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[24.61.119.116]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id u14-20020a05620a0c4e00b006bb568016easm15020938qki.116.2022.08.24.05.57.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 05:57:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 08:57:07 -0400 From: Brian Foster To: David Hildenbrand Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Jason Gunthorpe , Gerald Schaefer Subject: Re: [RFC] s390: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1529! Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 02:07:16PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 24.08.22 14:03, Brian Foster wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > When running a fuzzer workload to test an unrelated patch[1], I've been > > reproducing the VM_BUG_ON() splat below[2] on s390x. I've narrowed the > > problem down to a deterministic reproducer. The code for that is also > > appended below[3]. > > > > The splat occurs because during fork() we end up down in > > copy_present_pte() -> page_try_dup_anon_rmap() -> > > page_needs_cow_for_dma() for a !is_cow mapping, so copy_page_range() > > didn't acquire the ->write_protect_seq seqlock as expected. After > > digging into this a bit, I _think_ this boils down to a bug in the s390 > > arch fault code dealing with a write fault to a !VM_WRITE mapping.. > > > > The sequence of events implemented by the reproducer that leads to this: > > > > 1. Create a shmem segment and attach it SHM_RDONLY. This causes > > do_mmap() to set up a !VM_WRITE mapping, but also clear > > (VM_MAYWRITE|VM_SHARED) on the mapping because the backing shmem file is > > read-only. > > > > 2. Take a write fault on the mapping in kernel mode (via getrlimit() in > > this case). The write fault ultimately causes getrlimit() to fail with a > > bad access error, but not before the generic fault code creates an > > anon_vma mapping for the page. > > > > This occurs because first do_dat_exception() calls handle_mm_fault() > > with FAULT_FLAG_WRITE via the following logic: > > > > access = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS; > > ... > > if (access == VM_WRITE || is_write) > > flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; > > ... > > if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access))) > > goto out_up; > > ... > > fault = handle_mm_fault(...); > > > > So the FAULT_FLAG_WRITE fault proceeds because is_write is true and > > ->vm_flags has read or exec permission (but not VM_WRITE). This > > eventually gets down into do_cow_fault() -> finish_fault() -> > > do_set_pte(), the latter of which calls page_add_new_anon_rmap() because > > this is a write fault to a !shared mapping. > > > > Note this is immediately followed by a do_protection_exception() that > > uses access = VM_WRITE and thus fails the above check and returns with > > VM_FAULT_BADACCESS. So I think this ultimately DTRT wrt to failing the > > syscall to userspace, but the do_dat_exception() handling sets up an > > unexpected situation for fork().. > > > > 3. fork() -> dup_mm() comes across this mapping with ->anon_vma set (so > > vma_needs_copy() returns true), but is_cow_mapping() returns false > > because VM_MAYWRITE is cleared. From there we fall down into the page > > table copying path described by the BUG splat. > > > > This problem doesn't occur on x86 seemingly because we don't call into > > handle_mm_fault() for a write fault to a !VM_WRITE mapping, which is > > specifically checked in access_error(). Therefore, something like the > > patch below[4] seems to prevent the problem on s390. However, the access > > checking logic looks wonky enough to me that I wonder whether it > > warrants a closer look from s390 experts. For example, does this code > > need to care about any flags/context beyond write or read faults vs. > > write or !write mappings? I don't have enough context to reason about > > it. Could somebody more familiar with these two s390 exception variants > > chime in? > > > > Finally, note that so far I've only really tested the patch against the > > reproducer. I'm happy to try and form it into a proper patch and test > > further after some feedback... thanks. > > > > Brian > > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-s390/20220816155407.537372-1-bfoster@redhat.com > > [2] BUG splat: > > > > kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1529! > > monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] SMP > > Modules linked in: rfkill sunrpc ghash_s390 prng xts aes_s390 des_s390 libdes sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 vfio_ccw sha512_s390 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio xfs libcrc32c virtio_blk virtio_net net_failover failover dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod pkey zcrypt > > CPU: 1 PID: 1401 Comm: shmem-fork-test Not tainted 6.0.0-rc2+ #20 > > Hardware name: IBM 8561 LT1 400 (KVM/Linux) > > Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 0000000014928240 (copy_pte_range+0xa40/0xe58) > > R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 > > Krnl GPRS: 000003ff85b80000 000000000000000c 0000000000000000 000003ff85b80000 > > 0000000091c5f31f 0000000087d70640 000000008160e800 00000372024717c0 > > 000003ff85b80000 0000000000000000 00000000831c9c00 0000000091c5f31f > > 00000000823ada00 0000000087d70640 00000000149279c2 0000038000773880 > > Krnl Code: 0000000014928232: c0e5fffff48f brasl %r14,0000000014926b50 > > 0000000014928238: a7f4fd43 brc 15,0000000014927cbe > > #000000001492823c: af000000 mc 0,0 > > >0000000014928240: b904005b lgr %r5,%r11 > > 0000000014928244: a7f4ffde brc 15,0000000014928200 > > 0000000014928248: e310f0e80004 lg %r1,232(%r15) > > 000000001492824e: a7f4ff17 brc 15,000000001492807c > > 0000000014928252: ec3800091c7c cgij %r3,28,8,0000000014928264 > > Call Trace: > > [<0000000014928240>] copy_pte_range+0xa40/0xe58 > > ([<00000000149279c2>] copy_pte_range+0x1c2/0xe58) > > [<000000001492e258>] copy_page_range+0x510/0x770 > > [<00000000146f3896>] dup_mmap+0x47e/0x6c0 > > [<00000000146f3b52>] dup_mm+0x7a/0x278 > > [<00000000146f5a48>] copy_process+0x1298/0x1a48 > > [<00000000146f62fe>] kernel_clone+0x5e/0x3c0 > > [<00000000146f6742>] __do_sys_clone+0x5a/0x68 > > [<00000000146f67e0>] __s390x_sys_clone+0x40/0x50 > > [<0000000014f68dac>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200 > > [<0000000014f78c22>] system_call+0x82/0xb0 > > Last Breaking-Event-Address: > > [<0000000014927a46>] copy_pte_range+0x246/0xe58 > > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops > > > > [3] minimal reproducer: > > > > #include > > #include > > #include > > > > int main() > > { > > int id; > > void *p; > > > > id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 4096, IPC_CREAT); > > p = shmat(id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY); > > getrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, p); > > fork(); > > return 0; > > } > > > > [4] RFC patch: > > > > diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c > > index 13449941516c..c12722da1558 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c > > +++ b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c > > @@ -418,6 +418,8 @@ static inline vm_fault_t do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access) > > fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS; > > if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access))) > > goto out_up; > > + if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) > > + goto out_up; > > > > if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) > > address &= HPAGE_MASK; > > > > Heh, we might have identified this independently just recently: > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220816113359.33843f54@thinkpad/T/#u > > Can you take a look if that proposed small change also fixes the issue? > Yup, this looks like the same issue. The patch in that thread just "upgrades" the access mode as opposed to adding the explicit flag check. Either way seems reasonable to me. I just confirmed that change fixes the problem with the above reproducer as well. Thanks! Brian > > -- > Thanks, > > David / dhildenb >