On Fri, Feb 25, 2022 at 02:19:39PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 25.02.2022 13:28, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > On 25/02/2022 08:44, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 24.02.2022 20:48, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >>> In VMX operation, the handling of INIT IPIs is changed. EXIT_REASON_INIT has > >>> nothing to do with the guest in question, simply signals that an INIT was > >>> received. > >>> > >>> Ignoring the INIT is probably the wrong thing to do, but is helpful for > >>> debugging. Crashing the domain which happens to be in context is definitely > >>> wrong. Print an error message and continue. > >>> > >>> Discovered as collateral damage from when an AP triple faults on S3 resume on > >>> Intel TigerLake platforms. > >> I'm afraid I don't follow the scenario, which was (only) outlined in > >> patch 1: Why would the BSP receive INIT in this case? > > > > SHUTDOWN is a signal emitted by a core when it can't continue.  Triple > > fault is one cause, but other sources include a double #MC, etc. > > > > Some external component, in the PCH I expect, needs to turn this into a > > platform reset, because one malfunctioning core can't.  It is why a > > triple fault on any logical processor brings the whole system down. > > I'm afraid this doesn't answer my question. Clearly the system didn't > shut down. Hence I still don't see why the BSP would see INIT in the > first place. > > >> And it also cannot be that the INIT was received by the vCPU while running on > >> another CPU: > > > > It's nothing (really) to do with the vCPU.  INIT is a external signal to > > the (real) APIC, just like NMI/etc. > > > > It is the next VMEntry on a CPU which received INIT that suffers a > > VMEntry failure, and the VMEntry failure has nothing to do with the > > contents of the VMCS. > > > > Importantly for Xen however, this isn't applicable for scheduling PV > > vCPUs, which is why dom0 wasn't the one that crashed.  This actually > > meant that dom0 was alive an usable, albeit it sharing all vCPUs on a > > single CPU. > > > > > > The change in INIT behaviour exists for TXT, where is it critical that > > software can clear secrets from RAM before resetting.  I'm not wanting > > to get into any of that because it's far more complicated than I have > > time to fix. > > I guess there's something hidden behind what you say here, like INIT > only being latched, but this latched state then causing the VM entry > failure. Which would mean that really the INIT was a signal for the > system to shut down / shutting down. In which case arranging to > continue by ignoring the event in VMX looks wrong. Simply crashing > the guest would then be wrong as well, of course. We should shut > down instead. A shutdown could be an alternative here, with remark that it would make debugging such issues significantly harder. Note the INIT is delivered to BSP, but the actual reason (in this case) is on some AP. Shutdown (crash) in this case would prevent (still functioning) BSP to show you the message (unless you have serial console, which is rather rare in laptops - which are significant target for Qubes OS). > But I don't think I see the full picture here yet, unless your > mentioning of TXT was actually implying that TXT was active at the > point of the crash (which I don't think was said anywhere). No, TXT wasn't (intentionally) active. I think Andrew mentioned it as explanation why VMX behaves this way: to let the OS do something _if_ TXT is active (the check for TXT is the OS responsibility here). But that's my guess only... -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab