From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF103C433F5 for ; Thu, 24 Mar 2022 19:53:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235566AbiCXTzL (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Mar 2022 15:55:11 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56820 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235510AbiCXTzK (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Mar 2022 15:55:10 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 357B44ECF1; Thu, 24 Mar 2022 12:53:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D0EA460A73; Thu, 24 Mar 2022 19:53:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 165B6C340EC; Thu, 24 Mar 2022 19:53:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1648151617; bh=D75ud677m4ZIqiTRL5Pi0culPxhWBX4MDdbcWmJ4Pgg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=aI8QOAeEBJQ2V2pBj7SfIWPZUdZ8AP7+sWFiaDK/bH4sLE0US1azgNwG3FghT6fjR H2IVtJh3EB8tK5kGMKOr3dEn4WHmf0P7MZmmNbp8+5XJLp8tzwrx5Fhxs9Aquo3czC 1NyXTlM/bvXN+ohC4+7nFF6g6cNijIxErwAsgJF7xafLUICmze3qhOxMlqRzWpRLwq i1CRZUvuviw40RxaRejxz5w3U6JgYRAkZvzwEm7PGnX5xHI5lu8gFgPxonYTegqTbR LxDFwlWwGnAlKA8M3r91QpQ20o0vbjMb5M5XOW28POLKMqa0g/N0JRpozE5nsB+sDH a8fIY0jtqb6dg== Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 19:53:35 +0000 From: Eric Biggers To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Guenter Roeck , Dominik Brodowski , Theodore Ts'o , Jann Horn Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: allow writes to /dev/urandom to influence fast init Message-ID: References: <20220322191436.110963-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220322191436.110963-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 01:14:36PM -0600, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > For as far back as I can tell, writing to /dev/urandom or /dev/random > will put entropy into the pool, but won't immediately use it, and won't > credit it either. Did you check kernels v4.7 and earlier? It looks like this actually changed in v4.8 when the ChaCha20 CRNG was introduced. v4.7 would mix the data written to /dev/{u,}random into {non,}blocking_pool, which would immediately be reflected in reads from /dev/{u,}random, sys_getrandom(), and get_random_bytes(). Writes to /dev/{u,}random didn't affect the input_pool, which was separate. Was the change in behavior in v4.8 a regression? - Eric