> 
> 
> base-commit: e783362eb54cd99b2cac8b3a9aeac942e6f6ac07
> -- 
> 2.18.4
> 

Thank you. I'll pick these soon. Is there any objections?

/Jarkko

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-26 13:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-26  2:58 [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] KEYS: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2022-01-26  2:58 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 11:06   ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 16:39     ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 17:24       ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11 20:34         ` Eric Snowberg
2022-04-11 21:35           ` Michal Suchánek
2022-01-26 13:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-01-26 13:58   ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-26 22:06     ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-08  9:28       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 15:26         ` MAINTAINERS update suggestion (subject change) Mimi Zohar
2022-02-20 19:00       ` [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 11:59         ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-22 12:26           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 12:32             ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:32               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 13:43             ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-23 15:33               ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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