From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C378EC4167E for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 13:16:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1348959AbiBHNQE (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 08:16:04 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38090 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1348284AbiBHNKm (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 08:10:42 -0500 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22905C03FECE; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 05:10:40 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=SLOtUPizIxEMzl9MHmssXbkKq3wV6EV1FfuM53oIxG8=; b=DBwru8G20qotyb5cEIMslVov3c TGTgULRVMePaSIfKHeCY43YdN05D97O7K37hs8fQc2ETyaYRHlaggWJ1i4R2+qPbs0tePzIB8dysR 2Ut7zGGdYP0JPztkbpWaNoCPqIWSBT3GLimeBBpK4pQwhD2i6jFANoSdCZlP7fOzLX3kXhEr83GIu NY4Ki8Y78QebuMiWK+OzrqH0ycgDEaIRYHdOLFmmB42Wn8eu4CyIIsfJ4QO7/q/EQ5tiC1eORudQz +flOWaS1aWhUwXJX+MB+tt/HP4c9lGh9kkAfLl2DEuK1gDKKG2XvNwp2/OSOXymwi2x9kQYLkFXTR W4SeP7SA==; Received: from willy by casper.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1nHQGQ-004rIV-A0; Tue, 08 Feb 2022 13:10:34 +0000 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 13:10:34 +0000 From: Matthew Wilcox To: Julian Andres Klode Cc: Masahiro Yamada , Ben Hutchings , linux-efi , Linux Kbuild mailing list , efi@lists.einval.com, Linux Kernel Mailing List , David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Woodhouse , debian-kernel Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key Message-ID: References: <20211218031122.4117631-1-willy@infradead.org> <20220208110122.2z4cmbqexmnxuxld@jak-t480s> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220208110122.2z4cmbqexmnxuxld@jak-t480s> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 12:01:22PM +0100, Julian Andres Klode wrote: > It's worth pointing out that in Ubuntu, the generated MOK key > is for module signing only (extended key usage 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2), > kernels signed with it will NOT be bootable. Why should these be separate keys? There's no meaningful security boundary between a kernel module and the ernel itself; a kernel modulecan, for example, write to CR3, and that's game over for any pretence at separation.